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I N T R O D U C T I O N S
He has gone through a tremendous transformation, from a little water creature living 
in a realm of amniotic fluid, then coming out, becoming an air-breathing mammal that 
ultimately will be self-standing. It’s an enormous transformation; it is a heroic act, also 
on the mother’s part for bringing it about.
 
 — Joseph Campbell  —
All life starts and ends in a fuzz. The human embryo is a vague assemblage that, if all goes 
right, grows into a more or less discrete body, which at some point dies, dissolving into soil, 
water and air. On another scale, astrobiology traces the origins of terrestrial organic life all the 
way back to a pre-biotic soup in and from which it was ostensibly created, predicting that ap-
proximately 2.8 billion of years from now, all life on earth will have perished due the increase 
of the sun’s luminosity (O’Malley-James et. al). Science explores the evolutionary adventures of 
organisms, space ship Earth, and even the universe itself, adventures in which order emerges 
from and inevitably returns to chaos (Prigogyne and Stengers; Kauffman, The Origins). Natural-
ly, what goes for the universe also goes for the realm of words and thoughts, which assemble, 
combine, proliferate, transform and disappear. For example, the term “introduction” has found 
a specific niche in the discourse of biology, where it refers to the reallocation by humans of a 
species into an environment foreign to that species. The term “migration” has followed a dif-
ferent trajectory: first used to describe the cross-territorial movements of animals, this term 
was then applied to the journeys of insects, plants1, trees, cells, genes, and even planets, while 
in every-day social discourse it usually applies to human beings. I present these particular ety-
mologies because they convey something essential about life: each migration means a new 
beginning and each introduction must come from somewhere. In other words, there is no such 
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thing as a pure species, a natural habitat, or an original meaning. From the start, life means 
moving to another world, a world that will not leave any body unmarked. 
This thesis aims to contribute to science studies2, as well as to the allied fields of literature 
and science3 and science fiction studies, by examining strange events of the above-mentioned 
kind: introductions into foreign environments as a result of which species transform. The spec-
ulative element is that human beings are as much the “objects” as the “subjects” of these in-
troductions. Not only are humans themselves experimentally introduced into new (fictional) 
worlds, but human bodies are also reconceptualized as habitats for microorganisms, reminding 
us that our bodies contain “a greater number of bacterial than human cells” (Margulis, “Preju-
dice” 37). Analogous to these evolutionary adventures, this thesis introduces different species 
of text–literary, scientific and philosophical–into one-another. Thus literature becomes a stage 
on which the dramas of science and philosophy are performed; philosophical concepts are en-
riched by adding literary and scientific ingredients; and science is revitalized by the philosophical 
conceptualization and literary “imagineering” of futures (Rossini, “Figurations”). Such epistemo-
logical encounters in foreign territory, often leading to symbiotic relations and triggering un-
expected changes in each species, can be theorized as components of what philosophers Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari4 call “nomadic thought” (A Thousand 320). But before moving into 
philosophy, I will first sketch the theme of this thesis in broad strokes on the basis of examples 
from contemporary science fiction (sf) and bioscience.
In many sf narratives, humans migrate to (or find themselves introduced into) strange 
worlds, and in some cases, such journeys trigger transformations in human beings. In Kim 
Stanley Robinson’s critically-acclaimed Mars trilogy,5 for example, a group of one-hundred sci-
entists establishes a new society on Mars, using drugs and gene therapy to enhance them-
selves in order to cope with the harsh Martian circumstances, and simultaneously using bio-
technology to alter the planet’s atmosphere so that it becomes breathable. At the beginning 
of Green Mars (1994), the second installment of the trilogy, an unidentified narrator sheds a 
different light on the ideology of “terraforming” Mars–turning it into a second Terra (earth):
Of course all the genetic templates for our new biota are Terran; the minds designing 
them are Terran; but the terrain is Martian. And terrain is a powerful genetic engineer, 
determining what flourishes and what doesn’t, pushing along progressive differentiation, 
and thus the evolution of new species. And as the generations pass, all the members of 
a biosphere evolve together, adapting to their terrain in a complex communal response, 
a creative self-designing ability. This process, no matter how much we intervene in it, is 
essentially out of our control. Genes mutate, creatures evolve: a new biosphere emerges, 
and with it a new noosphere.6 And eventually the designers’ minds, along with everything 
else, have been forever changed. (Green 13)
 
This passage decenters the idea of the genome as the cradle of life itself, as well as the accom-
panying assumption that humans can modify life at will. In the course of the mission, increas-
ing numbers of scientists become convinced that Mars isn’t a passive, dead world waiting to 
be animated and colonized by humans, but a world onto itself that will affect its inhabitants in 
unpredictable ways. Their view is vindicated when the project of terraformation, partly due to 
political rivalry, spins out of control: transformations in the atmosphere, soil and ecosystems 
are no longer guided by scientists. The advent of a new world and a new people becomes even 
more apparent when second and third generation humans on Mars turn out to be physiologi-
cally adapted to Martian gravity from birth–taller, more slender, and more able to navigate the 
Martian landscape.
Rather than being mere fiction, the idea of permanent human settlement on Mars is a plan 
that has been scientifically developed by NASA and may become reality soon.7 Regardless of 
whether such a project will actually take place, what makes Robinson’s scenario significant 
is that it teaches us a great deal about the science and politics of the planetary dynamics of 
atmosphere, soil, weather systems, ecosystems, and so on. As contemporary history demon-
strates, humans do not need to travel in space to arrive at new worlds: in a relatively short 
amount of time they have transformed the earth itself in dramatic ways, so that we now live 
in the world-historical era of the “anthroposcene” (Crutzen).8 Historians like Rosalind Williams 
and David Nye have documented the construction of industrial habitats in the US, into which 
people from across the globe have been “introduced”–habitats that look, sound, smell, and feel 
different than previous (but relatively recent) environments. Moreover, not only have humans 
radically altered their habitats, they have also changed their behaviors and bodies through 
new forms of medicine, food, cosmetics, media, transport and household appliances. In a way, 
we are still catching up with these transformations. For example, new technologies require 
adapted cognitive and sensorimotor skills, and modern diets are out of sync with our genomes, 
thus challenging our digestive systems (Zwart, “Biotechnology”). All of this shows that the an-
throposcene does not refer to an era controlled by human beings. It would be more accurate 
to say that, at least since the Industrial Revolution, planetary dynamics such as climate and 
the survival and extinction of species have dramatically changed as a result of a feedback loop 
between human-induced changes and nonhuman processes, and consequently, that “human 
artifacts, such as machines, pollution, and even works of art are no longer seen as separate 
from the feedback processes of nature” (Margulis, “Gaia” 184).
The unorthodox statement from the narrator in Green Mars–“terrain is a powerful genetic 
engineer”–radicalizes a currently emerging insight that genomes are “reactive” (Gilbert; Stotz, 
Bostanci and Griffiths) rather than self-directing. As Paul Griffiths and Karola phrase it, “the 
factors that interactively regulate genomic expression are far from mere background condi-
tion or supportive environment; rather they are on par with genetic information since they 
co-specify the linear sequence of the gene product together with the target DNA sequence” 
(“Experimental” 12). This insight brings into view environmental factors as active elements in 
the generation of life, rather than mere results, influences, or perturbations, thus replacing the 
linear model of “genotype determines phenotype” for a multifactorial topology or complex sys-
tems model. In complexity theory, the units of development and evolution are not just genes, 
organisms or populations, but all of these at once. More significantly, what evolves are assem-
blages of systems that coincide with particular bodies. For example, in spatial terms, the devel-
opment of an ant is constituted by internal systems (neuronal, vascular, digestive, etc.) and ex-
ternal systems (the colony, an ecosystem, climate, and so on). This inside-outside spectrum is 
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unstable, forever changing: the outside is incorporated (for example through consumption and 
learning) while the inside is extended or externalized (through building and communication). 
Temporally, systemic developments are emergent, non-linear and thus unpredictable, not only 
because they depend on a vast and unknown accumulated history, but because they tap from 
a virtual potential. In living systems, periodic behaviors (life cycles, migration patterns) and 
gradual behaviors (growth, learning) are punctuated with bifurcation points at which systems 
make phase transitions (puberty, metamorphosis, death). Informed by a legion of scientific 
insights, Deleuze and Guattari argue that bifurcation events, rather than being consequences 
of set laws, are like dice throws:
[N]o one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string together 
or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another given 
multiplicity, or even if given heterogeneous elements will enter symbiosis, will form a 
consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to transformation. (A Thousand 276)
While complexity theory was first conceived within the context of living organisms, theorists 
have shown that it conceptualizes many mechanism-independent processes, meaning that such 
processes occur in all known systems (Delanda, Intensive; Goodwin, How the Leopard; Kauffman The 
Origins). Complexity theory is a theoretical model that explains how order emerges out of chaos. 
 A particularly clear argument about the nature and significance of nonlinear topology 
comes from the biologist and complex systems theorist Brian Goodwin. I will cite him at length, 
for his statement summarizes the point of departure for this thesis:
The introduction of a new species into an ecosystem or a new gene into the genome of an 
organism will in general have unpredictable consequences. Ecological management and 
biotechnology are intrinsically unpredictable interventions into natural systems. Another 
way of putting this is that nature is, in general, unpredictably creative. Those aspects of 
the natural world that have turned out to be largely predictable and controllable, which 
constitute the basis of our major technologies (lights, computers, cars, TV, hydroelectric 
generators, etc.), belong largely to the linear realm of cause-effect relationships and occupy 
a very small fraction of natural processes. Most nature is non-linear and complex, and hence 
unpredictable in its response to disturbance. We see this in the climactic consequences of 
global warming that we are now being forced to recognize, in the increasing incidence 
of epidemics of new as well as old pathogens, and in the dramatic extinction of species 
that we have unwittingly unleashed through habitat destruction and irresponsible farming 
practices … If we cannot predict, manipulate, and control complex systems, which 
include organisms, ecosystems (agricultural and natural), communities, organizations, and 
economies, what is the appropriate form of behavior in our relationship with them? Science 
itself has taken us to a new frontier of understanding, but it is not clear what form of praxis 
comes with it. We have lost the innocence of believing we can always fix things with new 
technology, but the alternative way of being in the world is only slowly emerging into 
general consciousness. (“Developmental” 342)
What Goodman conveys here is that science and technology should not be thought of as straight-
forward tools for human progress, but as radical reconfigurations of what it means to be human 
(Lemmens; Verbeek 27). The Industrial-instrumental mode of existence is running out of steam. 
As the philosopher of science Hub Zwart argues, instead of approaching transformations such 
as climate with the modern strategy of “containment,” humans need to adapt themselves and 
their environments to turbulent developments (Zwart, Denkstijlen 218, 228-9). From my pur-
view, Goodwin’s prospects of another science and an “alternative way of being in the world,” in 
which human beings are not masters of the world but participants in its unfolding, are neither idle 
theorizing nor utopian fantasy, but matters of societal, epistemological and ecological urgency. 
 Each in their own way, Robinson’s sf and Goodman’s vanguard science bring to the fore the 
reality and significance of evolutionary existence, understood as symbiotic embodiment, eco-
logical embeddedness, and susceptibility to transformation. These thinkers confront Western 
thought and culture with the pre-modern belief that everything is connected, a belief has never 
really disappeared, argues Bruno Latour in We Have Never Been Modern (1993). Darwin’s descrip-
tions of the overwhelming diversity of biological forms encountered on his journeys can be seen 
as just such a confrontation. In The Origin of Species he criticizes the “ignorance” of biologists de-
nying “the mutual relations of all the beings which live around us,” relations that determine “the 
future success and modification of every inhabitant of this world” (68-9). The challenge pre-
sented by Darwin and Goodwin is not to “return” to some hypothetical moment of unity, but to 
reinvent a world of immanent connections and readapt the tools of thought that have too of-
ten obscured this world. Darwin’s speculative treatise on the mutability of species, targeted at 
a general audience, can be seen as a first draft of what biologist Lynn Margulis and her son the 
philosopher Dorion Sagan call “the greatest tale ever to be told,” a tale that they argue needs to 
be written in a popular style because “it is everybody’s story” (Acquiring xvi).9 Crucially, in Margu-
lis and Sagan’s work, evolution is not a linear story told from the vantage point of humanity, but 
a hodgepodge of actors and dramatic events. Margulis and Sagan argue that in popular science, 
and evolutionary biology in particular, it is possible to envision “the whole” (Acquiring 126). In this 
encompassing story, life is not purely biological. Evolution is not a biological theater piece per-
formed on the stage of the inorganic world, a piece now partially directed by humans through 
science and technology. The “narrative” of evolution partakes of all the strata of life (physical, 
biological, social and technological), their mixtures (such as biotechnology), and all of the sys-
tems that pervade the strata (climate, economics, psychology, and so on). It follows that science 
studies cannot maintain the illusion of surveying the emergence of an evolutionary paradigm 
from a safe distance: it must actively participate in the story of evolution, which, according to 
Andrew Pickering, ultimately means forging “an evolutionary theory of indefinite scope (The 
Mangle 247). Needless to say, this daunting task is long-term, collective, and interdisciplinary. 
transMutation and noMadic thought
In the image of life presented by Goodwin and Margulis, human beings coevolve with their 
planetary others without ever controlling this process. If this vision of life as a complex becom-
ing is relatively rare, it is hardly new, as evidenced by Heraclitus’s aphorism everything flows 
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(“panta rhei”). As Michel Serres has argued, what needs to be emphasized is the temporal non-
linearity of life, its turbulence:
How can we not feel that time percolates rather than flows? Far from flowing in laminar 
and continuous lines, like a well-behaved river under a bridge, upstream to downstream, 
time descends, turns back on itself, stops, starts, bifurcates ten times, divides, and blends, 
caught up in whirlpools and countercurrents, hesitant, aleatory, uncertain and fluctuating, 
multiplied into a thousand beds like the Yukon River. (15) 
On the one hand, some form of awareness of immanent transformation is clearly present in 
contemporary biology. Heraclitus’s famous statement “one never steps into the same river 
twice” is complemented by modern biology’s insight that one never steps into the same river twice 
as the same person: cells are renewed all the time, forming a similar but slightly different body. 
But what about the radical transmutations occurring in embryos and species? Remarkably, 
those biological fields that most explicitly see life as a transformative process–evolutionary 
biology, developmental biology, and embryology–have since the 1950s become subservient to 
a “molecular paradigm”10 (Neumann-Held and Christoph Rehmann-Sutter), and to genetics in 
particular (Kay; Fox Keller, The Century). Within the parameters set by molecular biology, the 
concept of evolution has been reframed as a genetic reproduction of sameness with minor 
(usually malign) mutations that are selected over vast areas of time (i.e. redundancies and 
copy-errors). Why did this happen? Furthermore, why are most debates on the technological 
capacity to transform life fraught with tension?
One possible explanation lies in history, and specifically the history of eugenics, a politi-
cal ideology that promotes the enhancement and reproduction of particular “human races.” 
After WW II, when eugenics was publically rejected as a doctrine and a scientific idea, literary 
texts about dubious experiments with human bodies have consistently reminded society of 
eugenic practices under the Hitler and Stalin regimes and elsewhere. These warnings against 
the power of states to tinker with human bodies, violating their integrity and dignity, fre-
quently return in contemporary debates about biology and biotechnology, for example about 
embryo selection (Huxley’s Brave New World) or the prospect of biopolitical surveillance on the 
basis of genetic identity (Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four; Atwood’s Oryx and Crake). But the spec-
ter of eugenics is not a sufficient explanation: anxieties also pertain to the genetic modifica-
tion of other organisms, for example those that end up in foodstuffs (leading popular media 
to speak of “Frankenstein food”). Moreover, fears surrounding the biosciences exceed human 
intervention altogether. The widespread and virulent resistance against the concept of evolu-
tion in Darwin’s time indicates that anxieties concern the very possibility of transformation as such. 
While Darwin’s ideas have come to be accepted, new challenges have emerged. For example, 
neo-Darwinists like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have been unwilling to accept the 
burgeoning idea, perhaps advanced most forcefully by Margulis, that the slow accumulation of 
random mutations selected by nature is complemented by evolutionary jumps in which new 
species emerge. The tendency to deny the real possibility of transformation must somehow be 
more structural.
An explanation can be found on the basis psychoanalytical approaches to science studies 
such as the one pursued by Zwart, who aims “to address epistemological rather than historical 
issues” (Understanding 12). Following the footsteps of Gaston Bachelard, Zwart holds that each 
science has its archetype: a fundamental fantasy that remains hidden but all the while co-de-
termines the field (Zwart De Waarheid). For example, in chemistry, students may be fascinated 
by the idea of an explosion, yet in their pursuit of becoming real scientists, they are forced to 
lay this fundamental fascination to rest (47). Could it be that transmutation has the status of a 
biological archetype? I would argue that this is the case, but that it also constitutes a blind spot 
of Western thought as such, and can be linked, in one way or another, to all epistemological 
archetypes.11 Following Deleuze, I attribute the neglect of biological transmutation to a general 
inability to think “becoming” (Difference). In Difference and Repetition (1968), Deleuze demon-
strates that Western thought has systematically reduced difference to a negated or compara-
tive difference (being different from), thus denying the full positivity of difference-in-itself, or 
becoming-different. As Elizabeth Grosz explains, instead of defining something by what it is 
not, Deleuze searches for a real “that lacks nothing, that is fully positive, that functions as a 
whole, as well as for a real that changes, that generates the new, that continues becoming, 
even as it undoes earlier becomings” (Becoming 54). A central epistemological habit associ-
ated with the neglect of difference as such is the division of the world in human subjects and 
nonhuman objects. Epitomized by the works of Descartes and Kant, Western thought continually 
reproduces the “I” as a ground, thus marking a fundamental difference between human beings and 
others that will determine the way all other differences are perceived. For Deleuze, the challenge 
of thought is to go beyond this habit in order to intuit the world of inhuman becomings, because 
this is where the conditions of life, including human perception and thinking, are generated.12 
 In Deleuze’s work, modes of thought that envision the world as becoming are termed “no-
madism.” This term can perhaps be best read as a principle for thought, not in the sense of 
a constraining dogma but, quite the contrary, as a style of thinking that time and again en-
courages one to think otherwise, to cross into unknown territories. Nomadism has nothing to 
do with Enlightenment ideals of freedom and self-fulfillment: it means being continually at 
war with present conditions, including oneself. James Williams argues that in Deleuze’s work 
there are actually two principles that vie for dominance: “connect with everything” and “forget 
everything” (4-5). These are strategies which, however much they contradict, must cooperate in 
a struggle to cope with changes in the world, forcing one to establish new connections while 
leaving the past behind. A major trait of nomadism is to escape habits of thought (opinion 
or doxa) such as the binaries of subject and object, human and nonhuman, by affirming the 
relations and becomings that simultaneously condition and transform them. The challenge 
of nomadism, I would argue, is not to somehow “get rid of” the notion of a human subject, 
but to question its centrality by rethinking life through the prism of nonhuman forces, and by 
actively changing what it is to be human through thought-experiments. In Deleuze’s work, 
humanity is defined not by what it ostensibly is, but what it is capable of becoming (Bruun 
Jensen and Rödje 1; Colebrook, Deleuze 127). This capability is not some internal essence; rather, 
it develops in a web of relations connecting inside and outside, drawing and simultaneous-
ly blurring boundaries. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari describe these dynamic 
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relations as “territorialization” and “deterritorilization,” a becoming striated (ordered) and a 
becoming smooth (fluid) of the world (59-82).
The nomadic desire for difference is detected by Deleuze in all three modes that he singles 
out for thought: philosophy, art, and science. It seems important to concisely discuss Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conceptualization of all three domains in What is Philosophy, since their singulari-
ties, oppositions and interactions are central to this thesis. The differences between the modes 
of thought hinge on a different relation to the virtual (the realm of pure potentiality or becoming) 
and the actual (individuated bodies and states of affairs). According to Deleuze and Guattari, phi-
losophy attains a consistency that science never does; it consistently intuits becoming–time as a 
heterogeneous and continuous event. Deleuze and Guattari describe their difference as follows: 
It could be said that science and philosophy take opposed paths, because philosophical 
concepts have events for consistency whereas scientific functions have states of affairs or 
mixtures for reference: through concepts, philosophy continually extracts a consistent event 
from the state of affairs–a smile without a cat, as it were–whereas through functions, science 
continually actualizes the event in a state of affairs, thing, or body that can be referred to. (126) 
An event, for Deleuze and Guattari, cannot be quantitatively measured or otherwise referred 
to in a scientific way. Philosophy’s “smile without a cat” is an ideal event, an event “extracted” 
from a particular state of affairs. It presupposes an understanding of time not as a region be-
tween two points, but as a “meanwhile” (158), a time that never begins or ends, always becom-
ing in the middle. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, there is something essential about art that places it close to 
philosophy: art also moves in the direction of the virtual, away from the world of subjects and 
objects, but this time by creating affects and percepts: “affects are nonhuman becomings of 
man, just as percepts … are nonhuman landscapes of nature” (169). Affects and percepts are 
“blocs of sensation” that are no longer dependent on the feelings and perceptions of makers or 
observers because they have become preserved in the art work as “monuments” (167). Deleuze 
and Guattari propose that rather than being created through memory or fantasy, all art is 
“fabulation” (168).13 Fabulation is what allows the artist to escape the realm of human feelings 
and perceptions (doxa), a dangerous act: 
He has seen something that is too great, too unbearable also, and the mutual embrace of 
life with what threatens it, so that the corner of nature or districts of the town that he sees, 
along with their characters, accede to a vision that, through them, composes the percepts 
of that life, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of 
simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light, of purple or blue, which have no other object or 
subject than themselves. (171)
While the artist escapes doxa by his own strength, there is also a sense in which he is absorbed 
into an adventure involuntarily. The artist perceives and feels differently, intensely, and loses 
himself in sensations, with the benefit of creating art, but with the risk of going mad and creat-
ing nothing at all. If it is true that all art is “timeless,” as is sometimes said, this is because even 
the most ephemeral art gives form to becoming: “So long as the material lasts, the sensation 
enjoys an eternity in those very moments” (166).
Science’s maintains an entirely different, and in some sense inverted relationship to the vir-
tual or becoming. Science perceives the virtual as pure chaos that cannot be given form with-
out actualizing it. Its task is to extract pieces of chaos and actualize them in functions, proposi-
tions that relate to bodies and states of affairs (155-6). Compared to art and philosophy, science 
moves in the opposite direction: science is a “fantastic slowing down” or “freeze-frame” (118): a 
movement from the infinite speed of becoming to actual bodies and states of affairs. However, 
as Deleuze and Guattari warn, science “is inspired less by the concern for unification in an ordered 
actual system than by a desire not to distance itself too much from chaos, to seek out potentials 
in order to seize and carry off a part of that which haunts it, the secret of the chaos behind it, 
the pressure of the virtual” (156). It is this tension within science–the necessity of getting a good 
piece of chaos, and the need to return safely from the frontlines in order to actualize it–that is 
central to this thesis. As Isabelle Stengers has argued, a pitfall for science is proceeding towards 
the actual too quickly, thus producing facts, solutions and answers that are simplistic and in-
adequate (“Another Science”). The challenge of nomad science is to slow down the slowing down, 
to stay with the chaos long enough. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this can be achieved, 
for example, by inventing “strange attractors,” functions that refer to chaotic behaviors of sys-
tems (What is Philosophy 206), thus avoiding deterministic models of the “program” type (209). 
 Science’s line of actualization or effectuation intersects with art and philosophy’s lines of 
countereffectuation (159). These intersections pose two dangers, “either leading us back to the 
opinion from which we wanted to escape or precipitating us into the chaos that we wanted 
to confront” (199). But as Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre itself demonstrates, the advantages of 
these interminglings are evident, preventing each mode of thought from becoming wrapped 
up in itself. Deleuze and Guattari stress that they have never tried to do the work of artists or 
scientists (161), but they often make use of art and science, because each function and each 
sensation also has its concept (217). Bruun Jensen and Rödje characterize Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s relationship to science as friendship:
Rather than taking science apart, in order to expose underlying social powers and structures, 
Deleuze and Guattari look at the results of science and attempt to understand their actual 
and virtual capacities. They treat science as a distant and somewhat foreign friend whose 
tools and problems are different from their own, but who, precisely for that reason, can 
teach important lessons. (10)
These encounters with art and science have a great impact on the way Deleuze and Guattari 
do philosophy. For example, their allusion to the artist’s nonhuman adventure cited above, the 
artist who “has seen something that is too great,” is itself a kind of fabulation, a becoming-art. 
Following Deleuze and Guattari, although this thesis positions itself precisely at the inter-
sections of modes of thought, it is mostly invested in analyzing the underdeveloped term “no-
mad science,” specifically in relation to the biosciences, as well as experimenting with such a 
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mode within science studies. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop the concept 
of nomad science as a counterpoint to “State science” (which I reconfigure as “control science” 
in chapter 2 in order to make it more broadly applicable, for instance to “big” corporate science). 
Coterminous with the rise of the nation-state, State science is the dominant scientific mode 
intent on making things manageable, palpable, and predictable. In the folds and crevices of 
the state system, however, individual scientists may diverge from this standard model, moving 
with a certain degree of freedom between ideas, practices, disciplines, and institutions. Nomad 
is not the same as controversial, marginal, or pseudoscience (such as alchemy, phrenology, or 
parapsychology). Rather, nomad science is the slowing down of the slowing down of science–a sci-
ence addicted to chaos. Nomad science more readily crosses the lines of countereffectuation of 
art and philosophy, which may help it to keep the chaos in sight. This thesis demonstrates that 
science can find interest in art works that incorporate (rather than merely allude to) scientific 
elements, as in Robinson’s Mars trilogy, a work that conveys essential aspects about science 
and its objects. But as Deleuze and Guattari stress, it is never a matter of influence, of the one 
becoming like the other, but of a becoming that passes between the two (A Thousand 262). 
Whether the intersections explored really amount to such becomings, or either to chaotic dis-
solutions or loose associations (doxa), can only be determined afterwards.
As the work of Deleuzian philosopher Rosi Braidotti makes especially clear, nomadism is 
not just a matter of thought, but also of ethics and politics. According to Braidotti, nomadic 
ethics, through thought and activism, opens up the present to unforeseen possibilities by see-
ing subjectivity as a process of becoming different:
What this means is that the conditions for political and ethical agency are not dependent on 
the current state of the terrain. They are not oppositional and thus not tied to the present 
by negation; instead they are affirmative and geared to creating new futures. Ethical 
relations create possible worlds by mobilizing resources that have been left untapped, 
including our desires and imagination. They are the driving forces that concretize in actual, 
material relations and can thus constitute a network, web or rhizome of interconnections 
with others. Such a vision of the subject, moreover, does not restrict the ethical instance 
within the limits of human otherness, but also opens it up to the inter-relations with non-
human, posthuman and inhuman forces. (“In Spite of the Times” 16)
Whereas ethics is not a formal analytical angle in this thesis, the epistemological “introductions” 
that compose it can be regarded as examples of Braidotti’s ethics of “mobilizing resources that 
have been left untapped,” creating a “network” of thought “geared to new futures.” By focusing 
on the potentials in ourselves and the world, nomadic ethics offers an alternative to a critical or 
reflexive ethics that risks being so preoccupied with present configurations of power and knowl-
edge that it forgets to make a real difference. In resisting the present, nomadic ethics does not 
maneuver toward a particular end-state in the future, but rather affirms a virtual becoming sus-
pended between actual presents and futures (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 322).14 In other 
words, there is little use in saying that “we” have to “become nomadic”; rather it is nomadic 
practices that will make thought and humanity become in ways that no-one can tell in advance. 
bioscience and huMan transforMation
This thesis is more about nomad science than about control science, even though one can 
never discuss one without evoking the other. It presupposes that science studies, as well as 
literature and science and sf studies (fields that overlap significantly with science studies, see 
Chapter 2), can contribute to an understanding of life as becoming, and to the birth of another 
(bio)science that embraces this becoming. This can be achieved not by offering reflections or 
critiques from a distance, but by becoming implicated in bioscientific developments and, along 
the way, introducing foreign elements, for instance borrowed from sf. The goal of this thesis 
is fourfold:
 
1.  to analyze a particular subset of sf novels as mappings of contemporary control (bio)
science and nomad (bio)science;
2.  to analyze a particular sub-set of popular science and science studies texts in order to flesh 
out nomadic potentials in contemporary (bio)sciences;
3.  to demonstrate the use of particular sf texts and Deleuzian concepts for science studies;
4.  to contribute to more robust understandings of life as becoming in science studies, 
biosciences, and beyond.
There is no hierarchy between these goals. Rather, they are pursued more or less simultane-
ously, with one goal challenging and strengthening the other. To put it differently, this thesis 
introduces elements from sf, (popular) bioscience, and Deleuze’s philosophy into one another 
in no particular order, thus preventing one type of discourse from being “influenced by” or 
“receptive of” another in terms of one-way transfers. This is what Deleuze and Guattari in A 
Thousand Plateaus call nomadism’s “logic of the AND,” (28) emancipated from the dominant, 
rationistic logic of the “OR.” In place of comparing and assessing, nomadism always brings in 
new elements or rejuvenates elements by introducing them in another context. Such episte-
mological cross-fertilizations and migrations become urgent, I argue, with the advent of global 
crises such as climate change, which connect the human and nonhuman worlds along many 
vectors, requiring map-makers from many disciplines.
The remainder of this chapter will elaborate this thesis’s aim to contribute to a mode of 
science studies that –in collaboration15 with other sciences, philosophy and the arts– takes on 
the challenge of mapping contemporary global crises as symptoms of the feedback between 
humanity and its environments. A point of departure for this endeavor is the broadening of 
the horizon for human becoming–past and future–made possible by recent developments 
in the biosciences, notably genomics–a conglomeration of fields that has played a crucial 
role in the past two decades, not only as a key field in what is often called “the life scienc-
es,”16 but also as a perspective on life that influences science and culture at large. Genom-
ics brings forth a range of insights and technologies that are extraordinarily significant in 
the sense that they elucidate and intervene in the genesis of organic life, making it increas-
ingly recognizable, predictable and pliable. Research in genomics has laid the foundations 
for new ways of treating and possibly curing disease, and has promised revolutionary possibili-
ties for modifying ecological environments, for example to clear pollution. Yet the implications 
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of genomics are ill-understood as long as we see them as rational and unambiguous solutions. 
Instead, they should be understood as biopolitical–as part of a historical (re)configuration of 
how humans influence themselves and their environments.
The notion of “biopolitics” refers to the ways in which (human) bodies become discursively 
and physically incorporated in regimes of power, notably the governance of “vital” aspects such 
as health, safety, mortality, and sexual reproduction (Rose). It is the simultaneity of intensi-
fied observation, access to vast genetic data sets, and new prospects for genetic manipulation 
that marks genomics as a biopolitical site pur sang (Marks, “Biopolitics”), a site that has been 
the subject of heated debates in scholarship and society alike.17 A critical question in debates 
about genomics is the desirability of new possibilities. For example, genomics is creating the 
knowledge and technology that will one day, perhaps quite soon, make it possible for parents 
to choose to have a child with certain mental and physical characteristics. Already, genomics 
has made possible far more radical interventions in animal and plant bodies, for example, en-
abling the production of “in vitro meat”: animal flesh that does not develop into an organism, a 
possible alternative to animal suffering in the bio-industry. Yet consuming in vitro meat could 
cause serious health problems–scientists have yet to understand its long-term effects on the 
body. Apart from questioning the desirability of certain prospects, scholars also aim to unpack 
the assumptions and promises of genomics on the premise that they are overtly speculative. 
Notably, critics have qualified the aim of the Human Genome Project (HGP), to unveil ”the code 
of life itself,” as scientific hubris (Gould; Mayeri; Roof).
Although the outcomes of the HGP were far less spectacular than its promises, urging 
scientists to take on a more modest tone, they also–paradoxically–justified a call for further 
investments to continue the (post-)genomics pursuit, accompanied by new promises. Post-
genomic research fields such as proteomics (the study of the structure and function of pro-
teins) and systems biology (where researchers try to map the interactions between genetic, 
neuronal, hormonal and other systems) aim to unveil complex networks and interactions. This 
movement towards a complexity has consequences for debates around genomics and its so-
cietal implications. Genetic determinism–the belief in a one-to-one correspondence between 
a gene and a particular trait–no longer appears a viable position to take.18 Fundamentally, the 
question is no longer whether a given trait is “genetic” or which genes are responsible for it, 
but rather what particular role genes play in relation to other factors–inside as well as outside 
the body. This being said, it is still common that, in spite of its positioning among a host of 
other factors, the genome is interpreted as a kind of ground of origin, a final cause of life. One 
could speak here of “genomic determinism” (Crawford 26). This happens, for example, when 
life is reduced to a genetic program, making it predictable and susceptible to manipulation. 
In a 2012 lecture entitled “What is Life?” leading genomicist Craig Venter typifies the idea of 
genomic software as “a remarkably simple concept, remarkably complex in its execution.” It 
is this strange mixture of complexity and simplicity that allows molecular biologists to extract 
an enormous amount of data, work, money, prestige, and so on, while retaining a (deceptive) 
sense of control.19 As many biologists featured in this thesis point out, the idea of a program 
does not produce an understanding of life as becoming; it rather blocks such understanding. 
As long as the biosciences remain under the sway of determinism, they are unlikely to deal 
effectively with the chaotic behaviors of interlocking systems that determine such problems 
as climate change.
In the meanwhile, a bioscientist like Venter can give us the impression that the key to life, 
the power of transformation, will soon be found. In his endless confidence in the concept of 
the genetic program, Venter has proposed that the costs of manned Mars missions can be 
drastically cut by simply sending digital information and regenerating life from the digital code 
(“What is Life”). Given the advancements of genomics, this does not necessarily mean cloning 
human beings. At least potentially, it means making them. As noted above, because the pros-
pect of human transmutation is such a thorny issue, it is rarely touched on by mainstream 
scientists. Rather, it is either addressed by fierce critics or jubilant proponents. Given the pace 
of scientific developments, the time has come to take the debate beyond the crude positions 
adopted by “transhumanists” like Nick Bostrom and Ray Kuzweil, who believe that science 
will allow humanity to transcend its limitations (including death!), and the equally unproduc-
tive “technoconservatives” like Jürgen Habermas and Francis Fukuyama. As philosophers of 
technology have recently shown, this can be done by demonstrating that technology is not a 
mere conscious tool that we can choose to live without, but rather a necessary extension or 
mediator, thus blurring distinctions between human and nonhuman, nature and culture, the 
material and the spiritual (Bryant; Harman; Lemmens; Stiegler; Verbeek). From this posthu-
manist stance, the transhumanist notion that humans should strive to transcend their cur-
rent biological constitution is actually based on rather outdated humanist values of control 
(Sharon; Verbeek). While this reconceptualization of technology remains a vital task, I follow a 
slightly different trajectory (divergent and overlapping), inspired by the recent work of Donna 
Haraway, whose oeuvre could be characterized as bearing on, as well as performing, introduc-
tions, migrations, and transformations. 
Trained as a biologist in the 1970s, Haraway became interested in the historical, epistemo-
logical and political implications of bioscience and biotechnology. She moved to science studies, 
writing what has become a classic text, “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1985),20 in which she emphasizes 
that the future of humanity is intimately connected with technoscience, to the extent that 
humans have already become, actually or virtually, cyborgs. After having written a number of 
studies during the 1990s in which bioscience and biotechnology figure prominently, another, 
more subtle shift occurs in Haraway’s work, leading her to write A Companion Species Manifesto: 
Dogs, People and Significant Otherness (2003). In her recent work Haraway chooses to emphasize 
the persistence of ecological, developmental, and evolutionary existence in a technoscientific 
world. The key message is that the future of humanity is conditioned above all by the ecologi-
cal conditions of its earthly habitat and its relations to other life forms, without forgetting that 
technological artifacts play important parts in determining these conditions. Especially in When 
Species Meet (2007), Haraway is keen to connect to the work of biologists and biophilosophers 
such as Margulis who stress ecological embeddedness. Here Haraway uses Karen Barad’s no-
tion of “intra-action”21 to reflect on her relation with her dog Cayenne and, in a wider context, 
the relations between human and nonhuman animals in sports, agriculture, the bio-industry 
and elsewhere: “Partners do not precede the relating; the world is a verb, or at least a gerund; 
worlding is the dynamics of intra-action … and intra-patience, the giving and receiving of pat-
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terning, all the way down, with consequences for who lives and who dies and how” (“Sf” 9-10). 
Haraway’s dynamic understanding of culture, technoscience, and ecological relations serves 
as an antidote against the stark oppositions that have dominated debates about the future of 
humanity in a technoscientific age.
Haraway’s work has been highly influential in feminist theory, science studies, cultural 
studies, and beyond. It pioneers a new scholarly field called animal studies (McHugh; Ten Bos; 
Wolfe), which aims to show that humanity is in large part defined by the relations it cultivates 
with animal others, building on Haraway’s work, but also on Derrida’s reflections on human-
animal relations (The Animal). Furthermore, it feeds into new visions of the humanities under 
the banner of “posthumanities” (Rossini; Wolfe)22, as well as resonating with versions of en-
vironmental/ecological humanities, and Stotz and Griffiths’ idea of “biohumanities,” in which 
bioscience, philosophy, history, and society come together.23 Furthermore, I would argue that 
Haraway’s work exemplifies an “ontological turn” in science studies, where reality is no longer 
seen as a transcendent “truth” found only through experiments in natural science, but rather as 
“enacted” in practices in which scholars participate (Barad; Bruun Jensen; Latour, Politics; Mol; 
Pickering).24 As Bruun Jensen argues, 
epistemology collapses into ontology and the sciences are reformulated as practical 
activities aimed at (re)building the world by adding new elements with new capabilities 
and new relationships to it. Knowing (and thinking about knowing) are turned into 
particular styles and methods for connecting and cooperating with specific actors (human 
and otherwise)—thus shaping reality, or doing practical ontology. (248) 
Following this ontological turn, the idea of science studies as a theoretical “meta-perspective” 
on science is unmasked. Science studies is as “empirical” as the natural sciences and is implicat-
ed in their most empirical questions, just as science is implicated in science studies’s social and 
epistemological quandaries. But above all, as Haraway’s work so vividly illustrates, both fields 
are fully implicated in contemporary technobiological existence and its (potential) transforma-
tions–there is no “gap” between science and society. As a consequence, popular science should 
no longer be perceived as a distortion or pollution of science, a necessary evil (Sismondo 170-1). 
The “unscientific” or “impure” narratives, images, and ideas of popular science cannot strictly be 
separated from scientific research, and they often inform it as much as they are informed by it.
With its emphasis on embeddedness and relationality, Haraway’s work overlaps signifi-
cantly with a burgeoning Deleuzian scholarship in science studies and philosophy.25 Another 
reason why Haraway’s work is important to this thesis is that it underscores the value of sf for 
science studies (Squier; Wald “The Art”). In an interview with Jeffrey Williams, Haraway qualifies 
her concept of worlding as an “sf term.” Haraway’s work reveals that sf does not so much “rep-
resent” science as think along with science about the changing conditions of a technoscientific 
world, a practice in which new possibilities of life are enacted by human and nonhuman actors. 
Sf opens up “our” worlds, revealing them as processes of becoming, teeming with potential. This 
utopian function of sf is vital in a time when, according to Eugene Thacker, sf imaginary threat-
ens to become wholly subsumed into science and the (bio)technology industry. Technoscience 
creates its own visions of the future based on the premise of unstoppable scientific progress. 
As Thacker argues, critical sf refuses to be “locked into the narrow path of simply realizing the 
future” according to the scheme of dominant science, instead exploring the “potentiality” of 
science and technology in unforeseen ways (“The Science” 158). Since public imagination tends 
to be dominated by simplistic narratives of progress and disaster, hope and fear, there is a great 
need for complex, non-moralistic stories that illustrate the non-hierarchical, changing relations 
between technoscience, society, and the nonhuman.26 This observation about the use of sf nar-
rative links up with Thacker’s conviction that science studies should not settle for “‘responding’ 
or ‘replying’ to a technoscience that supposedly pre-exists theory”–rather, it needs to inter-
vene in a “technoscientific event” (“An Era”). The critical aspect of sf and science studies alike 
is not to reflect on science from an outside position, but read science “diffractively” (Haraway, 
Modest Witness; Barad; Van der Tuin), that is, together with other forms of experimentation. 
bio-sf
As sf critic Fredric Jameson argues in Archaeologies of the Future (2007), the paradigm shift from 
physics to the biosciences in the latter half of the twentieth century is reflected in the rise of 
biologically oriented sf, especially from the 1980s onwards (68).27 Bio-sf can be seen as a crucial 
element in the emergence of a “biocultural” imaginary (Davis and Morris), the double helix be-
ing one iconic image in this imaginary (Franklin; Nelkin and Lindee; Stacey; Van Dijck). Howev-
er, bio-sf does more than express a culture’s hopes and fears “around” bioscience. As a literary 
mode unraveling problems with references to, or strongly resonating with, the biosciences, it 
lays bare the “moral imperative or navigational system” (Canavan, Sklarr and Vu 208) of science 
itself. As Sherryl Vint has convincingly argued, sf and science studies are allies in thinking about 
science as part of an actor-network that includes nonhumans (“Archaeologies”).
Starting from this basic idea of thinking along, I aim to use sf texts alongside popular bio-
scientific texts (science writing, biographies, lectures) and science studies texts in order to 
understand fundamental scientific ideas, desires, attitudes and practices (Zwart, “Understand-
ing”). Bio-sf and popular bioscience mostly deal with the big questions –What is a species? 
What is life?–questions that may not inform everyday scientific practice, but that unwittingly 
guide scientific projects and careers. Reading these genres together through the prism of the 
concepts of State science, control science, and nomad science, I aim to map the fundamentals 
of bioscientific developments and to determine where and how nomadic approaches can be 
further developed. As I will demonstrate, nomadic ideas are produced most consistently in sci-
ence writing and science studies, while sf is strong on revealing scientific attitudes and desires. 
The level of practices can be modeled as a “node” where ideas, attitudes, and desires are “en-
acted” (Mol). But in the same stroke, the cross-readings of literary, scientific, and philosophical 
texts are not just meant to elucidate contemporary biosciences, but also to contribute to an 
understanding of the world as becoming in science studies and beyond.28
Nomad science is a rare phenomenon in science but also in sf. In spite of exploring new pos-
sibilities, sf often tends to reterritorialize on familiar grounds. Michael Crichton’s Jurassic Park 
(1991) and Next (2002) can be taken as examples of (critical) literary representations of control 
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science. In Jurassic Park geneticists from the biotech company InGen manage to recreate dino-
saurs by extracting and repairing DNA from dinosaur blood found in insects preserved in amber 
fossils (99). The goal is to build “a zoo unique in the world” on an island not far off the Costa Ri-
can Pacific coast. As chaos theory specialist Ian Malcolm predicts early on in the novel, the dino-
saurs prove impossible to contain; visitors get killed and some of the animals manage to escape 
from the island. Crichton’s novel Next is a pastiche of intersecting stories that explore the myth 
that there is a gene for everything, from sociability to thrill-seeking behavior, a myth kept alive 
not just by the media, but also by scientists and entrepreneurs who want to make money out 
of gene patents. Crichton’s novels deal with a desire to create new life, elaborating the idea of 
life as programmable, and sketching a number of attitudes vis à vis these desires and ideas, cul-
minating in (dubious) scientific practices. Fascination and awe of genomics are coupled with a 
critical meditation on the idea of DNA as a reliable and endless source of profit, effectively turning 
life into a privately owned commodity. As such, Crichton’s novels are important contributions 
to the societal debate on the implications of genomics and biotechnology (Turner, “Jurassic”). 
 In spite of their critical impetus, Crichton’s novels do little to change the fact that “the deter-
ministic program model of gene action is currently the only one available for popular discourse on 
human nature” (Leach Scully 354). By focusing on the genome sciences and presenting a charac-
ter like the chaos theorist Ian Malcolm as a mere bystander, Crichton offers a critique in the usual 
sense of the word–a judgment from an outside position–while novelists like Robinson explore 
alternative possibilities from within science. Sf novels, I would argue, are particularly fascinating 
and useful not as a means of justifying or criticizing dominant scientific disciplines, as if they dic-
tate what the future will look like, but as literary experiments with multiple scientific perspectives, 
dominant and recessive. Besides, as Sagan and Margulis warn, “if we simply extrapolate current 
trends, we arrive not at the future but at a caricature of the present” (“The Transhumans” 93). 
 A more complex example of bio-sf is Robinson’s Mars trilogy, which lays out a scenario of 
human and planetary transformation whose general thrust is neither utopian nor dystopian. 
Refusing to glorify or criticize developments in science such as space exploration and genetic 
engineering, Robinson thinks along with them, sketching their possible implications for society 
and the world at large. Texts like Mars offer fictional versions of Latour’s image of the “world 
wide lab” (“The World”): a lab that is open, collective and performative29, problematizing the 
classical situation in which solutions are transported from the research lab to society. What I 
find most interesting about novels like Mars is that they take science seriously, yet without ac-
cording too much authority to any one field in particular. As Robinson’s example makes clear, 
bio-sf is not necessarily based on biological determinism: it may also reveal the ways in which 
biology is enmeshed with psychological, social, cultural and physical processes. I would argue 
that in the most interesting examples of bio-sf, the biological is a biotechnoscientific hub or 
milieu that reveals the physical world as biophysical, sociality as “biosociality” (Rabinow, Es-
says) and politics as biopolitics. Narratives like Robinson’s exemplify sf’s ability, in Sherryl Vint’s 
words, to “explore and explain the relationship between changes in the material world–which 
might include new technologies–and changes in the human subjects who inhabit this world” 
(Bodies 19). Its strength lies in thinking about imperceptible becomings that are always already 
at work in science, society and the world at large, generative processes that undergird actual 
symptoms of transformation. Bio-sf novels may turn (human) evolution into a tangible reality 
through the novum of time travel (H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine [1895]), through a narrator’s 
meta-historical point-of-view (Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men [1930] and Kurt Vonnetgut’s 
Galapagos [1985]), or, as in the Mars trilogy, by imagining turbulent circumstances in which evo-
lution itself speeds up. As I will demonstrate, science studies benefits from a more sustained 
engagement with such sf narratives, not only to fuel its exploration of nonhuman agency, but 
also to think the becoming or “emergence” of science and life itself (Pickering, The Mangle).30 
Great sf is not about the future of an enhanced humanity “out there,” but about making sensible 
and perceptible an evolution in which “we” are always already cyborgs (Haraway, “A Cyborg”; 
Hayles; Smelik) as well as another variation/species.
outline
Part I of this thesis, entitled “The Problem of Life,” introduces the challenge of thinking life no-
madically as becoming consecutively in two areas: bio-sf and popular biology. Chapter 2, “Vital Ex-
periments: Sf, Science and the Shock of the Biophysical,” rather than entering into a general dis-
cussion of the sf genre and its limits,31 reads Fredric Jameson’s theory of sf together with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of “minor literature.” The advantage of Deleuze and Guatari’s approach 
is that it corrects Jameson’s assertion that sf is strictly about sociality. Apart from renegotiating 
social practices and norms, sf introduces biophysical becomings as shocks, or triggers of es-
trangement, that conjure up the possibility of another life. I argue that this perspective on sf as an 
experiment with nonhuman forces inevitably leads to an engagement with scientific elements in sf 
that is almost absent in Jameson’s approach. The aim of this chapter is to show that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach, combined with a focus on quasi-scientific problems, is especially useful for 
analyzing sf narratives in which humans and their habitats undergo significant changes. Such 
scenarios cannot be properly understood without addressing the entanglement of social, techno-
logical and biophysical processes. To provide an example, the chapter discusses Greg Bear’s novel 
Blood Music (1985), in which a nano-engineered virus escapes from the lab, infecting the whole 
population of North America in the course of the novel, and transforming human beings in a fea-
tureless, reddish flesh covering the landscape. I argue that Bear’s novel illustrates Deleuze’s idea 
that life is irreducible to social or biological or physical processes. The downside of Bear’s novel is 
that it favors deconstruction over construction, leaving rather limited prospects for actual nomad-
ic ideas or practices. Blood Music marks sf’s zero-degree point for viably thinking life as becoming. 
 Chapter 3, “Thinking ‘a Life’: Nomadism as a Challenge for Postgenomics,” discusses the con-
cepts of “State science” and “nomad science” developed by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thou-
sand Plateaus (1980) through the case of (post-)genomics and the research projects of Craig 
Venter in particular. Modulating the term “State science” into “control science,” the chapter 
analyzes how science functions within contemporary regimes of technoscientific biopower in 
which corporations become important strongholds alongside states. The chapter observes that 
(post-)genomics, while providing new technologies of control, also contains the promise of 
nomadic approaches to life. Venter’s work reveals such nomadic potentials in (post-)genom-
ics, but, arguably, he ultimately fails to pursue them. Glossing over Deleuze’s biophilosophy, 
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we can confront Venter’s image of life as “DNA-software” (What is Life) with Deleuze’s idea of “a 
life” that is irreducible to any substrate. I propose that Deleuze’s abstract yet material concep-
tion of life can serve as a catalyst for nomadic ideas in molecular biology.
Part II, “Tales of Transmutation,” conjoins the approaches developed in the two previous 
chapters, analyzing control science and nomad science in works by three sf authors. All three 
case studies deal with novels that portray a transmutation of humanity in which social, tech-
nological, biological, and physical factors play a role. Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts allow for 
an analysis of these transmutations as epistemological and biopolitical “problem-events” that 
provoke a myriad of nomadic and control strategies from characters in the novels.
Chapter 4, “Infected Genomes: Symbiogenesis in Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio,” reads Lynn Mar-
gulis’s theory of symbiogenesis together with Bear’s sf novel Darwin’s Radio (1999). In Bear’s novel, 
the course of human evolution is altered through the activation of an “endogenous retrovirus,” 
ironically located in a “non-coding region” of the human genome. This activation, ominously 
termed SHEVA32, causes humans to metamorphose into another species. At first perceived as 
a global plague, SHEVA provokes mass panic. In the US a task force is assembled to control the 
crisis and to find out how SHEVA operates at the genomic level. However, as the story unfolds, 
it becomes manifest that SHEVA is too complex to locate, decode, or “treat”—and, moreover, 
that it may not represent a disease at all, but rather an emergent, posthuman stage in evolution. 
Bear’s novel can be understood as a literary experiment with scientific ideas, notably Lynn Mar-
gulis’s theory of symbiogenesis, which holds that a species’ DNA is an assemblage of many ge-
nomes “acquired” in symbiotic relations. Bear’s novel and Margulis’s theory call the neo-Darwin-
ian conception of slow evolution into question, turning evolution into an immediate biopolitical 
issue. The import of these speculations, I argue, is not crass “prediction,” but a nomadic vision of 
life as always already different (impure, infected) and in becoming–a counterpoint to the image 
of the double helix as the bedrock of human identity and the promise of a man-made future. 
 Chapter 5, “Trading Traits: Species Encounters in Octavia Butler’s Lilith’s Brood Trilogy,” reads 
Butler’s trilogy (first published in separate volumes between 1987 and 1989) alongside the re-
cent work of Haraway, analyzing it as an instance of biotechnoscientific “worlding” in which 
relations between different species are center stage. In LB an extraterrestrial species called 
Oankali has rescued humanity from Earth, which had become inhospitable to humans due to 
pollution and atomic warfare. They start an experiment of “genetic trade” in which humans 
and Oankali will eventually transform. The trade, however, is hampered by humans who fear 
that they will lose their identity and autonomy. Molly Wallace has argued that the Oankali’s 
“natural” capacity for genetic engineering represents strategies of contemporary technoscien-
tific biopower, where genetic engineering is presented as something inevitable and beneficial. 
I agree partially with this latter reading, although I emphasize that the Oankali also allow us to 
think in life nomadic terms as a continual challenge of connecting, forgetting and becoming. 
Taking the cue from Haraway’s notion of “worlding,” this chapter analyzes Butler’s trilogy as an 
experiment in which literature and science “trade traits,” and where species co-evolve, building 
a new world out of an uncomfortable contact zone. Butler’s account of evolutionary “trade” 
connects technology, sociality, culture, and biology in inextricable ways, forging a literary proto-
type of a bio-based economy that uses genetic engineering but is not founded on determinism. 
 The third and last case study, “‘Terrain is a Powerful Genetic Engineer’: Constructive Interac-
tion in Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars Trilogy,” reads Mars together with evolutionary psycholo-
gist Susan Oyama’s concept of “constructive interactionism,” which offers an alternative to 
genocentrism and its reliance on a pre-programmed code. Oyama’s work is akin to Deleuze’s 
philosophy of difference, directed at thinking life without presupposing an objective code or a 
transcendent human subject as a ground:
Can it be that if we really reinsert ourselves into the world, see our development, investi-
gations, and technological control as actions within a network that we support and alter 
and that supports and alters us, see freedom and responsibility not as denials of causality 
but as a particularly human acknowledgement of it, if we see nature, including our own, 
as multilayered and constructed in development, not prior to it, if we see the world as 
truly our home … with all the loving reliance, multiple attachments, pride, and farsighted 
maintenance that “home” entails, is it possible that we will no longer need a mystical hidden 
message? Is it possible that the only message is our lives in our world and the life of our 
world in its universe? (The Ontogeny 193)
The Mars trilogy can be read as a literary counterpart to Oyama’s theory, offering a turbulent 
world in the making in which epistemological and biopolitical dilemmas emerge in the midst 
of things, without a steady ground for decisions. While state and corporate forces try to con-
trol the process of terraformation, it soon becomes clear that the experiment cannot be con-
trolled. As one character notes, “the planet is the lab” (Red 263), a lab in which humans, too, are 
transformed, and not primarily through (purposeful) technological interventions. Instead, as 
an unidentified narrator in Green Mars proclaims, it is the “terrain” (read: network of planetary 
systems) that is the most advanced “genetic engineer” (13). Those characters who understand 
the experiment along the lines of Oyama’s “constructive interactionism” are most successful at 
coping with the tough conditions on Mars and contributing to sustainable ways of living.
The title of the final part, “A New People and a New Earth,” is a quote from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s What is Philosophy?, where they formulate the ultimate goal of thought in a Nietzschi-
an vein: to think for the future. I argue that this is precisely what the novels discussed aspire to-
wards: not to simply “represent” a future for humanity, but to create the conditions for new ways 
of thinking and living that are different and more sustainable. The penultimate chapter, “Nomad 
Science and Cosmic Life,” sums up the observations about nomadic ideas, practices, desires and 
attitudes in the case studies. It presents a number of clusters of nomadic traits that may serve as a 
rough map for understanding and reinforcing nomadism in contemporary bioscience. The thrust 
of these nomadic elements is to incorporate and connect to everything, so that bioscience ends 
up exploring life as cosmic. The final chapter, “Coda: Bringing Science to Life,” presents some key 
findings and consequences of this thesis and points to possibilities for further research. It argues 
that narratives that innovatively couple biological and social, human and nonhuman existence, 
are vital in our time, and specifically for science studies. Such narratives bring science to life in 
the sense of revealing a dynamic picture of scientific tensions, but also in the sense of taking sci-
ence closer toward the fiery chaos of life. They are narratives with the power of transmutation. 
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SF,  SCIENCE ,  
 
AND T HE SHOCK OF T HE BIOPH YSICAL 
Science fiction has gone through a whole evolution taking it from animal, vegetable, 
and mineral becomings to becomings of bacteria, viruses, molecules, and things 
imperceptible.
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari –
introduction
Sf literature has never had the reputation of being experimental in terms of prose, narrative 
structure, or other formal aspects. Furthermore, many sf novels, while rather explicitly evok-
ing an air of otherworldliness, actually repeat conventional and shallow characters, plots and 
ideas. Paradoxically, these texts derive their popular appeal from the extent to which readers 
can recognize strange elements: as Terry Eagleton has acutely observed, extraterrestrial beings 
in popular culture “may have bulbous heads and triangular eyes, speak in a chillingly robotic 
monotone or emit a strong stench of sulphur, but otherwise … look much like Tony Blair” (49). 
It is for these reasons that many critics of sf focus on a limited number of authors whose works 
manage to escape the clichés and to think a world that is no longer comfortably unfamiliar. 
These sf writers create a world that is out of balance, in becoming. The reader’s confrontation 
with this problematic world ideally creates an effect that Darko Suvin, expanding on German 
playwright Berthold Brecht’s notion of verfremdungseffect, calls “cognitive estrangement” (4): 
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the feeling that a fictional world is somehow akin to one’s own, yet also different, unheimlich 
(I will return to this notion below). In presenting a world that appears thoroughly different but 
nevertheless contains relevant analogies to our own, we may not only perceive our present social 
context in a new light, but also open up vistas onto a new, transformed community in which, Suvin 
concurs, “human relations are organized more perfectly than in the author’s community” (45). 
 In his seminal Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions 
(2007), a collection of (revised) essays on sf, Fredric Jameson is in constructive dialogue with 
Suvin’s work, arguing that sf at its best is “a representational meditation on radical difference” 
(xii). Immediately qualifying this statement, he defines sf as the genre “devoted to the imagina-
tion of alternative social and economic forms” (xiv). It is in the incommensurability between 
these two statements that I want to posit my argument about sf. If sf has the potential to bring 
radical difference into representation by imagining “the future as disruption” (211), then why 
should its import be strictly socio-economic? Is sf not rather, in Raymond Williams’s words, “a 
reworking, in imagination, of all forms and conditions” (209), including those of organic and 
nonorganic life? As John Urry makes clear, the notion of “emergence” in complexity theory 
problematizes a bracketing of sociality in the way Jameson does vis á vis the prospect of an-
other world in sf. 
Emergent properties are never purely “social” and the kinds of processes that generate them 
are also not simply social. Complexity would argue against the thesis that “phenomena” 
can remain bounded, that social causes produce social consequences. Causes are always 
overflowing, tipping from domain to domain and especially flowing within and across the 
supposedly distinct physical and social domains. (Urry 8)
To translate this in Deleuzian terms, the transformations of bodies and states of affairs in sf 
experiments must be thought from the perspective of “pure events” (The Logic, 3), events that 
neither have a strict determination (social, biological, etc.) nor belong to a particular subject. 
Sf links such non-local events to particular scientific fields, but no field in particular can ever 
exhaust the problem of transformation.
Indeed, Jameson’s focus on socio-economic transformation is perfectly understandable, 
since the vast majority of sf texts is ultimately not about a quasi-scientific interest in the world 
at large or in nonhuman processes, but rather about mental lives and social relations set in 
a technoscientific future. Yet there are exceptions, such as Robinson’s Mars trilogy, in which 
the planet Mars itself is at least as important as the human characters, or even becomes, as 
Robert Markley has argued, the true hero of the story (782). To conceive of the planet itself as 
a major element of the story requires at least some form of engagement with physics, biology, 
geology, meteorology, space science, and other scientific fields. Nevertheless, in Archaeologies 
Jameson states that any scientifically grounded reading of Robinson’s trilogy “must eventually 
develop into a second allegorical one, in which the hard sf content stands revealed as socio-
political–that is to say, as utopian” (396). I want to argue that it is problematic that Jameson’s 
work, which continues to have a tremendous influence on sf scholarship, refuses to take the 
scientific content and the nonhuman elements of sf seriously.
In this chapter I want to demonstrate that Jameson’s work on sf can be complemented 
by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “minor literature” in order to do justice to those rarer 
sf writers who take up scientific ideas in order to grapple with biophysical1 existence. As this 
chapter’s epigraph, taken from A Thousand Plateaus, indicates, Deleuze and Guattari were well 
aware of sf’s potential for exploring the nonhuman, although they never explored this matter 
in earnest.2 In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari show how Kafka’s works 
produce a deterritorialization and a desubjectification of life: they break open established 
structures (territories) and ways of thinking (the idea of the human subject at the center of 
existence), revealing nonhuman processes of life that usually remain under the surface. While 
this approach is in full agreement with Jameson’s contention that the struggle of thinking radi-
cal difference is not merely personal but socio-political, Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on 
the nonhuman forces pervading and co-constituting humanity offers a better starting-point 
for dealing with the biophysical dimensions of sf. Relocating Deleuze and Guattari’s concept, I 
argue that “minor sf” moves beyond the patently human world (mental lives, social forms, ur-
ban landscapes, technologies, etc.), zooming in on the microworld of particles as well as look-
ing outwards to the macroworld of planetary and cosmic systems. Thus minor sf explores new 
possibilities for narrativity–not in the sense of creating new narrative forms, but in presenting 
physical and biological processes as constitutive narrative elements rather than mere objects 
or backgrounds for human action.
In minor sf, I will argue, humans and environments interact and transform in an open ex-
perimental situation. In order to make this experiment as consistent as possible, minor sf uses 
scientific ideas, desires, attitudes and practices as important resources. This relation between 
sf and science is captured in the following programmatic statement by sf critic and literary 
scholar Roger Luckhurst, who argues that genres like sf and popular science should not be 
figured as mere “pseudoscience”:
The aim is to regard sf and allied genres as historically situated forms that constantly 
change shape and boundary as scientific and technological possibilities emerge, the genre 
seizing opportunistically on new anomalies or nascent states or breakthroughs, working 
proleptically to open up (or close down) their cultural and narrative possibilities … It is 
less, then, that sf and its cognates are to be judged as inside or outside “proper” science but 
more that these fictions might be seen to occupy the temporary intervals when knowledge 
is controversial and in flux, in the phase-space between anomaly and normalization.3 
(“Pseudoscience” 404-5)
Minor sf precisely finds its niche in the “phase-space between anomaly and normalization,” but 
it continually tends towards anomalies–problems that cannot (at present) be solved by sci-
ence and technology. The present chapter will illustrate this approach by analyzing Greg Bear’s 
bio-sf novel Blood Music4 (1985), in which a new virus eventually changes the whole population 
of North America into a formless organic mass covering the land. It will be argued that this 
dramatic event of contamination and transformation, expressing a capricious, impersonal life, 
constitutes a nomadic sf problem: emergent, interdisciplinary (involving genetics, nanotech, 
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and other fields), and beyond human control. A novel like Blood Music, then, is not only a social-
political experiment: it also spectacularly confronts readers with biophysical existence. Literary 
experiments such as Bear’s are vital for imagining the future of technoscience and humanity in 
an age of great societal and biophysical transformations.
JaMeson’s theory of sf
In his seminal Archaeologies Jameson offers a complete version of his theory, which focuses on sf 
but also encapsulates his broader philosophical work on postmodernism or, as he often hope-
fully calls it, Late Capitalism. As he argued before in Postmodernity, or the Logic of Late Capitalism 
(1991), we are witnessing a total expansion and unprecedented intensification of capitalism, 
causing widespread cultural amnesia and political apathy, and leaving only a minimum reserve 
for resistance. For Jameson, the problem of literature today, and any mode of thinking for that 
matter, is to think beyond the bounds of capitalism, a hideous task verging on the impossible. 
The impossibility of this task lies in the fact that producing a different world is hard when 
the dominating system is in and of itself a machine for producing difference. Capitalism easily 
accommodates utopian ideas about a new society within its own boundaries: these dreams 
are incorporated in popular culture and advertising, two genres that are increasingly indistin-
guishable. Claims to difference often end up as commodified fantasies, for example in those 
more individualistic versions of (cultural) diversity and cosmopolitanism that say “You can be 
anything you want to be!” 
As Jameson argues in Archaeologies, most sf utterly fails the utopian test, indulging in tech-
noscientific dreams that have nothing to do with social urgencies. Nevertheless, Jameson re-
serves a unique space for literature in the task of imagining a radically different future: “Literary 
forms (and cultural forms in general) are the most concrete symptoms we have of what is at 
work in that absent thing called the social” (“Symptoms” 407). What makes sf more suitable 
for this task than other literary forms, is its ability to conceive a new world that is total and 
systemic: “A reform which singles out this or that vice, this or that flaw or error in the system, 
with a view towards modifying that feature alone, quickly discovers that any given feature en-
tertains a multitude of unexpected yet constitutive links with all the other features in the sys-
tem” (39). This realization that everything is connected leads to a generic imperative in sf that 
“the modification of reality must be absolute and totalizing” (39). The sf writer produces this 
totality not just by meticulously describing the features of a unique world, but by introducing a 
central problem: that element that Suvin, borrowing from the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, 
has termed the novum.5 This element is a genuine mode of production, whose mechanism is 
explored in the narrative. Characters bear witness to this novum, relate to it in one way or an-
other, and determine its mental image and meaning; yet unlike in most mainstream literature, 
the characters and their psychological lives are subordinated to the problem, which is collective 
in nature. Immediately related to the notion of totalization or system is that of closure. For an 
sf experiment to work, its world has to be an enclosed space and/or contain enclosed spaces. 
Often this amounts to geographical isolation, most famously exemplified by Thomas More’s 
Utopia (1516), and in its critical dystopian mode, by H.G. Well’s The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896).6 
Experimentation with the new requires a confined space safeguarded from the influences of 
the ordinary world. However, the creation of a utopia is never simply a matter of authorial will; 
as Jameson argues, it is only under certain historical conditions that a utopian space can de-
velop as “a kind of eddy or self-contained backwater within the general differentiation process 
and its seemingly irreversible forward momentum” (15). 
The most vital element in Jameson’s approach to sf is the emphasis on form. For Jame-
son, any attempt to furnish a fully-fledged new world, ready to be actualized in the future, is 
bound to fail. Many traditional sf texts, so Jameson suggests, in fact fall into this trap, by seeing 
the challenge of utopia in producing a particular content–a promise of wish-fulfillment. True 
utopian thought, Jameson claims, is not about any particular world but about the process of 
imagination itself, a process that should be focused first and foremost on form rather than 
content.7 What counts is not any end-product but “the story of its production” (217). Sf texts, for 
Jameson, are especially significant because they are overtly fictional: they create another world 
that exists only in the imagination. For Jameson, the best sf texts reflect on the very process of 
world-making, presenting utopia as a textual, pluralistic, and emergent practice (Archaeologies 
).The detailed description of a world is only an epiphenomenon of an experiment with form 
through the novum, an experiment that is fundamentally processual (the very act of imagina-
tion) as well as being about a historical process whose end-point is not even on the horizon. 
Jameson calls “ideological” any sf text that gravitates too far to the side of content, thereby 
becoming merely an expression of this or that concrete fantasy predicated on and continuous 
with the present situation (i.e. capitalism). The naive wish-fulfilling impulse is vital, but it must 
be sublimated, worked upon, to produce with any consistency and viability something that is 
actually new. 
The emphasis on form and on utopia-as-process in Jameson’s work is fundamentally re-
lated to his evaluation of the role of science in sf. Jameson considers expositions in sf texts 
about scientific practices, theories, or data as mere interludes, blocks of content that may be 
fascinating but do not add anything to the working out of the central problem, which after all 
is strictly social in nature. In an analysis of Isaac Asimov’s short story Nightfall (1941), which nar-
rates the anomalous advent of a solar eclipse in a world that, being lit by multiple suns, has no 
concept of darkness, Jameson writes: “To be sure, we need not examine the scientific premise 
any too closely, since it is rather the mimesis of a scientific premise which is the crucial fea-
ture,” and one page later, that “literary theory is best served by a conception of such scientific 
content as constituting a formal device” (90-91). For Jameson, science functions in sf only as a 
literary strategy (“formal device”) that allows the writer to think another social order: science 
in itself belongs to the realm of content and is thus irrelevant to the utopian imagination. If one 
were to invest too much energy in exploring science itself, then the whole work becomes ideo-
logical: a maze of problems that are at best irrelevant, and ultimately illusory. Sf’s intervention, 
for Jameson, is different from the basic operation of the sciences: reality is never represented in 
a direct way, but in a roundabout manner, through allegory: “Allegory happens when you know 
you cannot represent something, but you also cannot not do it” (Zhang and Jameson 376). In 
other words, in literature reality emerges as something constructed, which makes us realize 
that society could be organized otherwise.
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But there is a positive role for science in Jameson’s approach. Jameson relies heavily on 
Suvin’s idea that the hallmark of sf is a sense of “methodically systematic cognition” that is 
borrowed from science (“the post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific method”) and that 
moves in the direction of a speculative future (64-65). The estrangement of a different future 
does not come ready-made; it is a pain-staking process emanating from a novum which is 
totalizing, entailing “a change of the whole universe of the tale” rather than affecting merely 
of some of its elements (64). In Archaeologies, Jameson tries to demonstrate that this defini-
tion sets sf against the realism of naturalist fiction as well as the a-historicism of myth, fairy 
tales, gothic literature, fantasy and so on (24-25). In other words, sf writers, rather than creat-
ing merely fanciful stories, are concerned with real problems, and their struggles with these 
problems produce real knowledge. For Jameson, it is not scientific content but the scientific 
attitude that gives sf writers the vital tools to think a new society. However, as I noted above, 
the experimental potential of this attitude has rather rigid limits: the scientific outlook serves 
as a mere tool for the greater goal of societal transformation. 
I want to point to what I perceive as a number of problematic aspects of Jameson’s Marxist 
framework, first of all his treatment of science as developed from the work of Suvin. Suvin’s idea 
that sf is unique in following “accepted scientific, that is, cognitive, logic” (66) is unconvincing, 
for it reifies a simplistic image of science as a unitary discourse of objective reality, and more-
over, is unnecessarily condescending towards genres such as fantasy and weird.8 Jameson and 
Suvin are of course right in saying that literature is not equipped to handle the details of science 
(and neither, I would add, is scholarship), and that the end-result will never be scientific. I also 
agree with Suvin’s contention that sf should not simply “extrapolate” from science and technol-
ogy, thereby taking the current state of affairs for granted (28). However, to infer from this, as 
Jameson does, that it should be useless and even undesirable to take the scientific content of sf 
seriously, seems to me a denial of a crucial element of good sf: to think along with science about 
complex problems. When scholarship takes scientific elements in sf seriously, what material-
izes is a dynamic understanding of science in which the latter is taken as a highly differentiated 
set of fields, people, institutions, practices, ideas, attitudes, emotions and so on, rather than a 
single “attitude” or paradigm that can either be reproduced or criticized. Apart from offering a 
fictional ethnographies of scientific life, sf also taps from the potentials of science which are not 
given and, exactly because of that, offer fertile ground for literary experimentation. Important-
ly, sf is not necessarily about science or scientists. Instead, in exploring the complex stories of 
humans, animals, plants, planets, and other bodies, the most interesting sf novels move into ar-
eas that are usually avoided by other literatures–areas commonly seen as belonging to science. 
 A second problematic aspect of Jameson’s Marxist approach is that there is only one ma-
chine, one mode of production: socio-economic production. Although Jameson repeatedly 
blames certain sf texts for being too humanist (i.e. utterly familiar, non-radical), there is also a 
deep humanism inherent in his Marxist framework: the telos of Man and his revolutionary road 
through History, a narrative of social struggle that is the story of life. The nonhumanist tenor 
of poststructuralism and radical feminism constitutes a forceful critique of this image, sug-
gesting a more capacious understanding of the body: a social, racial, gendered, sexual, animal, 
biological body. Jameson does not pay nearly enough attention to scholars and writers who 
bring the body and sexuality into the picture, against the grain of Western culture which has 
long repressed the body in favor of a rational subjectivity of which the works of Descartes and 
Kant remain the most famous articulations (Braidotti, Nomadic; Grosz, Volatile).9 The urgency 
of thinking politics as biopolitics has become urgent in a time when new biotechnological in-
novations and modes of biological understanding are emerging. There is a need for critically 
analyzing the ways contemporary bodies, human and nonhuman, are made, and sf is a genre 
in which exactly this is being done (Smelik; Vint, Bodies).
 
Minor literature
In the following I present Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to literature, revolving around the 
problem of life, as a useful complement and corrective to Jameson’s appraoch. In one of the 
few instances in Archaeologies where Jameson uses a term developed by Deleuze and Guattari 
(“lines of flight”), he argues that in literary texts
the social totality is always unrepresentable, even for the most numerically limited groups 
of people; but it can sometimes be mapped and allow a small-scale model to be constructed 
on which the fundamental tendencies and the lines of flight can more clearly be read. At 
other times, this representational process is impossible, and people face history and the 
social totality as a bewildering chaos, whose forces are indiscernible (14)
In other words, utopian literature is not a matter of imagining a new society de novo. Rather, 
it entails an exploration of “tendencies,” and it is the imaginative power of this exploration that 
determines the value of sf. Jameson’s allusion to a “small-scale model” of the social totality 
harboring “fundamental tendencies and lines of flight” resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
idea that “writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even 
realms that are yet to come” (A Thousand 5). It expresses a desire to transcend the level of im-
mediate individual concerns and to intuit the social production of reality. However, especially 
in A Thousand Plateaus and later works, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that literature is a 
matter of mapping not just social tendencies, but tendencies of life.
In the light of Deleuze’s nomadic principle, the question is not whether or how adequately 
literature represents life as an object–i.e. the lives of novelistic characters as representations 
or allegories of “real” life–but rather whether literature affirms life in all its complexity and po-
tency by making the writing itself come to life. While perhaps all literature deals with life, not 
all literature expresses life intensively. As Daniel Smith has pointed out, 
For Deleuze, it is never a question of judging a work of art in terms of transcendent or 
universal criteria, but of evaluating it clinically in terms of its “vitality,” its “tenor of Life”: Does 
the work carry the process of Life to this state of an impersonal power? Or does it interrupt 
the process, stop its movement, and become blocked in the ressentiment of persons, the 
rigors of organic organization, the clichés of a standard language, the dominance of an 
established order, the world “as it is,” the judgment of God? (lii)
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According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is only through consistent experimentation with the 
raw matter of literature–language–that literature becomes lively. This mode of literary ex-
perimentation they call “minor literature.” Deleuze and Guattari differentiate minor literature 
from major (majoritarian) literature, which uses language to create a fictional world that is 
ultimately familiar, and in that sense conservative. As Ronald Bogue explains, “A major usage of 
language limits, controls, organizes and regulates linguistic materials in support of a dominant 
social order, whereas a minor usage of a language induces disequilibrium in its components, 
taking advantage of the potential for diverse and divergent discursive practices already pres-
ent within the language” (“Minoritarian” 168). Like anything else in the universe, language is 
continually changing; writers of minor literature thrive on this potential for change, affirming 
it through experimentation. Major literature, instead, reproduces standard grammatical, syn-
tactic, and narrative structures. This reproduction of linguistic normalcy is correlated with the 
maintenance of received ideas and societal structures.
Minor literature is not a genre, but a potential in all literature. In Kafka Deleuze and Guattari 
propose three characteristic for minor literature, the first being the disruption of language. In mi-
nor literature “language stops being representational in order to now move toward its extremities or its 
limits” (23; italics in original): words, grammar and sentence structures are reconfigured, show-
ing the endless variations possible in language.10 Independent of any content, this amounts to 
a joyfully unorthodox writing, an ability to make language “vibrate with a new intensity” (18). 
Deleuze and Guattari stress that Kafka’s Czech background is relevant for understanding how 
such a use of language typically emerges. Minor literature has nothing to do with minorities, 
even if the writer might belong to a minority group; it rather means to “become a nomad and 
an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language” (Kafka 19). As Deleuze and Guat-
tari state in A Thousand Plateaus, minor literature is about “the necessity of not having control 
over language” (417), opposing language as a power of domination (maintaining grammatical 
and syntactical constants) and affirming language as a power of becoming (potentia) produc-
ing “continuous variation,” an unpredictable evolution of language on the “virtual continuum of 
life” (122). When this potential for variation is exhausted to the fullest in an oeuvre like Kafka’s, 
literature becomes capable of creating visions of another society, another people. 
The second aspect of minor literature is “the connection of the individual to a political im-
mediacy” (18). Deleuze and Guattari lament the fact that most literature is preoccupied almost 
exclusively with the mental lives of individuals. The result is that literature is easily perceived 
as the pre-eminent place for experiencing and understanding personal feelings such as love, 
hope, fear, and exploring connoted philosophical questions such as human finitude, the mean-
ing of life, and so on. In major literature, the story deals primarily if not exclusively with individ-
ual or familial concerns, “the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background” (17). 
They propose that the role of minor literature is the exact opposite: it is to displace the sphere 
of self-reflection and dramatic personal relations, in order to reach the socio-political sphere. 
Criticizing Freudian psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari deny that relations portrayed in nov-
els should necessarily emanate from primordial family relations (Oedipal and other). Families 
are only one mode of triangulation (Father, mother, child); there are many other relations, each 
of them singular and complex. Instead of treating such relations as either a background or a 
discrete content (a topic or theme), in minor literature the whole work becomes “a micropoli-
tics, a politics of desire that questions all situations” (42). Kafka’s writing is propelled by prob-
lems: why is this happening? Who or what is doing this? What can be done? How to escape?
The third and final element of minor literature is the production of what Deleuze and Guat-
tari call “collective assemblages of enunciation”: literary statements that express something 
collective. The production of such statements is a direct effect of a dramatic political imme-
diacy in which the subject (the writer, a character) loses himself. Subject and object merge in 
the event, making it impossible to explain the narrative solely with reference to the (willful) 
actions of individuals. On the level of the writer, likewise, it is inadequate to explain the work as 
a natural extension of the author’s life or personality. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka’s 
personal life can be explained in the light of the social field which is expressed in his work. 
The name “Kafka” in fact no longer refers to this personal life, but to something collective: an 
oeuvre dispersed in time and space, a living thought. Kafka is an “expression machine” that 
inadvertently produces all kinds of social, psychological, and epistemological thoughts that tell 
something relevant about the world and about subjectivity:
There are no individual statements, there never are. Every statement is the product of a 
machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of enunciation (take “collective 
agents” to mean not peoples or societies but multiplicities). The proper name (nom propre) 
does not designate an individual: it is on the contrary when an individual opens up to 
the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the outcome of the most severe operation of 
depersonalization, that he or she acquires his or her true proper name. (42)
The potential of such literary statements is to reach a level at which life becomes more inten-
sive than the lives of human characters, a life of events that do not even “happen” in the sense 
of being circumscribed by and intelligible to persons or groups. It is the feeling of losing oneself 
in the sheer contingency of these events that makes minor literature escape signification: the 
production of a meaningful, ultimately harmonious world. Deleuze and Guattari are quick to 
stress, however, that any escape from signification and representation is risky, and that no es-
cape is final. Language restructures itself by producing again “a subject of enunciation, who is 
in connection with sense, and a subject of the statement, who is who is in connection, directly 
or metaphorically, with the designated thing” (20).
A number of striking resemblances and connections can be discerned between Jameson 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s approaches. Both are uninterested in a general theory of what 
literature typically does; rather they reflect on the works of those authors who experimen-
tally push the boundaries of what literature can do. Both view literature as a political rather 
than personal symptom, an analysis of life and a gesture towards a new society. Like Jameson, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue throughout their work that literature defies any structural rep-
resentational relation to a present context. Jameson’s emphasis on the very act of imagina-
tion comes close to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that desire is fundamentally “a procedure, a 
process” and therefore irreducible to any particular form (8). For both, then, a text that tries 
to represent difference, to achieve a utopia, can only be a version of Oedipal fantasy, where 
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one has finally found what had always been missing from life. Finally, Jameson’s (and Suvin’s) 
stress on narrative totalization and closure certainly has at least some affinity with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception of a literary work or oeuvre as a world in itself, a unique assemblage 
or literary machine that is fundamentally “unattributable” to a subject or context, and that 
“also has no object” (A Thousand 4).
I would argue, however, that Deleuze and Guattari have theorized the connection between 
literature and life more thoroughly. Their work does more to undo the habit of representa-
tionalism–the idea that literature, and thought in general, can be understood from the view-
point of human subjects representing the world to themselves. For Deleuze, thought is not 
the operation of common sense, reifying an autonomous thinking subject, but a moment of 
shock (Massumi). What emerges in this moment is a nonhuman, animalistic subjectivity, a “lar-
val subject,” that is not yet a fully formed, still plastic and heterogeneous (Difference 144-145). 
Moreover, thought is not merely introspective: through it, we learn that the whole world is 
full of experience, sensation, thought. Literature is able to trigger such a shock of the nonhu-
man by subverting the normal signifying function of language, bringing out its materiality –its 
raw sounds, perceptions and affections (What is Philosophy). As Deleuze and Guattari show, in 
Kafka’s oeuvre this usage of language often coincides with the presence of animals and with 
processes of becoming-animal: literature stages a confrontation with the nonhuman with the 
purpose of challenging the limitations of what humans are and should be, and pointing to a 
different collectivity in the future. 
exPeriMentation in sf
Having demonstrated how Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on the nonhuman complements 
Jameson’s theory of sf, I want to ask: Is it possible to “apply” the notion of minor literature to sf? 
Considering that the concept of minor literature designates a potential in all literature, the an-
swer to this question would have to be affirmative. Indeed, much sf contains political immedia-
cies (revolutionary inventions, wars, epidemics, etc.) and collective assemblages of enunciation 
(new subjects, societies, worlds). However, deterritorializations of language are much rarer in 
sf. Surely strange names of beings, planets, machines and so forth abound in sf, but these have 
very little to do with the creative uprooting of grammar and syntax that Deleuze and Guattari 
are after.11 I would argue that the deterritorialization of language is not a distinctive experimen-
tal strength of sf and that, consequently, a simple application of Deleuze and Guattari’s con-
cept of minor literature will not suffice. When approached from the side of the literary text, the 
challenge may be formulated differently: how does Deleuze and Guattari’s concept transform 
when placed in the new environment of sf? How does the essence of sf–the experimental pro-
duction of worlds through the novum–link up with minor literature? While undoubtedly there 
are multiple perspectives from which these questions can be approached, including the Jame-
sonian emphasis on form, I wish to foreground sf’s epistemological relationship with science. 
 What, then, is the status of science in sf? A suitable starting point for answering this ques-
tion is Hub Zwart’s Understanding Nature: Case Studies in Comparative Epistemology (2008), which 
builds on Zola’s notion of the “literary experiment.”12 Zwart stresses the complementarity of literary 
and scientific knowledge as “different strategies that enable us to gain important insights con-
cerning nature or natural entities, such as landscapes, animals or plants” (6). Literature, Zwart 
argues, constitutes a more “intimate” form of knowledge in which “the subject seems to be 
one, more or less, with its object” (3). Moreover, according to Zwart, literature itself already 
becomes an exercise in comparative epistemology, for example in Melville’s Moby Dick, which 
narrates a confrontation between a scientific and a literary (imaginative) approach to the 
question “what is a whale?” (86-88). For Zwart, novels become experimental mainly when they 
expose particular entities such as researchers, animals, and machines to one another in a sys-
tematic manner. Literature, then, takes on certain traits that we associate with science, while 
at the same time it reveals the imaginative or aesthetic dimensions of science. Zwart rethinks 
the relation between thought and aesthetics in ways similar to Birgit Kaiser, who has argued 
with Baumgarten (and Leibniz and Deleuze) that nature does not take “a leap from darkness 
into the clarity of thinking” (“Two Floors” 222), but rather emerges in a twilight of feelings and 
ideas. Thought and aesthetics relate to one another in a manner of enfolding, even though 
they operate “according to two different orders” (221).
Zwart and Kaiser’s approaches are in agreement with Deleuze’s basic view of literature as 
a map of forces (social, biological, physical, etc.) that must be read literally and not, as Jameson 
suggests for sf, exclusively as an allegory of social change. To perceive the strange worlds and 
events of sf as allegorical extensions of social (human) phenomena greatly diminishes sf’s po-
tential as thought. In Kafka Deleuze and Guattari try to reveal a “Kafka experimentation” that 
is based on “tests of experience” in which life emerges as something strange, unstable (7). As 
Réda Bensmaïa puts it in his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s book, with Kafka literature 
becomes “an experimental machine, a machine for effects, as in physics” (xi). Rather than aim-
ing at a particular outcome, the literary experiment is designed to be continued ad infinitum: 
“The problem is not that of being free but of finding a way out, or even a way in, another side, 
a hallway, an adjacency” (8). Just as in nomad science, where the practice of problematiza-
tion does not lead from problems to fitting solutions but rather produces a multiplication of 
problems, in minor literature desire follows a logic of contiguity (in space) and continuity (in 
time), a path of continuous variation or “line of flight” (47). This line of flight is an affirmation 
of the nonhuman, “anorganic” life that makes possible a new health and “new possibilities for 
living” (Bogue, Deleuze 192). As Colebrook, Lambert and Bensmaïa have emphasized, a similar 
pragmatic task is reserved for scholars, who should resist becoming statist thinkers subjecting 
literary texts to judgment (establishing a canon) or interpretation (as if they carry some deeper 
meaning). Rather, scholars should take them as sources of inspiration for drawing their own 
lines of flight.13
In line with the above, I want to read sf literally, analyzing the way it contemplates the 
problem of life, not just the desires and activities of human beings. Moving into the micro-
worlds inside (human) bodies and the macroworlds of outer space, sf treads on terrains that 
scientists are most familiar with. In order to build and navigate these worlds, sf incorporates 
scientific content, which–and this is crucial–functions as part of the literary machine, in particular 
through the novum. This incorporation can be regarded as a kind of epistemological “alliance” 
(Clayton, “Convergence” 824) or symbiosis: science becomes a symbiont that is useful for the 
firming the singular difference that each literary experiment produces.14 In Robinson’s trilogy, the 
problem-event of the Mars mission includes divergent processes that require different scientific 
vocabularies: the co-evolution and proliferation of species, the transformation of atmospheres, 
the psychosomatic ordeals of individual scientists living on Mars, the seclusion and blending 
of scientific and cultural groups, and the emergence of new societies and ways of thinking. 
Minor sf reveals a rich potential for nomad science, for making connections along a continuum 
or topological space, and complicates control science’s task of generating immediate solutions. 
 Like minor literature, minor sf produces nomadic characters, subjects who desire to be open 
to the world and to transform (Braidotti, Nomadic). In minor sf the windows of perception and 
understanding are opened up to the chaos from inside and outside, a chaos that threatens 
distinctions of inside and outside altogether, causing vertigo, but also enabling the creation of 
new possibilities for life and living. This is the object of minor sf: to follow problem-events oc-
curring in a field of forces, exploring the ways in which characters are affected by these events 
and act upon them. An sf problem–say, the encounter with an extraterrestrial species–can 
be destructive in some ways, but it may also trigger new capabilities and even new species. In 
minor sf, humanity is no longer that which is given, the very ground of being, but that whose 
conditions of existence must be intuited and transformed (in congruence with Foucault’s idea 
that historians should seek to describe the “historical a priori”15 of what it is to be human). As 
the Mars trilogy illustrates, such literary experiments with the vitality of human bodies always 
involve wider conditions–ultimately the world, or life as such–so that it really is a nomadic 
ontology that is at stake.
This brings me to one last aspect: the transformation of politics into biopolitics. Minor sf 
radicalizes Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that in minor literature everything is political–not just 
psychological, social and cultural existence, but also biophysical existence. In the Mars trilogy, 
the stress, depressions, aches and injuries that characters have to deal with are all related to 
the conditions on Mars. It is the shocking experience of living on a foreign planet that makes 
characters aware of biophysical existence, which becomes inseparable from their psychosocial 
lives. The success in understanding and altering these conditions , as well as human bodies 
themselves, is a precondition for thriving as individuals, communities and as a society. This situ-
ation exemplifies Deleuze’s image of the “society of control” (see chapter 3) in which every part 
of existence is subjected to continual modulation. In the genomic age we are witnessing the 
emergence of an all-encompassing biopolitics–a politicization of bios, understood as human 
life. However, the experiment on Mars also harbors the possibility of another biopolitics that 
resists the idea of total human control, picturing human life as part of biophysical processes at 
multiple scales. This is what Braidotti has termed “zoē-politics,” an awareness of the agency in 
zoē or life as such: “Nature is more than the sum of its marketable appropriations: it is also an 
agent that is beyond the reach of domestication and commodification … ‘Life’ has emerged as 
the subject and not the object of political processes” (Transpositions 47, 55). Crisis situations in 
minor sf trigger a realization that “our lives” are entangled with all kinds of processes that we do 
not control, but that we must come to terms with: the world is not a stage for human action, 
but a network of actors. As the case studies in chapters 3 to 5 will demonstrate, the most suc-
cessful human characters are those who respect and respond to the agency of nonhuman life. 
literary organism, but also a source of mutations. Taking scientific ideas, desires, attitudes and 
practices as important raw material, the sf writer adopts a language that is not his own, us-
ing that language in a completely different way (usually without deterritorializing language 
as such). He is free to delve into any field or problem, unencumbered by the disciplinary and 
methodological constraints that scientists have to deal with. This is a risky experiment with the 
limits of literature: How much scientific detail can the writer and the reader take? How much 
science can the story absorb without succumbing to its weight? The symbiosis of sf constitutes 
an exchange of traits, a becoming-scientific of literature and a becoming-literary of science, 
that needs to be managed carefully to prevent the experiment from losing consistency.
When exactly does sf become minor sf, a literary practice expressive of a desire for “the 
open, virtual potential to become in unforeseen ways” (Burns and Kaiser 12)? This happens, I 
argue, when the narrative is not just about the lives of human beings but about life itself, for 
example in Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy, where a whole new world emerges in the in-
terplay of human and nonhuman factors without humans being able to control the experiment. 
By starting from an unsettling event beyond human control, this mode of sf produces “collec-
tive assemblages of enunciation,” pointing to the possibility of another humanity and another 
world. The experimentalism of minor sf, then, transforms literature in a way different but akin 
to Kafka’s experiments. The writer’s dependence on a scientific language that is not his own 
can conjure up “the feeling of self-betrayal, or of ‘falsifying oneself’” (Lambert 26), which is simi-
lar to what the writer of minor literature experiences, belonging neither to the cultural majority 
nor to a specific minority. Just as minor literature manages to extract from language new forms 
that disturb our sense of subjectivity and point to a nonhuman life, minor sf extracts from science 
ideas, desires, attitudes, and practices that co-construct a narrative in which science and the human sub-
ject are no longer stable, autonomous entities, but parts of planetary and even cosmic assemblages open 
to change. In minor sf, narrative is a snap-shot of evolution, involving the becomings of animals, 
plants, and other nonhuman elements. Here, the novum constitutes what Paul Patton, draw-
ing on Deleuze, has called a “problem-event” (Deleuzian 113): an ontological, epistemological and 
political problem that is all the more disquieting for being a becoming rather than a discrete, iso-
latable problem. The scientist-protagonist is completely immersed in the event of the novum, 
and thus unable to play the role of distanced, neutral observer. In other words, minor sf is not 
primarily about experiments by human subjects, but foremost about experiments with human 
subjects and their worlds. 
If sf turns scientific practices, images, ideas etc. into a singular subject matter, minor sf goes 
one step further, truly thinking along with science, not by extrapolating from facts but by explor-
ing problems such as planetary transformation in the Mars trilogy. Chapters 3 to 5 will demon-
strate that while, at first sight, such problems divide science, eliciting divergent responses from 
various disciplinary and theoretical positions within and beyond the biosciences, under the sur-
face these problems connect disparate scientific fields like a rhizome. It is often on the cutting 
edges of science, those nomadic areas between the disciplines, that minor sf finds fertile ground 
for exciting stories, riffing on possible connections between “hard” and “soft” sciences, anthro-
pological and non-anthropological concerns. Reading sf literally, then, is emphatically not about 
claiming some kind of (scientific) factuality, or about taking things at face value, but about af-
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bear’s bio-sf
If from a Deleuzian point of view, all great literary texts record a writer’s unique struggle with 
a problem–ultimately the problem of life (Smith xiii)–in sf such guiding problems are often 
related to a particular scientific field. For example, the idea of the fabricated monster in sf nar-
ratives from Frankenstein to Jurassic Park is related to the hopes and fears inherent in biological 
research (Zwart, De waarheid). Other common biological novums in sf are the outbreak of a 
contagious disease or the encounter with an unknown (extraterrestrial) species. In his bio-sf 
novels, Greg Bear spawns a variation on these novums, imagining transformations of human 
life as we know it as a result of genetic infection through viruses. Bear’s narratives of change 
from within are insufficiently understood when analyzed as allegories of social or psychologi-
cal change (although his oeuvre is replete with political, psychological and parapsychological 
ideas). Rather, the event of genetic infection makes it possible to “discern beneath the merely 
personal the power of the impersonal” (Lambert 16), putting the integrity of human forms and 
behaviors into question, including the idea of the autonomous subject, the “I.” 
The a-typicality of Bears narratives, in which human transmutation is described openly and 
scrupulously, becomes obvious as soon as one glosses over the history of sf. In Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein (1818), often counted as one of the first sf narratives, scientist Victor Frankenstein 
manages to build a complete humanoid being de novo from a vast collection of body parts gath-
ered from “the dissecting room and the slaughter house” (55). The reader does not witness a vi-
able process of transformation from an inanimate to an animate body, but rather is presented 
with a sudden, miraculous moment when Victor sees “the dull yellow eye of the creature open” 
(58). In a similar vein, in H.G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), a scientists specialized in 
vivisection retreats to an island where he manages to create new human-like creatures through 
medical experiments with animals, experiments that remain utterly opaque to the reader. 
More recently, Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2004) leads the reader into a dystopian fu-
ture where genome scientist Crake has created a new species of man and killed all the “old” hu-
mans through the dissemination of a virus against which only he is protected. I want to point 
to three salient aspects of these literary representations of transmutation. First, the process 
occurs in confined, secret places (usually laboratories) whose environments play no role what-
soever, apart from displaying the effects of the transmutation. Second, these scenarios seem 
mostly concerned with warning against the dangerous possibilities of science, leaving alterna-
tive, positive uses relatively untapped. Third, by looking exclusively at the purposeful actions of 
human beings, these texts fail to account for transformation as a potential inherent in life itself. 
 In his bio-sf novels Blood Music (1985), Darwin’s Radio (1999), and Darwin’s Children (2003), 
Bear provides an alternative to these literary scenarios, unfolding the idea of a nonhuman 
life taking hold of humanity, changing it from within, without attaching moral claims to this 
event. In Blood Music, genetic engineer Vergil Ulam injects himself with a strange, seemingly 
intelligent cell culture he had fabricated as an alternative to laboratory rats. The cell culture 
then “takes over” his body, which slowly begins to transform. Ulam’s “disease” spreads like a 
virus, contaminating the whole population of North America in the course of the novel. By 
the end, infected human bodies have completely dissolved into a featureless, reddish flesh 
covering the land, habitats for nanomachines or “noocytes” that keep the noosphere (realm 
of thought) alive in the absence of human consciousness. Blood Music prefigures nanotech 
pioneer Eric Drexler’s “grey goo” hypothesis presented in Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of 
Nanotechnology (1986), which entertains the possibility of artificial nanolife proliferating beyond 
control, overgrowing the Earth’s continents. It feeds into technophobic and dystopian lamen-
tations about new technologies signaling the end of human nature (Baudrillard; Fukuyama; 
Habermas).16 Seemingly informed by such worries, Jameson has argued that Blood Music is a 
“chronological marker” for a paradigm shift from physics to biology, a shift that “is calculated 
to make problems for conventional sf representation and narrative,” because “the complexi-
ties of biology and the genetic, indeed bio-power itself, offer a content and a raw material far 
more recalcitrant to plot formation than even Einsteinian cosmology and the undecidability 
of atomic subparticles” (Archaeologies 68). Jameson’s discarding of Blood Music and his reserva-
tions about bio-sf as such are curious in an age of far-reaching biotechnological developments. 
Even if it were true that, as Jameson argues, contemporary bio-sf has not succeeded in offering 
convincing utopian narratives, would it not deserve critical discussion, including its relation to 
the biosciences and contemporary biopolitics? 
In Blood Music, biological content is entangled with social existence in immediate, pressing 
ways, creating a situation that is biopolitical. Being or not being infected becomes the primary 
marker for one’s existence. The story sketches a biopolitics of control vis à vis the “plague” in-
volving the Centers of Disease Control and the US military. Blood Music critically interrogates a 
“prophesy” in science and society that nanotech is able “to accomplish almost anything called 
for by human desires” (Milburn, “Nanotechnology” 262). Epistemologically, Bear’s story com-
bines nanotech with genetics, imagining an intelligent entity based on biochips that behaves 
neither like an organism nor like a machine, imagining an extended eco-network that ends all 
(individual) human agency. In spite of being critical about techno-utopianism, Bear’s repre-
sentation of life is also problematic, because it presents a cybernetic model as if it were a kind 
of theory of everything, a key to life itself, thus reinforcing a scientific and political desire to 
control life. Yet in following the problem of horizontal genetic communication, Bear also brings 
into literary representation a hybrid, inorganic life, an important prelude to thinking humanity 
and its world beyond the notion of control.
The bio-cybernetic life form in Blood Music transforms humans into one large entity that 
can perhaps no longer be perceived as an organism, for it has no organs. This idea is akin to 
what Deleuze and Guattari call a “Body without Organs” (A Thousand 4), a term borrowed from 
the poet Antonin Artaud. Deleuze and Guattari imagine a different body–or, more aptly per-
haps, a different modality of the body–that is not governed by a telos of organization and con-
servation. The notion of Body without Organs, which applies not just to biological bodies but 
to any body, refers to a site of intensive connection and transformation, rather than a body as 
already differentiated (in functional parts) and qualified (as a particular species).17 The organ-
ism is an actualization of virtual intensities that do not simply “belong” to it, but rather coincide 
with it. If organisms have no choice but to follow the “natural” developmental paths carved out 
for them, this process can be interrupted by events in which nature operates “against itself” (A 
Thousand 267). For Deleuze and Guattari, experimentation in art is a way of affirming this po-
tential for disruption in nature, resisting the mundane demands of the organism and of society. 
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They argue that the work of writers like Artaud or William Burroughs, in questioning and 
mocking the specific arrangement of body parts, creates a body without organs, thus “liber-
ating life” from the organism (169-70; 175-77). In experimenting with the body, these writers 
begin to believe that the idea of autonomous subjectivity, of “having” a body of one’s own, is 
but a limiting cognitive habit. At the molecular level, “every animal is fundamentally a band, a 
pack” (264), and all organisms are connected rhizomatically. Writing should be an affirmation 
of this molecular multiplicity, not the reification of human subjectivity.
According to Mark Hansen18 and Catherine Hayles, the concept of Body without Organs 
expresses a philosophical desire for endless variation, a desire that blinds Deleuze and Guattari 
to the highly specific, constrained processes of organic life.19 The critique leveled at the concept 
of Body without Organs is similar to many responses to Blood Music: when the push toward 
variation becomes too intense, the situation ends in chaos, leaving no hope for the future. Blood 
Music manages to dismantle the organism, bringing out life as an impersonal event, yet fails to 
construe something new, ending up in a homogeneous mass of self-replicating information-
matter. The human body literally merges with the landscape, just like in J.G. Ballard’s novel 
The Crystal World (1966) where suddenly the whole world, organic and nonorganic, gradually 
crystalizes. Another example is Arthur C. Clarke’s Childhoods End (1953), in which an extrater-
restrial power prepares humanity for transmutation into a different form, where all humans 
connect physically and mentally, eventually joining “the Overmind,” a God-like force pervading 
the universe. With such transmutation narratives, there are no characters and no narrators 
to continue the story–in Jameson’s words, such events are “recalcitrant to plot formation.” 
They may alternately imply a kind of verification of messianism–an arrival at the end of history 
where humanity fuses with its maker–or a “falling,” a regression to the pre-biotic soup from 
which life emerged. 
However, it remains an open question whether the end situation of Blood Music really is 
one of homogeneity, inertia and simplicity, and whether it is good or bad. Deleuze and Guat-
tari go at lengths to argue that the body without organs is never simply something positive or 
negative: it is both desirable and dangerous, and therefore experimentation should be carried 
out with great care.20 In the story of Blood Music, it is careless experimentation that allows hu-
man life to turn into a decentered swarm, an idea that is disturbing “for its engulfing largeness 
and for the many, too many smallnesses of which it is made” (McGurl 551 n. 37). If Bear goes 
too far into the direction of chaos, something is gained from this nevertheless. In Blood Music, 
the swarm, a form of life that humans can hardly recognize as such21, becomes not so much 
intelligible as something that can be felt and heard through the actions and communications 
of the noocytes who gradually “take over” the human body. Whereas Jameson argues that the 
biological is recalcitrant to plot formation, I would argue the contrary: life, understood not as a 
given species or a molecular essence but as the unfathomable inorganic life inhering in the organic, 
is a most fertile source for sf experimentation. Narratives of transmutation such as Bear’s and 
Ballard’s do not fit the dominant picture of evolution as leading from simplicity to human civi-
lization (Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring 22). They challenge us to think about evolution nonlin-
early, and with no pretension to human superiority. Rather than reifying oppositions between 
the human genome (as informational essence) and the nonhuman environment, Blood Music 
represents DNA as place where the outside becomes inside. As in the Mars trilogy, human bod-
ies are part of an immense biophysical network open to change. If Blood Music can be called a 
story of monstrosity, then this monstrosity refers first and foremost to the very processes of 
contamination and transformation that become intelligible with contemporary biosciences. In 
the words of the character Bernard, “the situation itself is monstrous” (212). In this sense Blood 
Music is akin to Kafka’s The Trial, where the law is no longer a rigidly organized body, instead 
becoming an event, “an influence machine, a contamination” in which there is “no longer any 
difference between outside and inside” (Kafka 8).22
conclusion
The fact that Deleuze and Guattari chose as a subtitle for their book on Kafka the cautious “To-
ward a Minor Literature” indicates that they want to bring out a certain potential in literature 
that is still, and perhaps always, embryonic: a capacity to bring life as such into view. Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that Kafka’s short stories were short for a reason: the basic experimental 
idea was a dead-end. They argue that Kafka’s famous novels are far more successful precisely 
in being “interminable works” that bring out an immanent field of desire, a politics that includes 
everything. I have argued that sf novels like Bear’s perform something similar, recording the 
struggle with an ongoing problem-event that cannot be solved. Thus sf stops being, in writer 
and critic Brian Aldiss’s words, “the search for a definition of mankind and his status in the 
universe” (25), and becomes an exploration of conditions that make humanity possible (social, 
physical, biological, etc.) but also make its transmutation inevitable. This search for nonhuman 
conditions is aided by a plethora of scientific elements, not by something as vague as what 
Jameson (with Suvin) calls a “cognitive attitude.” In Blood Music science is not an authoritative 
window onto the world, which can either be promoted or criticized, but rather an assemblage 
of ideas, desires, attitudes and practices that become vital ingredients for narrative. The sus-
pense of sf novels such as Bear’s lies mostly in the continuous feeling of discovery, a pursuit 
of anomalies that leads into epistemological and ontological boundary zones between the 
disciplines and on the borders of science as such. Minor sf thrives on that adventurous, no-
madic side of science that is usually rather minimal or even absent from a scientist’s everyday 
experience.
Blood Music confronts readers with phenomena of molecular entanglement, swarm intel-
ligence, and spontaneous transmutation, ideas that shatter the image of a superior, autono-
mous humanity. If Blood Music provokes a shock of the biophysical, then this shock leaves hu-
manity literally paralyzed, as well as transmogrified beyond all recognition. I would argue that 
Blood Music, rather than representing a historical and, for Jameson, deplorable “watershed” for 
sf (Archaeologies 68), marks a critical threshold or zero-degree point where sf becomes minor, 
figuring life differently while balancing at the brink of chaos. Blood Music is not an especially 
careful experiment, but it does create the basic conditions for thinking a nomadic science, sub-
jectivity and biopolitics. As I will demonstrate in chapter 4, Bear’s novel Darwin’s Radio, written 
a decade later, goes one step further. Here the transmutation of humanity does not involve 
a complete merger of humanity and world, but a moment of mutual feedback that leads to 
vital experiments: sf, science, and the shock of the biophysical — 49 
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new traits and physiological forms. Bear’s desire to think with science, expressing in literature 
something essential about life–its immanent connections and ongoing transformations–both 
evokes and resonates with the basic tenets of a nomad science that introduces new transdis-
ciplinary problems. It is to nomad science and the question of life that I will tend now, momen-
tarily stepping out of the world of sf and into contemporary biosciences.
—  3  —
T H I N K I N G  A  L I F E : 
N O M A D I S M  A S  A  C H A L L E N G E  
 
F O R  ( P O S T - ) G E N O M I C S
Life goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it,  
but thought goes beyond the limits that life fixes for it.
– Gilles Deleuze –
 
introduction
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari propose that science has two forms. On the one 
hand there is “royal” or “State” science, which is organized in hierarchical institutions at the 
service of power. Power binds science to its own purposes–organizing and thereby controlling 
the world–and in return grants science a sense of autonomy and authority (412). The funda-
mental operation of State science, according Deleuze and Guattari, is reproducing knowledge 
as well as its conditions of production (410; 413). On the other hand, there is a mode of science 
that lacks a fixed institutional form, refusing to be directly and permanently linked to power; 
it is “itinerant,” “ambulant” or “nomadic” (411). Nomad science is characterized by four prefer-
ences: fluidity rather than solidity, becoming rather than being, topology rather than Euclidian 
geometry, and problematization rather than theorem (398-99). The basic operation of nomad 
science is “following the flow of matter” (412) without aiming to control it. Although Deleuze 
and Guattari emphasize that nomad science is not better than State science, “just different” 
(410), they clearly encourage nomad thinking. As we will see, State science, in its urge to arrive 
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at solutions sooner rather than later, can severely limit the potentials of thinking, and even 
produce “solutions” that are entirely unfitting. 
A number of scholars have offered historical and contemporary examples of nomad sci-
ence. Manuel Delanda traces nomadic traits in both sides of the debate between Isaac Newton 
(1642-1727). and Robert Hooke (1635-1703), Newton initially following nomadic lines (including 
those of alchemy) but eventually becoming an ultimate State scientist–the head of the Royal 
Society (“Material” 16). Andrew Pickering argues that the prospect for nomadic perspectives in 
contemporary science lies with “the sciences of complexity, emergence and becoming” (“No-
mad” 155) which he traces back to early cybernetics specialists working outside state-funded 
research. Along the same lines, Sian Sullivan and Katherine Homewood link nomad science to 
contemporary ideas about non-equilibrium dynamics that fly in the face of government and 
corporate practices of control and postures of certainty (22). Jeremy Hunsinger argues that 
nomad science describes well those scientists advocating “open and mutable” cyberinfrastruc-
tures (277) and Marcelo Svirsky discerns a nomad science of political activism that resists strat-
egies of incorporation in government and corporate programs of participation, instead spurring 
“creative acts of citizenship that actualize ruptures” (3). To summarize, keywords of contempo-
rary nomad science appear to be complexity, open infrastructures, and non-institutionalized 
creativity (Hunsinger; Pickering, “Nomad”; Sullivan and Homewood; Svirsky).
I see two major challenges in working with the concepts of State science and nomad sci-
ence in science studies. Firstly, the label “State” is outdated in the sense that it does not do 
justice to the increasing role of corporations in scientific research, often in combination with 
governmentally funded initiatives and programs. As a response to this problem, I want to pro-
pose to substitute “State science” for a new term, “control science,” to analyze corporate sci-
ence as well as scientific projects where the state and corporations work in tandem. Control 
science can be understood in analogy to what Deleuze has called “societies of control,” a con-
temporary constellation of power emerging in the era of global capitalism in which control is 
no longer primarily disciplinary (as in Foucault’s notion of biopolitics), but rather distributed or 
networked. This new biopolitics is distinguished by heightened levels of flexibility–a capacity to 
“modulate” subjects, policies, methodologies, etc. in response to new circumstances. A second 
challenge is that, given the ubiquity of terms like “complexity” and “emergence” (also in state-
funded programs), drawing distinctions between State, control and nomad science is often a 
difficult task.1 As I will show below, scientific projects which appear to truly “follow” complexity 
wherever it leads them, can easily reterritorialize on the grounds of capital and the state, thus 
leaving nomadic potentials untapped. The challenge is not to determine easy labels, but to map 
the de/re/territorializations of science.
In order to start thinking about contemporary dynamics of control and nomad science, 
addressing the challenges mentioned above, this chapter to analyzes the story of the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) and the subsequent scientific adventures of biologist Craig Venter. I 
do not wish to argue that Venter is somehow “representative” for all research done under the 
banner of (post-)genomics–quite the contrary, Venter is “biology’s bad boy,” as the popular 
media have it, someone who opens new territories for science. Venter’s autobiography A Life 
Decoded: My Genome my Life (2007) is fascinating because it reveals the deep ambiguity of his 
ideas, practices, attitudes, and desires. On the one hand, Venter’s entrepreneurship, his capac-
ity to think beyond scientific and national borders, his flexibility, and his dedication to making 
life as such susceptible to modulation on the molecular level, puts his research squarely into 
the category of control science. Indeed, scholars see a significant role for genomics in the a 
new era of technoscientific biopower (Cooper; Marks; Rose). However, Venter’s recent ef-
fort to sequence “the genome of the ocean” (A Life 343) out of the DNA extracted from water 
samples collected in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans also points to nomadic potentials in (post-)
genomics. The ocean is a “nomadic” space par excellence: a topological space that is difficult to 
navigate let alone to control. The water samples collected by Venter and his team are not dis-
crete objects but fluid ecologies, becomings, whose complexity may problematize the way we 
think about aquatic and terrestrial life. The question is to what extent these potentials can be 
actualized within the parameters of Venter’s overall research project aimed at the unraveling 
of life’s essence, and I argue that this is difficult. To draw out the nomadic potentials of Venter’s 
(post-)genomics projects, I will confront his work with ideas about life from Deleuze’s philoso-
phy and from the work of evolutionary biologists Susan Oyama and Lynn Margulis. This kind 
of cross-fertilization seems vital in order to recast (post-)genomics’s desire to understand and 
modulate life in more humble terms: as an experiment that is clearly beyond anyone’s control, 
but in which we participate nevertheless.
state and noMad science
In order to understand the role of power in State and nomad science, I will briefly introduce De-
leuze and Guattari’s notion of the “war-machine,” which occasions their incursion into the na-
ture of science in A Thousand Plateaus. As Deleuze and Guattari maintain, the state resembles an 
organism: essentially reactive and defensive, its primary objectives are the safety and stability 
of its territory (412). The war-machine has nothing to do with this image of territorial interiori-
ty. It is an open assemblage, a “deterritorialization” whose force is directed against any attempt 
to organize populations within stratified regions.2 The war-machine is an anthropomorphic 
assemblage (a creation of thought or activism) whose intensity is measured by the number of 
connections it makes and its “power of metamorphosis” (A Thousand 565). The more intense a 
war-machine, the more it moves towards the plane of immanence, affirming life as becoming. 
The war-machine is not necessarily violent, even if, according to Deleuze and Guattari, (gueril-
la) warfare is a necessary “complement” to social deterritorialization (466). It is associated with 
processes that destabilize and transform territories and populations, such as “underground” 
resistance, migration, and contamination. Deleuze and Guattari stress that the military institu-
tions of the State are no more and no less violent than the war-machine. Although it is not a 
matter of determining which form is better, Deleuze and Guattari’s do claim a certain primacy 
and a positivity for the war-machine. The war-machine is a sea of potential for social arrange-
ment out of which the states arise like islands, attracting populations and blocking free move-
ment. Its positivity lies in creating new ways of living, or “lines of flight,” (466-7) that escape the 
diagrams of etatism and capitalism. The war-machine thinks in flows that threaten to open up 
the modes of thinking developed–enveloped–within the confines of the state, notably binary 
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oppositions: for example, between subject and object, normal and abnormal, nature and cul-
ture. Nomad science, a mode that is “difficult to classify” and whose “history is even difficult 
to follow” (398), can be seen as a war-machine that opens up State science from the margins. 
 The four key aspects of nomad science are intrinsically rather than coincidentally vague. 
Referring to a term from Husserl, Deleuze and Guattari concur that nomad science deals with 
“vague essences” rather than exact ones (405). Deleuze and Guattari use one aspect of nomad 
science to explain the other, which makes it even more difficult to present them in a lucid man-
ner here. I will offer them all at once, in the original order, and then proceed to explain them in 
more detail, contrasting them with State science:
1. a use of “hydraulic models,” in other words, a preference for fluidity rather than solidity; 
2.  a focus on “becoming and heterogeneity, as opposed to the stable, the eternal, the identi-
cal, the constant”; 
3.  a topological approach that “operates an open space throughout which things-flows are 
distributed, rather than plotting out a closed space for linear and solid things”; 
4. a model that is “problematic, rather than a theorematic” (398-99).
The four points overlap to the extent that they can be seen as perspectives on a single idea: 
before actualizing in bodies and states of affairs, the world is a becoming. The best way to ex-
plain State and nomad science is perhaps to stipulate their relations to this idea at the heart 
of Deleuze’s philosophy. While State science thinks of matter as a passive, dead “material” 
waiting to be formed, nomad science evokes “a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as 
such” (454). There is movement in matter. The world is in first instance a topology, a fluid unity 
where each element is connected to the whole, and to change one element will necessarily 
affect all the others. The world is in flux, and nomad science affirms the potential of this flux 
by following it. Accordingly, nomad science defines matter not by a fixed identity or essence but 
rather by its singularities (critical points, for example the boiling point of water) and its affects, 
meaning its “ability to affect and be affected” (xvii). This idea applies to inorganic as much as 
to organic bodies. A concrete example that Deleuze and Guattari give is the craft and sci-
ence of metallurgy, which carefully follows the singularities and affects of metals, rather than 
hammering form out of passive material (453-458). This susceptibility of matter to becoming 
that metallurgy attests to cannot be thought within the axioms of State science, which builds 
its structures on a homogenous, inert matter. State science is a science of laws: it discovers 
constants to which all phenomena can be related as “variables” via a rational method. Deleuze 
and Guattari qualify its logic as one of controlled reproduction, a procedure that implies “the 
permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow 
from the bank” (410). To think the openness of bodies to becoming, as in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
example of metallurgy, forces us to assume an open or “smooth” space to which the enclosed 
spaces of State science are only secondary.
Especially the idea of a “problematic” model perhaps demands some further explanation. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, to problematize is to never settle for a particular identity of a body or 
entity–rather, it is to inquire into its unique and ever-changing conditions of existence:
One does not go by specific differences from a genus to its species, or by deduction from a 
stable essence to the properties deriving from it, but rather from a problem to the accidents 
that condition and resolve it. This involves all kinds of deformations, transmutations, 
passages to the limit, operations in which each figure designates an “event” much more 
than an essence; the square no longer exists independently of a squadrature, the cube of a 
cubature, the straight line of a rectification. (A Thousand 398-99)
Mathematical and geometrical figures are not givens, but already answers to problems (how 
to design, build, etc). But what goes for figures and concepts goes for anything: life is noth-
ing other than the continuous unfolding of problems. An organism’s conditions of existence, 
Deleuze argues, are problematic in-and-of-themselves, not by virtue of a scientist’s point of 
view. In fact, the organism is “nothing if not the solution to a problem, as are each of its dif-
ferenciated organs, such as the eye which solves a light ‘problem’” (Difference 263). Organisms 
do not germinate from an internal or external cause, but materialize as solutions within a 
problem-field (i.e. actual and virtual conditions) that forces them into action–how to grow, 
sustain, create, recombine, transform. Every problem is already a kind of answer, a strategic 
response to higher level problems in the intermediary zone between organization and chaos. 
Deleuze and Guattari oppose the problematic model to that of theorems and axioms. The 
theoremic model of State science, they argue, conceives of problems as obstacles (399). It is 
based on a positivistic outlook that envisions science as a rational puzzle-solver, with a strong 
tendency to neglect “the metamorphoses, generations, and creations within science itself” 
(399). Perhaps we could say that, from this perspective, truth is the state in which obstacles 
have been removed, where life is evened out, made homogeneous, peaceful. State science 
is a science of the actual, where the world comes ready-made, distributed in essences and 
properties, parts and wholes, subjects and objects. The heat or turbulence of the war-machine 
undoes the hardening of binary oppositions that theorematic models presuppose. Nomad sci-
ence brings back the chaos, the violent movement of life under the surface of actualized bod-
ies. Operating at the fringes of science, it is engaged in battling chaos on the one side and 
State science’s axioms on the other, opening up and boosting thought by connecting hitherto 
seemingly disparate phenomena.
Unfortunately, the chapter in A Thousand Plateaus on the war-machine hardly concreticizes 
State and nomad science through clear examples.3 Deleuze and Guattari do mention metal-
lurgists, “gothic journeymen” (medieval builders), and engineers as historical models of nomad 
science (457-58; 406; 400). What binds these craftsmen is an intimate relationship with mat-
ter, a taste for experimenting with new procedures and materials. These examples show that 
nomad science has an immediate practicality: its problems are not mere abstractions but calls 
to action, calls that seem to emanate from matter itself rather than from power. However, 
there is a more elaborated example that Deleuze and Guattari provide without actually using 
the terms of State and nomad science: the debate on the between Eighteenth-Century biolo-
gists Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). This debate 
may serve as an entry point for thinking about the fundamental attitudes of State and nomad 
science towards the problem of life in the era of (post-)genomics. 
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Cuvier maintained that species are formally distinct, eternal types with a harmonious set 
of functions (organs), whereas Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire stressed that the species change in re-
sponse to their environments, that they share universal elements (belonging to a common 
“plan of nature”), and that organs compete with one another. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire was pri-
marily interested in the conditions of existence of species–the very possibility of the generation 
of newness which is real but not easily demonstrated or described. For Cuvier, instead, there 
are only the empirically observable, actual differences, which are coherently organized in the 
genera, the species and in each organism. Cuvier resolutely denounced the idea of a plan of 
nature, calling it “metaphysical.” The two scientists differed not just in their thinking, but also 
in their careers. Both served Napoleon Bonaparte, but it was Cuvier who had been trained as 
an administrator and, increasingly during his career, became occupied with political tasks, del-
egating the scientific work to students, while Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire remained “the archetype 
of a disinterested scholar, avid for freedom” (Le Guyader 19). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari qualify the differences between the two scientists as follows:
The sweet and subtle Geoffroy and the violent and serious Cuvier do battle around 
Napoleon. Cuvier, the rigid specialist, is pitted against Geoffroy, always ready to switch 
specialties. Cuvier hates Geoffroy, he can’t stomach Geoffroy’s light-hearted formulas, his 
humor (yes, Hens do indeed have teeth, the Lobster has skin on its bones, etc.). Cuvier is a 
man of Power and Terrain, and he won’t let Geoffroy forget it; Geoffroy, on the other hand, 
prefigures the nomadic man of speed. Cuvier reflects a Euclidian space, whereas Geoffroy 
thinks topologically. (A Thousand 53)
As this example shows, the dynamics of State and nomad science are fundamentally dramatic–
a play of desires, passions, and achievements, a staging of confrontations, arrestments and 
escapes. It suggests that scientists like Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, who have a propensity to think 
in terms of topological space, generally maintain a flexible position in relation to scientific 
disciplines as well as to the state. In the end, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire was declared defeated in 
dominant scientific circles, and the idea of a “plan of nature” was generally considered unsci-
entific. Due to this “defeat” Geoffroy became a somewhat neglected figure in the history of 
science. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in historiography to forget scientific nomads, ob-
scuring, for example, the fact that Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s work was much more influential on 
Darwin than Cuvier’s (Tresch, The Romantic 19-20).
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s intuition of infinitesimal differential elements structuring and con-
necting all living creatures, and making new life forms possible, resonates with the ideas about 
evolution developed in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries as well as with the birth of ge-
netics in the Twentieth century (Deleuze, Difference 233-4). Furthermore, comparing Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire’s debate with Cuvier with contemporary debates in the molecular biosciences, we 
can detect a number of striking similarities related to the interconnection between science and 
(bio)power. As Foucault’s work has shown, the emergence of modern biology around the begin-
ning of the Nineteenth century coincides with the birth of the modern state, and the two phenom-
ena have been deeply intertwined from the start. Science provided important armamentarium 
for mapping and controlling the behaviors of individuals and populations, enabling modern 
states to wield a more or less rationalized biopower or “power over life” (The Birth 19). The 
rigidity of Cuvier’s taxonomies and his proximity to Napoleon Bonaparte can be fruitfully jux-
taposed to the persistence of genetic and genomic determinism in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First centuries, and the unprecedented role of the state in financing and recruiting the sort of 
research that reifies the genetic explanation of life. Although Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s concep-
tion of invisible differential elements also resounds in genetics, his stress on connectivity, dif-
ferentiality and generativity is hard to reconcile with genetic or genomic determinism, rather 
prefiguring the complex systems-based thinking of scientists operating at the fringes of the 
molecular paradigm in the biosciences.
genoMics and the new bioPower
Deleuze and Guattari’s ruminations on State science, nomad science, and the war-machine, 
complemented with Foucault’s historical analyses, can be used to understand how the conflu-
ence of (cold-war) militarization and state-funded science since World War II, particularly in 
the US, gave rise to a new form of biopower. After World War II, with the exodus of physicists to 
the biosciences, and, concomitantly, the introduction of the discourse of information and com-
munication science into biology (Kay), the biosciences became increasingly dominated by a big 
science approach (De Solla Price), enabling unprecedented possibilities for prediction and con-
trol. In her influential historical study of the “cracking” of the genetic code, Lily Kay shows that in 
the 1950s molecular life became the preferred object of state-sponsored science. Kay describes 
how during this period “military power extended into the world of the mind” and came to domi-
nate the biosciences “through its various discourses and representations, notably the discourse 
of information and the technoscientific imaginary of communication and control systems” (11). 
Through this novel constellation, Kay argues, the molecular biosciences helped to inaugurate a 
new form of biopower where “the genetic code became the site of life’s command and control” 
(5). Kay’s historical analyses form a highly significant backdrop for contemporary biology, which 
continues to be closely aligned with governments, military incentives, and discourses of control. 
 It is in this context of emergent biopower that I want to place the story of the Human Ge-
nome Project (HGP), a story that is compelling for at least three reasons. Firstly, in some sense, 
the story of the HGP is still unfinished because the debate about its results is still going on. 
While critical voices argue that the HGP suffered from basic misunderstandings which explain 
is allegedly unspectacular results (Gould; Sarkar), the leaders of the HGP tend to emphasize 
that it is part of a long journey toward understanding life. Secondly, the HGP has not just set 
the ground for new biomedical possibilities– Zwart and Penders have argued that “on the basis 
of emerging bioarchives that are now becoming available, a complex and comprehensive nar-
rative is developing concerning the past history and possible future of human existence” (“Ge-
nomics” 228; my emphasis). Finally, the HGP was not the consensual international endeavor 
it sometimes appeared to be. Its central figures cooperated but also competed fiercely in a 
race to decode the human genome, quarreling over the adequate route to take in what has 
been dubbed a series of “gene wars” (Cook-Deegan). The story’s culmination point was the 
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June 2000 announcement of the completion of the sequence of the human genome at the 
White House under the auspices of President Clinton. The protagonists–genome scientists 
Francis Collins and Craig Venter (on stage) and James Watson (in the front row of the audi-
ence)–presented the world with an image of the human genome as a “book of life” whose 
contents would bring to light the secrets of human biological existence once and for all. Presi-
dent Clinton likened the sequencing of the human genome to a mapping endeavor not unlike 
the famous expedition by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, who in 1801 set out to explore 
the huge area of land to the West of the United States in order to pave the way for coloniza-
tion. The celebration of the finalized HGP, an inner journey to the essence of humanity, marked 
a moment when the biosciences decisively claimed the cultural role of the pioneer, and the 
image of the triple helix attained a status more iconic than ever before, a symbol for the iden-
tity and destiny of the human species. As Zwart has observed, these mapping metaphors are 
not innocent (“The Adoration”). Clinton’s proud allusion to the Lewis and Clark expedition–a 
prelude to the full colonization of the North American continent–condones the controversial 
aspects of state sponsored scientific explorations. 
Ironically, the moment when the human genome was announced decoded also became 
the moment when the idea of a genetic code, as a paradigm, began to crumble (unfortu-
nately it remains as dominant as ever in the cultural imaginary).4 When the human genome 
was sequenced, it turned out that the human species has approximately 23.000 genes–much 
fewer than previous estimations which had ranged from 100.000 up to 300.000. Moreover, 
the human genome turned out to be extremely similar to the genomes of other species, thus 
positioning humans far closer to other animals, at least genetically. This realization has been 
interpreted by Zwart as a “narcissistic offense” to the human race (“Genomics and Self-Knowl-
edge”), but it can also be seen as a major blow to the scientists involved as well as to State sci-
ence, with its reliance on the reproduction of steady identities. With this number of genes, the 
one-trait-one-gene model became an historical artifact. The very scientists who had whole-
heartedly embraced the discourse of genetic determinism for many years, using it to promote 
their research, were now forced to substitute it for an emphasis on (genomic) complexity, 
foregrounding the significance of such processes as gene interaction, gene transcription, gene 
splicing, and epigenetic regulation of protein synthesis. The possibilities for therapy that had 
appeared to be just around the corner, now seemed much farther away. Although certainly for 
its staunch critics, in the end the HGP was a humbling lesson (Gould) or even “an unmitigated 
failure, the most colossal misuse ever of scarce resources for biological research” (Sarkar 87), 
the end of the HGP did not signal the end of genomics. Rather, what has occurred in “post-
genomics” is a shift in discourse and, to some extent, in research, which has moved towards the 
multiple elements at work in the expression of genes. 
If molecular biology has taken a “post-genomic” course, it cannot be inferred that the bond 
between bioscience and power has weakened in any way–rather, molecular biology has been 
gradually moving from State science to control science. This reconfiguration is implicated in a 
shift towards new forms of biopower which was prefigured in a short text by Deleuze writ-
ten in the early 1990s, “Postscript on Societies of Control.” Here Deleuze speculates on a new 
era that begins to take shape roughly around the 1950s, in which State ordained disciplinarity 
begins to wane, giving way to a multiplication of “soft” strategies throughout the various levels 
of society as well as beyond the borders of the state. Capitalism features prominently in this 
dissemination process, completely reshaping the role of classical centers of control as analyzed 
by Foucault, such as the prison, the school, and the hospital.5 Apart from taking biopolitics as 
a heuristic instrument beyond the disciplinary world of modernity that Foucault’s work maps, 
Deleuze intensifies the point that Foucault’s concept of the subject is not reducible to the no-
tion of “the individual”–that bed-rock of humanist and Enlightenment understandings of the 
self (Revel). The notion of “dividual” presented here by Deleuze points to the ways in which the 
uniqueness of each individual life, whose psychological and social life was the object of disci-
plinary logic, is now being displaced by new assemblages in which the modern notion of ”mass” 
gives way to “samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (3). The flexibility of individual and collective 
life under contemporary capitalism is thus closely related to the rise of global, computer-driven 
systems of modulation in place of the conventional modes of (re)production. Rather than or-
ganizing life through specialized enclosed spaces (families, factories, states), technoscientific 
capitalism’s global scale and 24/7-economy raises the imperatives of productivity and training 
to a level that is at once grand and molecular, totalizing and dispersive.
This historical shift of biopower sketched by Deleuze (a shift already implicit in Foucault’s 
work, who understood the disciplinary society to be vanishing) is the background against 
which the notion of control science becomes intelligible. Control science is epitomized by a de-
centralized, more flexible and fine-grained kind of reproduction of knowledge and information. 
In molecular biology genetic networks and cellular interactions replace the gene as guiding 
metaphors, which no longer apply to definite units (an individual, ethnic group or species) but 
rather establish transversal connections between (sub)levels of analysis (cellular, organismal, 
ecosystemic), disciplines, and species. In medicine, the distinctions between illness and health, 
hospital and home, patient and doctor, are blurring. Health is no longer a particular situa-
tion in the present–one is never really healthy–but something that is continually monitored 
and modulated. Patients are increasingly managing their health on the basis of genetic data 
and other bioinformation, even without a doctor acting as intermediary, for example through 
direct-to-consumer genetic testing and through devices that measure heart rate. Opaque no-
tions such as “life style” are becoming increasingly important in thinking about health, thereby 
dispersing it, making it non-local, yet also personalized. It seems that the more information 
one has, the more one is able to prevent disease, but the more precarious and elusive one’s 
health becomes. In this sense, health is becoming an “event” in the Deleuzian sense–an event 
that rather than actually happening is always “that which has just happened and that which is 
about to happen” (The Logic 10).
Deleuze’s notion of societies of control and the idea of control science resonate with a 
number of important recent writings on biopolitics and genomics. Nikolas Rose argues that 
the linkages between power and biomedicine in the genomic age cannot be adequately inter-
preted within the framework of coercive control by the State (eugenics). Instead, what arises 
is a “politics of life itself” in which all citizens participate: “It is neither delimited by the poles of 
illness and health, nor focused on eliminating pathology to protect the destiny of the nation. 
Rather, it is concerned with our growing capacities to control, manage, engineer, reshape, and 
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modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living creatures” (The Politics 3). What 
Rose argues here is that the newly available knowledge and biotechnologies are profoundly 
emancipatory if treated ethically and democratically. Civilian organizations such as patient 
groups give rise to a new “biosociality” (131-154) (a term coined by Paul Rabinow), ensuring that 
genomics does not become a tool for the top-down governance of life.
Melinda Cooper offers a more critical examination of the new possibilities offered by ge-
nomic knowledge and data, which function as new forms of capitalism-driven control, but 
also reterritorialize on the state. According to Cooper, what we are witnessing in the (post)
genomic era is an intensification of the relations between biology, corporations, the state and 
the military, especially in the US. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration developed an 
agenda of permanent warfare (the policy “preemptive strikes”), where war is waged no longer 
for states or for human beings, but 
in the name of life in its biospheric dimension, incorporating meteorology, epidemiology, 
and the evolution of all forms of life, from the microbe up. The extension of preemptive 
warfare to include the sphere of environmental and biopolitics conflates the externalization 
of war with the evolution of life on earth–as if permanent war were simply a fact of life, 
with no other end than its own crisis-driven perpetuation. (98)
In other words, the biologization of politics and war goes much further than preventing pan-
demics and fighting bioterror; it concerns the recruitment of humans and other species in new 
regimes of safety and health that work according to a logic of continuous (pre-emptive) mod-
ulation. This regime makes use of new forms of technology and information, creating what 
Victor Toom has termed a mode of “forensic-genetic biopower” through which biological life 
increasingly comes to fall under the law (184).
These opposing assessments of genomics and contemporary biopolitics make it more chal-
lenging to mark a clear distinction between State science, control science, and nomad science. 
On the one hand, genomics, as a massive data-producing machine designed to forge a map of 
life itself, seems primarily engaged in reproduction, rather than the nomadic practice of following 
the singularities of matter (A Thousand 410). The question is what happens to genomics after 
the HGP: are nomadic notions of complexity and emergence being mainstreamed into a new 
control science? Or, more in line with Rose’s work, is there an affirmation of nomadic potential 
in genomics after the HGP, altering the very axioms of genomics? 
Venter’s adVentures
Genomics has produced its own stories through popular scientific publications and the media 
(Wald, “Patterns of Prejudice”; Zwart, “Understanding”). As Priscilla Wald makes clear, these 
stories are not merely “personal” anecdotes or marketing instruments. Rather, they are “fun-
damental in the production of scientific and medical knowledge and, therefore … attention to 
them needs to be incorporated into scientific and medical research. (“Blood and Stories” 305-6). 
The stories genomicists tell are not just about their work: they narrate the processes of life itself, 
for example, how Homo sapiens disseminated over the continents. Wald argues that the nar-
ratives provided by genomics and population genetics should not be taken at face value, since 
there are many possible narratives based on genetic information. Moreover, these biological 
narratives ought to be understood in the social context where they emerge–they necessarily 
merge with other narratives (“What’s in a Cell?”). Starting from Wald’s assumptions, I want to 
show that Venter’s stories about science and about life are suitable for tracing nomadic poten-
tials in genomics. We may then raise the question whether, or to what extent, his adventures 
are instances of nomad science, or rather expressions of the new flexibility of control science. 
 In his autobiography A Life Decoded: My Genome: My Life, published in 2007, Venter recounts 
his converging personal, scientific and entrepreneurial struggles and successes. The main text 
is interspersed by text-boxes in which Venter reflects on his own personal traits in genomic 
terms, producing what he calls a “genetic autobiography” (7). Even though many of these text-
boxes stress that there is still a lot to be learned about the actual meaning of genomic informa-
tion, and despite Venter’s reference to new perspectives in areas such as epigenetics (332), the 
provocative formula of his autobiography reinforces the image of life as a genetic “book” that 
can be read but also (re)written. Venter’s autobiography is a strong testament to what Zwart 
has called “a bioinformatization of the life-world”: “Genomics-based technologies have begun 
to pervade our daily lives, our autobiographies and narratives, as well as our anthropologies, 
rather than our genomes as such” (“Genomics” 135).
In the following I will limit myself to some of Venter’s descriptions of his major scientific 
achievements. In 1999, when the HGP was already nearing completion, Venter established his 
own research institute Celera genomics, competing with the state-funded genome sequencing 
efforts. Using his newly developed “shot-gun sequencing” method, Venter wanted to show that 
the instruments of the official HGP, funded by the US government, were too cumbersome and 
therefore too slow. His philosophy was that the map of the human genome should be a resource 
available to everyone, not the exclusive possession of the state or of corporations (A Life 260). 
Venter was struggling on two frontiers as it were. On the one hand, against William Haseltine 
(representing big business), he was fighting for his integrity and that of his team because he had 
promised to make the human genome publicly available (260). On the other hand, John Sulston 
of the Wellcome trust accused him of leaning too much towards privatization of the human ge-
nome (which is why Venter could not publish the results in Nature and had to opt for Science in-
stead). A major incentive for writing this book seems to have been to strike back at his scientific 
adversaries (John Sulston, James Watson, Francis Collins, and Eric Lander, among others) who 
accused Venter of turning life science into a business rather than a joint effort for the common 
good. These struggles indicate how State science and control science vie for dominance, each 
mode offering different versions of what counts as the common good. The camp of Sulston, 
Watson and Collins, representing State science, wanted to keep the HGP centrally organized 
in order to make sure that it would benefit everyone, while control science, represented by 
Venter, opportunistically explored new possibilities, decentralizing and speeding up the project. 
 After the publication of the human genome in Science , which indicated that much more 
than the genome sequence alone was needed to understand life and develop new therapies, 
Venter decided that genomics needed to take up the challenge of the newly discovered com-
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plexity of life. Venter literally embarked on a new adventure on his sailing boat Sorcerer II which 
took him and his team across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to map “the genome of the ocean 
itself” (343). Every hundred knots his crew took water samples which were then stored in 
freezers and analyzed in his laboratories at the J. Craig Venter Institute, resulting in “four hun-
dred newly discovered microbes and 6 million new genes, doubling the number then known to 
science” (346). Venter’s claims that the results of his expedition will contribute to a better grasp 
of oceanic and atmospheric “health,” to generating new biotechnologies that use microbes 
to generate clean fuel (334), and to methods for “engineering our sick atmosphere” (348). The 
Sorcerer II expedition took genomics out of the sphere of the human toward the natural envi-
ronment that sustains human life. 
In some respects, the Venter’s ocean expedition seems to illustrate perfectly a nomadic ap-
proach to genomics. In A Life Decoded, Venter presents himself as a free scientist with a passion 
for life, rather than a scientist working for the State or for a corporation. Zwart has argued that 
Venter’s “aquatic” desire for adventure can be opposed to the “territorial” style of his scientific 
adversary Francis Collins: 
Mapping the earth is a practice that is part of strategies of colonisation and annexation, 
establishing firm governance on terra firma. It is an effort to transform the diffuse and 
unknown into something discrete and accessible, and therefore governable... The sea has 
always been associated with freedom of movement, with migrating beyond the spheres 
of action of established rulers … Whereas Collins identified himself as a “trusted aid” in 
service of a governmental programme, Venter’s work has always had a rather different 
moral profile, that of embarking and setting sail to places where one is left to one’s own 
devices … discovering new worlds, breaking away from entrenched positions. (On Decoding) 
Indeed, Venter’s independence and mobility, most significantly his ventures into ocean life, can 
be regarded as tenets of nomad science par excellence. The water samples, each containing 
thousands of microorganisms, contain great complexity, a “milieu” of life rather than merely the 
genomic data. The same possibility is found in research fields like metagenomics and ecoge-
nomics, which work with soil samples that hold information about ecosystems rather than 
single organisms.6 But does Venter’s work aim at understanding ocean life as a multiplicity in 
becoming? Does the smooth space of the ocean propel him to adopt more nomadic scientific 
practices and ideas? More concretely, are Venter’s unorthodox manners reflected in alternative 
views that problematize the idea of the genome as the control center and essence of life? 
In a more recent scientific saga in which Venter stars, the potential of genomics is actualized 
in the form of a procedure and a research object that, I argue, unequivocally defies life as multi-
plicity. Venter has been engaged in various projects aimed at creating “synthetic life,” for exam-
ple, by “transplanting the genome of one bacterium in another, marking the first example of spe-
cies transmutation” (356). Whereas the objective is to create new life forms that may help make 
the planet healthier, there is a deeper scientific desire that animates Venter’s project of artificial 
life: “I want to take us far from the shore and into unknown waters, to a new phase of evolution, 
to the day when one DNA-based species can sit down at a computer to design another. I plan 
to show that we understand the software of life by creating true artificial life” (357). It is strik-
ing how among Venter’s quotations of famous scientists like Watson, Schrödinger and Pasteur, 
Darwin is quoted by far the most in A Life Decoded. However, Venter’s ambition, it seems, is not 
just to rival Darwin: inaugurating a new era of the artificial transmutation of species is clearly 
not just an paradigm shift and a world-historical event–it constitutes an evolutionary leap. 
 Venter’s recent projects highlight a cybernetic view of life first developed by thinkers such as 
Norbert Wiener, Erwin Schrödinger and Richard Feynman.7 In a 2012 lecture entitled “What is 
Life? A Twenty-First Century Perspective,” given on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary 
of Schrödinger’s classic study What is Life?, Venter looks back in history to argue that his work is 
“consistent with Schrödinger’s code-script,” thus suggesting that the information-turn in biolo-
gy was a crucial one in the search for the essence of life. Venter argues that the synthesis of new 
genomes and their successful transplantation into cells is proof of the idea that “life is based on 
DNA software; we’re a DNA software system. You change the DNA software, you change the 
species. It’s a remarkably simple concept, remarkably complex in its execution.” Venter ends his 
lecture with a spectacular image of the not-too-distant future:
Try to imagine 70 years from now in the year 2082 what will be happening.  With the 
success of private space flight, the moon and Mars will be clearly colonized. New life forms 
for food or energy production or for new medicines will be sent as digital information to be 
converted back into life forms in the 4.3 to 21 minutes that it takes for a digital wave to go 
from earth to Mars. (What is Life?)
It is unclear what Venter’s scenario of the digitalization of life, which, he keeps repeating 
throughout his lecture, is so “remarkably simple,” promises for the future. In any case, it is 
consistent with a tradition of “command-and-control” cybernetics8, and with the transition to 
bioinformatic biopower described by Cooper, Kay, Zwart and others, with its belief in the econ-
omy and in technoscience to regenerate wealth ad infinitum. If a virtually endless assortment 
of bio-objects can be designed on a computer and engineered using a “minimal genome” as 
basic tool kit (Venter, A Life 354), then, in Judith Roof’s words, “DNA, a small operative molecule, 
becomes the twirling model of an imaginary of self-replicating wealth” (209).9 
My point is not merely to criticize the “program” metaphor as a feat of biological determin-
ism. Rather, I would like to point out that, as Haraway has shown more than three decades 
ago, there are multiple metaphors, and clusters of metaphors, for life at work in twentieth-
century biology, for example the “organicist” metaphors of fields, liquid crystals and fabrics in 
developmental biology (Crystals). As Haraway demonstrates, these metaphors challenge the 
reductionist or determinist tendencies in genetics (and, to extrapolate her argument to the 
present, in genomics), bringing to light what biologist Paul Weiss termed a “molecular ecology” 
of the cell (183) as well as exposing analogies between the organization of “molecular popula-
tions, the cell, the whole organism, and the ecosystem” (205).10 As I will demonstrate below 
with reference to the work of biologist Lynn Margulis and evolutionary psychologist Susan 
Oyama, metaphors that are able to connect different levels and scales without reverting to 
reductionism seem more likely to correspond to nomad science.
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Through innovative research methods, pioneering projects, entrepreneurial audacity and a 
planetary vision, Venter indeed brings about a degree of deterritorialization of State science, 
making it more flexible and adaptive. Venter’s exploration of “unknown waters” undoubtedly 
yields new possibilities for understanding and modifying life. At the same time, Venter’s projects 
reterritorialize on corporate profit and personal gain.11 But what is really significant, is that the 
foundations of a molecular biology based on cybernetic models of control remain firmly in place. 
Venter’s “shotgun sequencing of the oceans” (A Life 334) seems more of a planned effort at con-
tainment than a nomadic adventure: it literally freezes that which was fluid, forcing life into a 
reductionist model where it becomes intelligent software “building its own hardware” (What is 
Life). In Venter’s reductionist discourse, the story of science becomes a molecular puzzle in which 
technical obstacles are gradually overcome until, finally, life’s secrets are revealed and the ge-
nome becomes an infinite source of reproducible solutions. I would argue that nomad science, 
instead, puts itself genuinely at risk by immersing into an ocean of problems that are not man-
made, much in the way that Manuel Delanda describes the practice of making “intensive maps”: 
What need to be mapped in this case are not the borders of entities possessing a spatial 
organization, like the boundaries of an ocean, a lake, or another body of water, but thresholds 
of intensity causing spontaneous transformations in the spatial organization of those bodies. 
(History 121)
Such a search for critical “thresholds” imply a differential spatio-temporal topology, not a neu-
tral reservoir from which an essence, in Venter’s case a “genome of the ocean,” can be extract-
ed. Instead of reducing ocean life twice–first to DNA and then to digital codes–a true explo-
ration of the ocean’s complexity would produce rich developmental and evolutionary stories 
featuring a myriad of species (including humans), cells, genomes, technologies, the elements, 
weather, and so on. Since humans, and scientists in particular, are part of the experiment, they 
too may be transformed in unpredictable ways.
thinking a life
As the case of Venter illustrates, (post-)genomics has nomadic aspects–searching for com-
plexity and exploring prospects for new life–but these aspects are not sufficiently fleshed out 
to turn genomics into a genuine nomad science. In spite of the apparent scientific defeat of 
genetic determinism, science still operates within the dimensions of a “molecular paradigm,” a 
general inclination in biology to reduce life to the workings of small parts that can be reproduced 
digitally as well as analogically (Neumann-Held and Rehmann-Sutter 3). Scientific efforts such 
as Venter’s, aimed at reproducing and mastering life, may lead to impressive results and stories, 
but not, as Venter claims, to a capacious understanding of what life is. Venter’s case shows 
that whereas (post-)genomics claims to be a multifaceted, non-deterministic line of research, 
it may still regard the genome as a “center” from which life is produced, thus swapping genetic 
determinism for genomic determinism. Some argue that, in fact, much research in genomics 
still tends to treat the environment as a purely secondary, exterior “condition,” a source of per-
turbations that has to be distinguished from a true genomic cause (Hoffmeyer 156; Ulrich 138). 
 Is a nomadic mode of molecular biology at all possible? As Maureen O’Malley and John 
Dupré argue, a true transformation in (post-)genomics “from a dissection of things to the dy-
namics of processes” (1270) requires a genuine effort to think through the idea of a biologi-
cal system, which in turn hinges on “demonstrations that the behaviour of single components 
cannot be understood simply in terms of their intrinsic properties, but must be seen as simul-
taneously determined by features of the systems of which they are part” (1274). Some of the 
most convincing proposals for such an approach in postgenomics come from biologists and 
philosophers working together. In a paper entitled “Genes in the Postgenomic Era,” biophiloso-
pher Paul Griffiths and biologist Karola Stotz argue that if genes are currently defined by “the 
way DNA sequences are used in particular cellular and broader contexts, and not merely by 
their structure,” then, strictly, genomics should also embrace the idea that “phenotypes are not 
simply expressions of genetic information but rather emerge from a ‘developmental system’” 
(Griffiths and Stotz 515-16). In order to add more conceptual grounding to this systemic ap-
proach, I will now turn to Deleuze’s biophilosophy, whose emphasis on connectivity and pro-
cessuality strongly resonates with approaches in contemporary bioscience such as the above 
(Ansell-Pearson, Germinal; Grosz, Becoming; Marks, Gilles; Parisi, Abstract).
For Deleuze, if we want to understand specific differences, for example between biological 
species, we cannot simply presuppose the identity of these species. Organisms and species are 
the results of repetitions of differences across scales, including the molecular and the territorial, 
not the execution of a pre-existing Bauplan (Williams 11-12).12 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
looks to the field of embryology to develop this idea. An embryo is complex, “vague” body in a 
continuous process of transformation: it is a body that cannot be divided in distinct parts and 
whose developments are continuous,i.e. irreducible to a linear succession of phases. Rather 
than treating embryology as a special case at the margins of biology, Deleuze takes it as a start-
ing point for the question of life, thus prefiguring a move in biology “from linear causal chains 
to non-linear dynamics” (Rose and Caduff 330).13 Even mature bodies are but coagulations or 
decelerations of life as intensive movement. This leads to a point that is perhaps counter-intu-
itive: the embryo and its intensive processes are ontologically prior to species and organs. This 
means that it is inaccurate to say that the embryo constructs itself according to a pre-existent 
set of instructions along the lines of “become a fish, form gills.” Embryogenesis is the onto-
logical problem-field (or, in Deleuze’s terminology, the “Idea”) in relation to which species and 
organs develop as solutions or reified categories. The individuation of intensities precedes their 
differenciation as species and organs (308-9). According to Deleuze, this primacy of intensities 
(or in-dividuals: entities that cannot be divided into parts) is also seen on the level of phylogeny: 
A living being is not only defined genetically, by the dynamisms which determine its internal 
milieu, but also ecologically, by the external movements which preside over its distribution 
within an extensity. A kinetics of population adjoins, without resembling, the kinetics of 
the egg; a geographic process of isolation may be no less formative of species than internal 
genetic variations, and sometimes precedes the latter. (269)
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Whereas the ordeals of the fetus testify to an “unlivable life” that remains hidden within the or-
ganism, the vicissitudes of populations bear witness to a fundamental openness of organisms 
to their surroundings and the “formative” (i.e., constructive) role of ecological connections. 
Like the embryo, the intermingling of diverse populations is a non-metric, topological phe-
nomenon: population is a vague essence ontologically prior to the reified category of species. 
 The image of a creative and connective life is elaborated in A Thousand Plateaus. Here De-
leuze and Guattari typify the dominant (neo-)Darwinian story of life as “arborescent” (tree-
like) because it assumes a branching out from the one to the many, from sameness to differ-
ence, from the primitive to the complex. Discarding the image of life as linear transmission or 
reproduction, Deleuze and Guattari replace the arborescent model with a “rhizomatic” one. 
In biology, a rhizome is a network of plant-roots that overgrow and connect to one another 
in the soil in such a way that it becomes hard to determine where one plant ends and the 
other begins. Plants that may be easily identified above the ground appear to be local and 
temporary manifestations of a much more complex rhizomatic process. The connectivity and 
dynamic becoming of a rhizome, according to Deleuze and Guattari, offer a model that is gen-
erally applicable to all life. For example, while humans and other animals can be distinguished 
as separate species, they are fundamentally connected through symbiotic relations on the 
molecular level:
Under certain conditions, a virus can connect to germ cells and transmit itself as the 
cellular gene of a complex species: moreover, it can take flight, move into the cells of an 
entirely different species, but not without bringing with it “genetic information” from the 
first host … We form a rhizome with our viruses or rather our viruses cause us to form a 
rhizome with other animals. (11)
Here Deleuze and Guattari suggest that, while contagion is commonly envisioned as some-
thing negative, threatening the life of the organism, from the perspective of evolution viral 
contamination can be a way of renewing life. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, real variation 
or difference is largely created on the level of the rhizome; the incredible diversity found in na-
ture cannot be understood by the essentially conservative processes of random mutation and 
natural selection alone (Ansell-Pearson).14
From the perspective of Deleuzian biophilosophy, a fundamental challenge for (post-) ge-
nomics and molecular biology in general is to confront the question of life beyond the theo-
rematic apparatus of that establishes the genome as a center of analysis. As Deleuze phrases it 
in his last work, Immanence: Essays on A Life, the challenge is to think life as “a life” that cannot 
be ascribed to this or that individual entity (organism, cell) or cause (genes, natural selection):
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and 
that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events 
or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects. This indefinite life itself 
does not have moments, close as they may be to one another, but only between-times, 
between-moments. (29)
It is here that Venter’s image of life as a “DNA software system” becomes most vulnerable 
to philosophical critique. Venter’s claim that life can be (re)produced from the digital code is 
wrongheaded because genesis always happens on a plane of immanence, not on a plane that 
is already organized and controlled. Genetics and genomics are revolutionary in the sense that 
they intervene in rhizomatic processes on the molecular level (horizontal gene transfer), but 
the idea of reproducing life is illusory–how can one reproduce a becoming which is never actual? 
Life as becoming cannot be represented, recorded or reproduced, because, in Elizabeth Grosz’s 
words, it is “not a capacity inherited by life, an evolutionary outcome or consequence, but the 
very principle of matter itself, with its possibilities of linkage with the living, with its possibilities 
of mutual transformation” (Becoming 52). 
Deleuze’s approach to life as connective and processual, partially derived from embryol-
ogy and the idea of the rhizome, resonates strongly with contemporary alternatives to the 
molecular paradigm in biology. A first example is provided by evolutionary biologist Lynn Mar-
gulis’s theory of endosymbiotic evolution, a critique of and alternative to genocentrism as well 
as neo-Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism reconciles Darwin’s ideas with the molecular paradigm 
in contemporary biology, stating that evolution (the production of biological novelty) occurs 
through the gradual accumulation of random DNA mutations subject to natural selection. In 
Acquiring Genomes, co-written with her son Dorion Sagan, Margulis argues that the genesis of 
new forms out of existing ones cannot be explained by examining species in isolation: “Animal 
evolution resembles the evolution of machines, where typewriters and televisionlike screens 
integrate to form lap tops, and internal combustion engines and carriages merge to from au-
tomobiles. The principle always stays the same: well-honed parts integrate into startling new 
wholes” (172). Margulis’s work examines the ways in which symbiotic relations between ani-
mals, for example bacteria living in the guts of mammals, are often useful, thus offering coun-
terweight to the dominant idea of a competition between species. Radical transformation of 
species is simply unthinkable in neo-Darwinism, which is overly preoccupied with linear genet-
ic transmission from generation to generation and thereby “misses the symbiotic forest for the 
genetic trees” (201). Margulis’s work on symbiosis as a generative process resonates strongly 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s adoption of the rhizome, and instantiates elements of nomad 
science. Rather than taking the gene or the organism as centers of analysis, Margulis starts 
from highly fluid relations, which allow her to explain the variety of forms and the potential of 
becoming in nature. The fact that a tree can offer food and shelter for a great number of spe-
cies is an instance of life’s tendency to “literally incorporate more and more of its environment 
into itself” (“Welcome” 81). In place of a distinction between genetic causes and phenotypic 
effects, genome and environment, what emerges is a topological space in which everything is 
connected. Margulis’s theory of endosymbiogenesis has by now been accepted by the scientific 
community as an additional model of evolutionary change, but not, as Margulis proposes, a 
more significant model than the classical one.
A second example is the work of evolutionary psychologist Susan Oyama. Her Develop-
mental Systems Theory, first formulated in the Ontogeny of Information (1985), articulates the 
idea that biological life must be approached as a set of interlocking systems that are continu-
ally constructed. The title of Oyama’s book is meant to suggest that the idea of information 
as pre-programmed in the genes is a faulty one: information “neither preexists its operations 
nor arises from random disorder” (3). Oyama intends to remove the focus in biology from a 
bottom-up molecular approach to a multi-scalar systemic one . The genome is displaced, but 
only in order to purge its transcendental status as an “unmoved mover”; it remains a crucial 
factor in the developmental system (The Ontogeny 156). Oyama’s idea that nature is nothing 
other than the development of forms (phenotype) effectuates a move towards immanence: 
“Seeing natures as developmental products, and thus as phenotypic rather than genotypic, 
turns us away from the search for transcendent reality and back to the processes and products 
of development” (Evolution’s Eye 66). Oyama refuses to regard genes and environments as limi-
tations on what a body can do; rather these are entities that emerge as parts of developmental 
systems. As Oyama argues, there is no opposition between nature and nurture, biology and 
history or genes and environment, where the first denotes something internal, determined and 
constraining and the other something external, contingent and developing: “Like potentials, 
constraints are most usefully conceptualized as relational, not ‘endogenous,’ and as emerg-
ing in processes, not as prior to them. Possibilities for change evolve; they are generated in 
interaction. To oppose necessity (physical, biological, or developmental) to history, then, is to 
misrepresent both” (89). Oyama’s stress on system, process, and immanence is strikingly close 
with Deleuze’s understanding of nature as a series of ontological problems (Delanda)–how to 
grow, sustain, multiply, transform, and so on.
Margulis and Oyama’s work testifies to Deleuze’s ideas that life is not determined by es-
sences but by relations and becomings, which do not belong to organisms but subsume them 
(A Thousand 263). This scientific and philosophical position may serve as an antidote against 
presentism (“let’s stick to the here and now and be realistic”) as well as against the sort of spec-
ulative claims such as Venter’s that mechanistically project a future world of our own making. 
Margulis and Oyama rethink life in ways far more imaginative than the Human Genome Project 
could ever have achieved. Putting the very axioms of modern biology into question, they have 
met with great adversity in their professional lives. Yet for all its boldness, there is a humbling 
quality to the work of Margulis and Oyama, placing humans within this dynamic field of rela-
tions rather than at the top of the pecking order. They differ in that respect from the (predomi-
nantly male) celebrity scientists in the field of genomics like Francis Crick, Jameson Watson and 
Craig Venter, who claim to have found the essence of life in DNA. If science, like literature, cre-
ates stories about life, stories in which science itself appears as a character (Wald “Blood and 
Stories”), then the figure-heads of genomics narcissistically allow themselves a far greater role 
in these stories. As several feminist scholars have argued, women are able to make a difference 
in science by resisting the climate of aggressive competition, fostering cooperative and caring 
attitudes not just toward one another but also toward (living) research objects and the world 
at large (Fox Keller, A Feeling; Mol; Plumwood). There seems to be a significant overlap between 
the work of female (and sometimes feminist) scientists working in the margins of science, 
emphasizing humility and togetherness, and the phenomenon of nomad science, an overlap 
that will be further explored in the chapters that follow and addressed explicitly in Chapter 7. 
conclusion
How can (post-)genomics, having moved from genome mapping to the study of bi-directional 
cellular processes, deepen its commitment to complexity, meaning its biological, scientific and 
social “outsides”? How can nomadically inclined scientists connect to the molecular paradigm 
to insert more complexity, without relinquishing their relative independence? These epistemo-
logically and politically difficult challenges need to be addressed because our understanding of 
the biosphere, and our ability to intervene in it, I argue, depend on interdisciplinarity. The whole 
spectrum of sciences is needed to curtail and modulate anthropogenic transformations of the 
biosphere in order to prevent humanity from destroying significant parts of it, including itself. 
Humans’ exceptional abilities to affect their environments should be deployed in responsible 
ways, that is, based on a long-term, co-evolution perspective on life on Earth and perhaps even 
beyond. Interdisciplinarity also includes the social sciences and the Humanities, because social, 
technological and cultural processes are crucial in co-evolution (Jablonka; Sagan and Margu-
lis, “Welcome”). But interdisciplinarity goes further: literature and art can let the biophysical 
aspects of human existence rise from the background (Kaiser, “Poésie”; Lambert; Thiele), en-
meshing them with sociality, psychology, and culture, thus imagining, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
words, “a new earth and people that do not yet exist” (What is Philosophy 108). 
As I hope to have showed, Deleuze’s work, including his texts co-written with Guattari, 
offers scientists and scholars useful tools to understand the interaction between dominant 
and submerged perspectives on life, and offer potential routes to further develop nomadic 
ideas. The nomad-State science pair, complemented by control science, serves as a means 
for bringing more (bio)political analysis into science studies. Moreover, Deleuze’s elucidation, 
critical interrogation and recombination of ideas in biology can help to bring multiple branches 
of the (bio)sciences and the humanities closer together. In spite of scientific skepticism about 
philosophy15, we can observe unprecedented opportunities for such a joint-venture: genomics 
and other fields in the biosciences are devoting significant portions of their budgets to ad-
dressing the societal impact of their work. An important step to take in moving toward nomadic 
interdisciplinarity–a readiness to transform in the encounter with other disciplines. For science 
studies, nomadic interdisciplinarity implies not just engaging with social implications of sci-
ence, but also with the ideas about life itself that science is investigating (Stotz and Griffiths 
38). Paradoxically, it is through critically re-examining the fundamentals of biology that science 
becomes most thoroughly open to the concerns of society. Another paradox is that this en-
gagement with fundamental ideas, practices, attitudes, and desires of science is perhaps best 
facilitated by genres that are quasi-scientific: popular science and sf. The following chapters 
will further explore the potentials for nomad science in contemporary biology through these 
genres. The thrust of these stories is not to predict or determine the future of science and hu-
manity, but to create the conditions for another science in which humans are pictured not as 
masters but as participants.
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D A R W I N ’ S  R A D I O 
We may be vessels, large ships, unwitting sanctuaries to the thriving communities 
comprising us. When they are starved, cramped, or stimulated we have inchoate 
feelings. Perhaps we should get to know ourselves better. 
–  Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan – 
introduction
In Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio (DR), the activation of a retrovirus in the human genome, omi-
nously named SHEVA1, causes anomalous and extreme symptoms in pregnant women all over 
the world, including miscarriages and a leathery facial skin. When the seemingly disparate dis-
coveries of genomicist Kay Lang and archaeologist Mitch Rafelson are combined, a spectacular 
diagnosis materializes: rather than a regular disease, SHEVA is the trigger for a sudden and 
rapid metamorphosis of the human species. Partly inspired by Margulis’s theory of symbiogen-
esis, describing how interspecies relations can lead to the emergence of new species, DR exper-
imentally turns evolution into a dramatic, historical, even political event (Turner, “Open-ended 
Stories”). The novel won a Nebula award and provoked a limited number of responses from cul-
tural and literary critics, who mostly praise Bear’s engagement with science (its sequel Darwin’s 
Children [2003] was, in several ways, less successful and will not be discussed here).2 Lisa Lynch 
has argued that DR engages in genre-critique in the sense that it relinquishes standard plots of 
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medical/techno-thrillers by US authors like Robin Cook, Dean Koontz and Richard Preston, which 
portray a predictable succession of events around an epidemic outbreak, with medical profes-
sionals and scientists representing unambiguous heroes protecting “the political and biological 
security of the United States” (72). While in these other novels biotech companies often display 
criminal and otherwise unethical behavior, DR deals with problems arising from legitimate ac-
tivities–the merger of science, industry and politics. In DR the virus is not a clearly defined threat 
from the outside, but, as Mayer describes it, “an ambivalent thing, an in-between creature” 
that “effectively undermines the binaries of healthy/ill, good/bad, and harmless/dangerous” (8). 
 DR gives narrative form to three major ideas in Margulis’s work on evolution (which later 
became popularized in her books written together with her son Dorion Sagan), first of all that 
“symbiotic leaps can, in a few generations, establish new species” (“The Transhumans” 98). 
Secondly, by making a retrovirus the trigger of sudden evolution, DR fleshes out Margulis and 
Sagan’s point that “evolution is not progressive” (Acquiring 22). In place of Descartes’s image of 
humans as rational, transcendental agents, Margulis and Sagan imagine human beings as ut-
terly dependent on other organisms for their well-being. Moreover, humans may even be seen 
as mere “vessels” for communities of microorganisms (see the epigraph of this chapter). Finally 
what emerges in DR is Margulis and Sagan’s image of the genome as a strange multiplicity 
connected to the outside, which provides an alternative to the determinist image in popu-
lar culture of the double helix as “essence,” and a provocation to molecular biology and neo-
Darwinism. In portraying an event of evolutionary transformation that can only be explained 
by symbiotic relations, DR promotes a non-anthropocentric view of life, highlighting human-
ity’s ecological dependency and transience. Bear, Margulis and Sagan contribute to turning 
evolutionary change into a collective problem in the broadest sense of the term. As I hope to 
demonstrate, a combined reading helps to get a fuller grip on Bear’s literary experiment with 
evolution, while simultaneously dramatizing Margulis’s scientific struggles.
In spite of the apparent influence of thinkers like Margulis and Sagan, Lynch has argued 
that Bear’s novel presents a biologically reductionist image of life by coupling genomics with 
a near-religious “blind trust in evolution” (90). While immediately seeing the dangers of such 
reductionism, I want to demonstrate that SHEVA is not necessarily a biological “cause” that de-
termines the course of events in the novel. Rather than being reductionist, DR can be regarded 
as a literary experiment with evolution. As sf critic Roger Luckhurst has argued, DR, and Bear’s 
oeuvre as a whole, is an interesting resource for science studies, because it maps the complex 
networks in which science participates:
As Bruno Latour has done for science studies, so Bear’s fiction offers the opportunity to 
trace the networks that connect together wildly diverse hard and soft things: laboratories, 
parliaments, machine intelligence, galaxies, bedrooms, spaceships, survivalists, mitochondrial 
DNA, American presidents, geologists, viruses, high tech start-up capitalists, the undead, the 
posthuman, and the alien. (“Catastrophism” 217)
In his work Bear consistently imagines “the end or catastrophic transformation of human-
ity” (218) without confining his experiments “in isolated laboratories or in arcane arguments 
between experts” (227). In other words, the novum of SHEVA operates in an unstable, ongo-
ing situation that resists control. As Luckhurst suggests, Bear’s desire to get to grips with the 
complexity of human transformation in all of its biological, social, psychological, and spiritual 
dimensions, can itself be perceived not as a bid for total control but as a generic contamination, 
a “car-crash of sf, thriller, gothic, conspiracy fiction, and noir” (230). From this perspective, the 
problems worked out in DR—What caused SHEVA? What is it? What to do?—stem from an 
emergent event rather than from a determined cause or a set of genre-conventions. 
Rather than forming a unified group expressing pre-programmed behavior, scientists play 
highly ambiguous roles vis-à-vis the formidable problem SHEVA represents. These different 
epistemological roles or attitudes can be analyzed along a distinction between control science, 
epitomized by a search for constants, precise measurements and solutions, and nomad sci-
ence concerned with continuous variations, approximations and problematizations (A Thousand 
398-418). In the novel, control science is exemplified by the (failed) development of a vaccine 
by the Centers of Disease Control (CDC) based on a genomic analysis of SHEVA. Meanwhile, 
the protagonists engage in a nomad science that patiently follows SHEVA’s unfolding, point-
ing to the limitations of established theories, and pushing for alternatives. These nomads ask 
complex questions inciting them to introduce phenomena, experiences and ideas that others 
deem irrelevant or even nonsensical. In the following I analyze the scientific elements of DR 
and their biopolitical implications along the lines of control science and nomadism. As I will 
demonstrate, the various intuitive responses to SHEVA developed in DR, including brainstorm 
sessions, epiphanies and dream interpretations, are not naïve or unscientific methods, but seri-
ous attempts at following SHEVA as a problem-event, bringing out the evolutionary dimen-
sions of contemporary global crises.
the question of Variation
The path towards understanding SHEVA crucially involves an encounter between two scien-
tists whose stories alternate in the first part of the book. The first story covers the vicissitudes 
of evolutionary biologist and genetic engineer Kaye Lang, who has been working on the role 
of mitochondrial DNA (DNA of bacterial origin) in human evolutionary change. Kay’s work 
suddenly becomes of great importance in the wake of the SHEVA outbreak when it turns out 
that the genes involved in SHEVA correspond exactly with the ones she has studied. A gov-
ernmental task force endowed with the mission of creating a vaccine for SHEVA hires Kay 
for her expertise. Conducting research at various affected locations, Kay discovers that dur-
ing the Twentieth Century, large numbers of pregnant, SHEVA-infected women around the 
world have been killed and buried in mass graves–ostensibly because their bizarre symptoms 
instilled fear and shame in their husbands and communities. For Kay, it is an injustice that the 
fetuses should die and that the SHEVA-infected women are treated as deviant individuals, or 
worse, as threats. Soon the discoveries in field and lab work force Kay to dissent from the of-
ficial definition of SHEVA as a disease, describing it as an “evolutionary computer” (101) picking 
up and responding to environmental signals (hence the title, Darwin’s Radio). Kay proposes that 
a mixture of overpopulation and information overload cause SHEVA to respond by sending 
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signals along human neurological and genetic pathways, setting in motion a radical species 
metamorphosis within the course of a strange double reproductive cycle. 
The parallel story revolves around the archaeologist Mitch Rafelson who has been expelled 
from the scholarly community for his excavation of sites that were claimed by native Ameri-
cans as sacred burial grounds. Tempted once again by the adventure, Mitch joins a friend on an 
expedition in the Austrian Alps where he stumbles upon two frozen Neanderthal mummies, a 
man and a woman. To his bafflement he discovers that the woman’s uterus contains a fetus 
that is not Neanderthal, but Homo Sapiens. When Mitch hears Kaye speaking on television, he 
realizes that SHEVA may explain his discovery of an immediate evolutionary leap. With the help 
of some colleagues, Mitch finds scientific proof that the Homo Sapiens fetus is indeed SHEVA-
infected. It is at this point, when the parallel stories merge, that the reader realizes that SHEVA 
is not just an ordinary disease, but an evolutionary signal that may change human destiny. Soon 
the two scientists meet in person to share their insights, and, as it happens, they fall in love. 
 Although much of the science in DR is accurate (Goldman), Bear has stated that the main 
function of the novel is to “provoke debate,” to stimulate bioscientists to rethink evolution 
(“When Genes” 324).3 In a 2003 speech before the American Philosophical Society, Bear quali-
fies his speculations in DR as an attempt to reopen the question of what generates variation, 
a question that according to Bear has been carefully suppressed by scientists since Darwin. 
The dominant neo-Darwinist theory of evolution supposes that variations occur randomly in 
populations and that the beneficial ones are selected in each generation, bringing about a 
gradual transformation of the species. Bear stresses that there is a consistency to the produc-
tion of variation that exceeds the relation between the blind processes of natural selection and 
natural drift. In his speech Bear explains that this consistency lies in a complex co-operation 
between living entities, rather than in mere selfish behavior:
Like genetics, evolution is not just one process, but a collaboration of many processes and 
techniques. And evolution is not entirely blind. Nor must evolution be directed by some 
outside or supernatural intelligence to generate the diversity and complexity we see. 
Astonishing creativity, we are discovering, can be explained by wonderfully complicated 
internal processes. These newer views on evolution involve learning and teamwork. 
Evolution is in large part about communication—comparing notes and swapping recipes, 
as it were. It appears that life has a creative memory, and knows when and how to use it. 
(“When Genes” 329)
While adhering to Darwin’s main principles, Bear suggest that something more than just ran-
dom mutation causes variation in species: speciation has a strategic function, it “jumps” at 
significant moments.4 Not only does the genome function as a kind of mind: it is connected to 
“an extensive, species-scale neural network that solves problems on a much vaster scale than 
science has ever anticipated” (“The New Biology”). But what causes these entangled minds to 
activate SHEVA? In DR, the “virus hunter” Christopher Dicken first speculates that SHEVA might 
have been triggered by the Chernobyl disaster (61), subsequently developing a more complex 
theory about SHEVA’s activation involving urban overpopulation, deteriorating social conditions, 
increasing stress, radiation and information overload (130-131). During his research with SHEVA 
patients, Dicken discovers that SHEVA only occurs in relatively steady heterosexual couples. 
Dicken suggests that, in accordance with Darwin’s theory, SHEVA causes a “sexually transmit-
ted disease, but a selective one” (130): the new children will be born in solid families, increasing 
their chances of survival.
Bear’s ideas about “wonderfully complicated internal processes” recalls writer and journal-
ist Arthur Koestler’s evolutionary theory presented in The Ghost in the Machine, in which human 
evolution is depicted as a succession of different brains that grow over and overcode one an-
other.5 According to Koestler, the human brain plays an important part in filtering and process-
ing information from the environment, information that triggers particular adaptive responses 
in organisms and populations. As Koestler argues,
before a new mutation has the chance to be submitted to the Darwinian test for survival in 
the external environment, it must have passed the tests of internal selection for its physical, 
chemical and biological fitness. The concept of internal selection, of a hierarchy of controls 
which eliminate the consequences of harmful gene-mutations and coordinates the effects 
of useful mutations, is the missing link in orthodox theory between the “atoms” of heredity 
and the living stream of evolution. Without that link, neither of them make sense. There 
can be no doubt that random mutations do occur: they can be observed in the laboratory. 
There can be no doubt that Darwinian selection is a powerful force. But in between these 
two events, between the chemical changes in a gene and the appearance of the finished 
product as a newcomer on the evolutionary stage, there is a whole hierarchy of internal 
processes at work which impose strict limitations on the range of possible mutations and 
thus considerably reduce the importance of the chance factor. (133)
Reviving Lamarck’s discredited theory of the heritability of newly acquired traits, Koestler’s 
work is a very early challenge to the Modern Synthesis comprised in the 1950s after Watson 
and Crick’s publication on the structure of DNA. In Bear’s thought, the Koestlerian notion of 
intelligent evolution is manifested at the level of internal selection by a “genomic computer,” 
but also at the level of a species-wide “neural network.” If Bear’s work is vitalistic, this is not 
the “old spooky vitalism,” (104) as Kay calls it in DR, which summons an intelligent force behind 
evolution, but a vision in which life is the capacity to differ, the differential element of a set of 
systemic forces. Evolution, for Bear, is a creative process involving communications between 
organisms and ecosystems rather than an abstract process of natural selection acting on suc-
cessful selfish behavior. In this sense, Stephen Dougherty’s rather harsh assessment of DR as 
uncritically following bioinformatics’s reduction of human beings to “mere conduits of infor-
mation” (280) seems unwarranted.
DR is organized around a problem similar to Bear’s earlier novel Blood Music: how to cope 
with a proliferating infection transforming humanity itself (see chapter 2). The main differ-
ences are that in DR the change occurs without human intervention, from within the human 
body, transforming humans in a viable way, leading to a new variation or species. In DR, the 
idea of an infected genome messes with the dominant image of the genome as a relatively stable 
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individual memory. The genome is revealed as hybrid and permeable, animated by mobile ele-
ments such as transposons.6 Consequently, it does not serve as a passive ground for a struggle 
between “good” characters trying to honor and protect it, and “bad” characters seeking to ex-
ploit it for selfish purposes. As Lynch has argued, what differentiates DR from medical thrillers 
like Richard Preston’s The Cobra Event, in which ecoterrorists cause a disease outbreak, is that 
finally in such novels “the crisis is contained: nothing much changes in the world the novel has 
described,” while DR leaves the reader “with a description of a world in the process of being 
remade” (75). Bear’s focus is not the intrigue associated with the thriller genre, but the inhu-
man processes of transmutation. 
syMbiogenesis
Although with its strong focus on genomics DR is one of the few examples of what could be 
called a “genomics novel”7 (Zwart, “Genomics Metaphors” 166), one of the most obvious re-
sources for understanding the literary experiment conducted by Bear is the work of Margulis 
and Sagan. In the brief reading list offered in DR’s sequel Darwin’s Children, Bear acknowledges 
his indebtedness to Margulis and Sagan, whom he calls “the most stimulating popular writ-
ing team in modern biology” (490). Margulis is even attributed a minor role in DR. After hav-
ing appeared on national TV to announce her discovery, Kay is called on the phone by “Lynn,” 
who congratulates her on her success (90). Kay compares her experiences specifically to the 
“criticism and injustice” experienced by both Darwin and Margulis during their careers. Indeed 
it makes sense to regard Margulis’s work as a recommencement and deepening of Darwin’s 
quest for understanding variation. Darwin’s work gave more credence to the idea, already pro-
posed in the Eighteenth Century by his grandfather Erasmus Darwin and by other thinkers 
including Geoffroy Saint-Hillaire, that the species are not fixed, that there are all kinds of con-
nections between them. While Darwin in his work demonstrated the diversity and malleability 
of species and argued that variations are selected through natural selection and sexual repro-
duction, he never really answered the question of what produces variations before they can 
be selected. “Origin of species” is an odd title, for it is precisely this question that is left unan-
swered. According to the Modern Synthesis, the lacuna in the evolutionary puzzle was solved 
in the early Twentieth Century with the discovery of Mendel’s work and the birth of genetics. 
Margulis and Sagan try to demonstrate that this has been an invalid assumption.
In a series of articles and books written from the late 1960s onwards, Margulis demon-
strated that mitochondrial DNA, which comprises approximately two-third of all human DNA, 
is of viral origin: we are populated by strange visitors, and have been all along. In fact, specia-
tion in general is the result of long-term symbiotic relations between different organisms that 
combine their genetic material to create wholly new species, a process she calls endosymbio-
sis.8 SHEVA might well be a product of such a long-term symbiotic relationship. In the popular 
scientific book Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of The Origins of Species (2002), written together with 
her son the philosopher Dorion Sagan, Margulis argues that there has been a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the work of Darwin in the dominant paradigm of neo-Darwinism. 
Margulis and Sagan debunk the idea that male-female sexual intercourse has been central 
in the evolution of life on earth. Hybridity, or the recombination of genetic material through 
mating, is an important element in the development of mammals, but not in plants or bacteria. 
Moreover, like Gould and Eldridge, Margulis and Sagan challenge the neo-Darwinian concep-
tion of evolution: “The reliance on accumulation of random mutations in DNA is not so much 
‘wrong’ as oversimplified and incomplete: It misses the symbiotic forest for the genetic trees” 
(201). Although they recognize the role of random mutation, they state that these changes are 
“nearly always inconsequential or detrimental” and that their role has, in the past half-century, 
been “dogmatically overemphasized” (15). The authors wish to call into question a whole ap-
paratus of terms in modern biology, beginning with the most influential ideas such as Richard 
Dawkins formulation of the “selfish gene”:
 
There is no life in a gene. There is no self. A gene never fits the minimal criterion of a self, of 
a living system. The time has come in serious biology to abandon words like competition, 
cooperation and selfish genes and replace them with meaningful terms such as metabolic 
modes (chemoautotrophy, photosynthesis), ecological relations (epibiont, pollinator), 
and measurable quantities (light, heat, mechanical force). So many current evolutionary 
metaphors are superficial dichotomizations that come from false clarities of language. 
They do not beget but preclude scientific understanding. (17)
Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis regards life as a series of associations that cannot be re-
duced to “selfish genes or combative male mammals” (87). It is a theory about the association 
and potential fusion of materials that is neither incidental and random nor guided by transcen-
dental goals; rather, development and evolution are immanent to life. If there is such a thing as 
an evolutionary “strategy,” then it has nothing to do with the metaphors mentioned above; in 
a Deleuzian vein, such a strategy is simply the name for a particular ecological situation, a set 
of entangled and embedded populations set in motion by tendencies or desires.
Margulis work on small-scale, miniature life evidently helps Bear to make humanity strange, 
to confuse subjectivity and objectivity. Countering molecular biology’s tendency to represent 
microorganisms exclusively as “disease agents or food contaminants” (95), Margulis and Sagan 
argue that “bacteria are exemplary genetic engineers: splicers and dicers and mergers of ge-
nomes par excellence. We people just borrow their native skills” (“All for One” 45). The dexterity 
and creativity of microorganisms that Margulis and Sagan admire so much is clearly reflected 
in a dream sequence in DR occurring after Kay has examined SHEVA-infected corpses found in 
mass-graves in the Republic of Georgia:
After hours she dozed off and dreamed of bacterial buildups inside the bodies within the 
trench graves. Biofilms, that most people thought of as slime: little industrious bacterial cities 
reducing these corpses, these once-living giant evolutionary offspring, back to their native 
materials. Lovely polysaccharide architectures being laid down within the interior channels, 
the gut and lungs, the heart and arteries and eyes and brain, the bacteria giving up their wild 
ways and becoming citified, recycling all; great garbage dump cities of bacteria, cheerfully 
ignorant of philosophy and history and the character of the dead hulks they now reclaimed. (41) 
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Rather than thinking about the people and the lives they lost, in her dream Kay loses herself in 
an inhuman world where microorganisms build environments and make livings, worlds that 
Margulis and Sagan have described in great detail.9 It is clear that none of the above is meant 
to be metaphorical. As we shall see below, in DR, dreaming becomes a revelatory moment in 
which the inhuman appears.
noMad Vs. control science
Scientific ideas in DR figure neither merely as metaphors nor as plain facts: they are vital ingre-
dients of the narrative. Bear’s novel is a potent example of the way in which literature is able to 
move beyond the critique (in the sense of external judgment) of scientific developments and 
ideas and think along with science about problems that exceed current understanding. Whereas 
most characters and groups in the novel are directed at controlling SHEVA, the main charac-
ters Kay and Mitch, along with a small group of friends and colleagues, take on the challenge of 
“following” SHEVA as an emergent, complex problem, and to remain open to any idea that will 
help to truly explain its workings. In the course of the novel, the protagonists discern how SHE-
VA works by putting together the pieces of a puzzle. The first symptoms occur when, strangely, 
large numbers of women around the globe have two subsequent miscarriages.10 Furthermore, 
in the course of their pregnancies, women develop strange pigmentation on their faces, as if 
they are wearing brown masks. Many women are afraid to report the unexplainable deforma-
tions, fearing that these will be interpreted as diabolical or punishments of God. The inexpli-
cability of the symptoms leads to aggression and denial: SHEVA-infected women around the 
world are secluded, attacked or even killed. The obscurity of the “epidemic” makes it hard for 
investigators to map its development and dissemination. As the sequel Darwin’s Children makes 
clear, even when SHEVA babies are finally born, the confusion is hardly solved: the children are 
widely perceived as deviant.
Coming to terms with species metamorphosis is problematic (for the writer and for the 
characters) because it never actually happens in the sense of an occurrence between two pin-
pointed moments: it is a largely imperceptible, emergent event. The intangibility and sheer ter-
ror of the idea of sudden transspeciation trigger a “black box” (Latour, Science) response: SHEVA 
must be decoded, solved, controlled, and this transformation of SHEVA into a fact (a pathogen) 
obscures its true history. Yet this response is challenged by the main characters who gradu-
ally begin to realize that the struggle with SHEVA’s “symptoms” is doubled by a more complex 
story that is not about disease control, but about evolution. This tendency towards complexity 
can be theorized through Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of nomad science. I will focus on two 
important tenets of nomad science: problematization and mobility.
In DR, nomad science and its diagnostic role are represented by the main characters, Kay 
and Mitch, who explore an emergent problem by grappling with its symptoms, while the Task 
force, representing control science, incessantly tries to control the problems, as well as to in-
corporate the scientists in their approach. The tensions caused by competing desires for mo-
bility versus stability, problematization versus solution, are manifested throughout the novel. 
While the extreme symptoms related to SHEVA remain anomalous, the Task force nevertheless 
decides somewhat haphazardly to capture them under the name “Herod’s Flue,” thus coupling 
the dramatic appearance and biblical proportions of the symptoms with degrees of familiar-
ity and intelligibility that the government, the scientists and the general public are seeking. 
In anticipation of a vaccine, the primary instrument suggested by the Task force is abortion. 
Pregnant women come under enormous pressure to abort–those who do not co-operate 
risk forced abortion and social deprivation. Several women infected with Herod’s flu are even 
murdered by their husbands. The disease itself becomes something of a funding asset: Mark 
Augustine, the head of the CDC, wonders whether SHEVA could be “something so horrible, so 
provocative, that funding for the CDC would be guaranteed to rise” (58-59). 
Against this current of state and corporate interests as well as public opinion, Kay explains 
SHEVA as the activation of an evolutionary memory reacting to environmental pressures. Kay’s 
epigenetic understanding of the SHEVA-induced mutations as creative responses to the out-
side raises many questions. As one scientist in DR asks, where is this evolutionary memory 
stored? How is it activated? These questions are not answered in the novel, but the contours 
of an answer become visible in Kay’s treatment of human evolution as a complex system that 
suggests a far more intricate notion of heredity than does neo-Darwinism. The latter accords 
full agency to genes and organisms, whereas Kay in DR displaces individual agency in favor of a 
systemic view. In a meeting with Mitch and colleague Christopher Dickens, Kay tries to express 
her intuitive thoughts:
All individual creatures are networks of cells. All species are networks of individuals. All 
ecosystems are networks of species. All interact and communicate with one another to 
one degree or another, through competition, predation, cooperation. All these interactions 
are similar to neurotransmitters crossing synapses in the brain, or ants communicating in a 
colony. The colony changes its overall behavior based on ant interactions. So do we, based 
on how our neurons talk to each other. And so does all of nature, from top to bottom. It’s 
all connected. (242)
Kay’s view, resonating with contemporary visions of life as network in science and fiction11, is in 
accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomad science, first of all because it as-
sumes a topological development which, when mapped a posteriori, does not lead back to a 
site of origin. Kay’s desire is not for origins or control but for connection, contamination, and 
transformation. The genome, from this point of view, is not a discrete cause of the organism’s 
phenotype but one of the elements of development and evolution. Kay’s theory meets with 
strong resistance from other members of the Task force, not predominantly for its lack of sci-
entific evidence, but in fear that, true or not, neither politicians nor the wider public will accept 
it. As Mark Augustine suggests to the Task force board: “Let’s go with what’s solid … SHEVA is 
Herod’s. It causes gross birth defects and miscarriages” (133). The potential for nomadic fluidity 
is denied by a top-down decision to go for “what’s solid.”
After a series of heated discussions with the board, Kay resigns from the Task force and 
continues her work as a nomad scientist travelling through the country together with Mitch, 
gathering ideas and forging alliances with other scientists and journalists. They believe so ve-
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hemently in Kay’s theory that they decide to conceive a child, even though no children have 
been born since the SHEVA outbreak. Kay perceives their decision as an act of science: “I once 
worried that work and family wouldn’t fit together. Now, there’s no conflict. I am my own lab-
oratory.” (357). The act of proving her theory through self-experimentation, blurring all bound-
aries between private and public, science and life, can be seen as an ultimate act of nomad 
science. Kay’s decision is not a narcissistic or selfish one, aimed at establishing her name as a 
scientist, a pioneer, or something the like, but an unselfish immersion into a larger evolution-
ary story she cannot predict. Kay’s nomadic following of SHEVA’s unfolding is an open-ended 
experiment– risky, yet thought-through and conducted carefully. 
Alongside her in vivo experiment, Kay continues her thought-experiments, often conducted 
together with her colleagues and with her colleague-husband Mitch, leading her to the con-
cept of “emergent properties” that has become commonplace in contemporary fields such as 
complexity theory. As Manuel Delanda explains, an individual body cannot be reduced to the 
sum of its parts; what matters is a certain capacity inherent in this body to generate new prop-
erties (Intensive 72). Somewhere toward the middle of DR, Kay tries to convince Mitch of the 
idea that evolution is not the property of a given species, hidden in the genome as it were, but 
belongs to a complex ecological system “with emergent thought-like properties” (242). Even in 
Mitch, who is generally supportive of her theories, her efforts at explanation evoke resistance:
Mitch shook his head. “Emergent properties confuse me.” Kay glared at him for a moment, 
both challenged and exasperated. “We don’t have to posit self-awareness, conscious 
thought, to have an organized network that responds to its environment and issues 
judgments about what its individual nodes should look like,” Kay said. “Still sounds like the 
ghost in the machine to me,” Mitch said, making a sour face. (242)
Referring to Koestler’s controversial work The Ghost in the Machine (1967), Mitch questions the 
scientific solidity of Kay’s thoughts. Kay, in turn, tries to defend herself, to attain credibility, 
by placing her ideas against Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired traits (“Is this 
Lamarckian evolutionary theory? No!” [242]).12 This conversation is exemplary for the ways in 
which thought-experiments and brain-storm sessions–scientific practices that have a ten-
dency to go nomadic–clash with control science’s presumption of discrete, locatable causes. It 
is as if the Task force even blocks nomadic though after Kay has resigned from it: the tendency 
to control has been partially internalized. 
Molar and Molecular bioPolitics
While in his work Bear is often concerned with biopolitical issues such as bioterrorism (Quanti-
co [2005]) and new military technologies (Mariposa [2009]), DR is unique in the sense of sketch-
ing a global biopolitical scenario in which not just people’s health and security are at stake, but 
the very integrity of human bodies and populations. Bear’s novel engages a number of biopo-
litical issues: what are the roles of men and women in the dissemination of the virus? Who is 
entitled to diagnose the symptoms and what alternatives do SHEVA-infected women have? 
In the attempt to control the outbreak, whose health is being protected? What kind of health is 
this? What happens when disease turns into a criminalized or even militarized issue of national 
security?13 Through these questions, Bear’s novel aggrandizes societal tensions and trends related 
to the biosciences, biomedicine and the governance of health and security–notably the molecu-
larization, commercialization and globalization of health (Rose). Rather than trying to do justice 
to all relevant biopolitical aspects14, I will focus on the biopolitics of SHEVA as a scientific problem. 
 The political dynamics in the novel can be analyzed in analogy to the scientific processes 
in terms of a politics of control operating mainly through the CDC, the SHEVA Task Force, 
and pharmaceutical corporations (the “molar” level), and an almost invisible nomadic politics 
of individuals and loose alliances (“molecular” level).15 On the molar level, scientists, medical 
professionals, government officials, journalists, and patient groups treat SHEVA as an impinge-
ment on human health. Scientists, politicians and entrepreneurs claim to understand SHEVA 
in order to secure their positions and to meet the public demand for clarity. Head of the CDC 
Marc Augustine is concerned that the general public, in its ignorance, will go with a religious 
explanation and that “science will go right out the window” (DR 337). Patient groups accuse the 
government of withholding information and failing to protect SHEVA-infected people. Panic 
is raised in large parts of society, but the possibility of a steady human world is still prevalent. 
Lynch, who has analyzed these political processes in great detail, compares the cooperation 
and competition between corporate and government players in DR to the negotiations around 
the Human Genome Project (78-9). The key idea is indeed that SHEVA is framed as a problem 
in the genome that can be localized and “treated.”
Meanwhile, nomad scientists problematize the situation rather than trying to solve it. 
When it becomes clear that Kaye’s ideas about SHEVA are not just useless but antithetical to 
the goal of forging a vaccine, she is eliminated from the task force. Expelled by their academic 
communities, Mitch and Kaye straddle the borders of science and civil society, traveling around 
the country to prevent sequestering or quarantine, gathering information, creating theories 
and meeting many different people. They affirm the momentum that SHEVA presents, allow-
ing themselves to change, while others try to contain SHEVA as a dangerous “thing” that has 
to be controlled. I see Kay and Mitch’s nomadic approach to SHEVA as akin to what Beatriz da 
Costa and Kavita Philips have called “tactical biopolitics”: a mode of artistic, scientific, activist 
and philosophical experimentation with life (xviii). The voices of renegade scientists subvert the 
capitalist and nationalist vestiges on the molar biopolitical plane, engaging in a molecular poli-
tics of contagion: through befriended colleagues and a curious journalist, news of their actions 
and ideas seep into scientific and political networks and even into the public media. 
By the end of the novel, Mitch and Kaye have a child together–the first reported SHEVA 
child–and call it Stella Nova. They immediately notice that Stella has new bodily features, in-
cluding the ability to speak from birth, a double tongue that enables her to utter two sentences 
at the same time, and the ability to emit odors that sooth humans around them. Kay suggests 
that these features will allow a new generation of humans to tackle problems associated with 
augmented population and information density (including stress). Stephen Dougherty has sug-
gested that, for all of the complexity DR evokes, its jubilant denouement reinforces a rather 
conservative message:
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In submitting ourselves to the genome … we are merely following the true genius of the 
species; we are merely affirming the true principles of life and the deep biological structures that 
reflect them; and we are wisely assenting to the superior knowledge of technoscience. (281) 
While seeing the rationale behind this reading, I want to stress that the fact that certain char-
acters in DR interpret the genome as a program does not force the reader to understand the 
narrative, and evolution as such, as the execution of such a program. Although DR’s apex may 
strike some as unbelievable as well as unnecessarily conjuring a sense of vindication on behalf 
of the protagonists,16 the implications of Stella’s birth are neither comforting nor clear. Rather 
than predetermining the narrative frame on the basis of scientific dogma or a moral take-home 
message, I would argue that Bear delivers an account of scientific exploration and human evo-
lution without a clear cause or conclusion. If in the novel evolution becomes a biopolitical event, 
it is not because evolution comes under human control–quite the opposite: evolution brings 
about a situation that, ultimately, cannot be controlled.
Passages of intuition
DR contains many references to religion and spirituality that lend the event of species trans-
mutation an almost messianic allure. As in the Biblical story, where Herod’s politics fails to 
prevent Jesus’ birth–and with it, the arrival of a new way of life that will contaminate not just 
the Middle-Eastern provinces but the Roman empire as such–the birth of Stella Nova is bound 
to inaugurate a new era of mankind. The Christian motif of redemption has prompted Lynch 
to criticize Bear for delivering a scenario based on “a blind trust in evolution” (90). According to 
Lynch, DR carries as its final message the “ultimate wisdom of the human genome,” and conse-
quently, the novel “downplays the role played by social and political realities” (90). Furthermore, 
Lynch places the spiritual aspects of DR in opposition to the role of science. For her, the novel as 
such has a mystical bent, for it suggests that “Lang is not correct about SHEVA because she’s 
a scientist: she is correct because she is intuitive and visionary, able to take the leap of faith 
necessary to see the grand design dictated by the human genome” (87). Similarly, Schell argues 
that in their spiritual zeal, DR’s protagonists naively “realize that they are nothing more than 
bodies expressing innate genetic propensities” (816). Lynch and Schell highlight some of the po-
tential political effects of a novel that, albeit in a very complex and original way, turns evolution 
and science into mesmerizing spectacles of a quasi-spiritual nature, thus potentially distracting 
readers’ attention from social aspects. They also stress that the ideas presented in the novel 
are intuitive explorations that may easily be misinterpreted by the lay reader as scientific facts. 
While sharing some of Lynch and Schell’s concerns, I nonetheless want to argue that Bear’s 
assumed “trust” in evolution need not represent a political or epistemological dead end. In my 
view, Lynch and Schell’s critical reading of the spiritual elements in DR leads to an unnecessarily 
rigid separation of science and faith. Essentially, the kind of faith Bear communicates is not a 
dogmatic belief but an intuition articulated in hypotheses. 
Bear’s novel can be regarded as a move towards new modes of relating to the biological as-
pects of human existence, balancing the tendency towards control with an intuition of and rev-
erence for the ultimately unknowable complexity of life. While akin to the world of the spiritual, 
this attitude, expressed in what I will call “passages of intuition,” is also intrinsically part of science 
and politics. With “passages” I mean both literally the text sequences and the trials of the characters 
struggling to come to terms with transformation. Passages of intuition in Bear’s novel include 
dreams, reveries, epiphanies, eureka moments, brain-storm sessions and passionate actions that 
recur throughout the novel as interludes. These are not flights away from the flow of events, but 
critical points within the topology of the novel, points at which hitherto separated elements 
connect, and the main characters move in unforeseen directions. A key example of such a criti-
cal point is when Kay brain-storms about SHEVA in the company of Mitch and Christopher: 
This is so clear to me, guys. Why can’t you see it? Here’s the complete feedback loop: the 
environment changes, causing stress on organisms–in this case, on humans. The types 
of stress alter balances of stress-related chemicals in our bodies. The set-aside-memory 
reacts and movable elements shift based on an evolutionary algorithm established over 
millions, even billions of years. A genetic computer decides what might be the best 
phenotype for the new conditions that cause the stress. We see small changes in individuals 
as a result, prototypes, and if the stress levels are reduced, if the offspring are healthy and 
many, the changes are kept. But every now and then, when a problem in the environment 
is intractable … long-term social stress in humans, for example … there’s a major shift. 
Endogenous retroviruses express, carry a signal, coordinate the activation of specific 
elements in the genetic memory storage. Voilà. Punctuation. (243-44)
Kay’s critical insight comes to her appearing obvious, even necessary: as a revelation. At the 
same time, the dots in the above fragment illustrate the difficulty of expressing an idea that 
cannot be explained by existing paradigms. Passages like these constitute attempts to come to 
terms with SHEVA, not by representing it on the basis of a scientific methodology, but by try-
ing to “approach” it intuitively, using imaginative terms that are necessarily vague (“set-aside 
memory,” “evolutionary algorithm,” “genetic computer,” and so on). If control science is intent 
on reaching a solution in a straight path, intuition takes a roundabout, nomadic route. This 
nomadic approach becomes quite outspoken when the main characters are no longer willing 
or able to place themselves at a distance from the problem of SHEVA and start to embody it. In 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian vein, to imagine SHEVA in this way does not mean to represent it from a 
distance, but rather to become (with) it through active, affective connection.
Mitch’s medium of intuition is the dream. After his journey to the Alps, Mitch is haunted 
by dreams about Neanderthal men and women living in exile from their tribe, ostracized for 
their physiological deviances triggered by SHEVA, and eventually killed. Mitch draws an im-
mediate connection between this imagined past and the uncertain present: “Perhaps this was 
the original sin of our kind, that our Neanderthal ancestors wished to stop progress, hold on to 
their unique position … By killing the new children. Those who would become us. Now we do 
the same thing, perhaps?” (330-31). As dreams about the Neanderthals keep returning, Mitch 
begins to feel a strong affective relation to these ancestors, and develops a deep urge to fight 
for a people that does not yet exist.
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Kay’s intuitions of SHEVA rather take the form of epiphanies, moments when a “caller” sud-
denly becomes present to her, a caller that does not utter words but causes “waves of amaze-
ment, of child-like glee and adult consternation” (280). She takes the caller to be a divine entity 
that uses her as a medium to announce a new era, a ruthless yet “gracious” force that she 
claims has “shaped human history” (280). One day at work when the caller returns, Kay decides 
to have a colleague make a brain-scan to find out whether her experience has any neurological 
basis. Remarkably, her scan shows a significant overlap with the brain-scan of a SHEVA child. 
Despite the lack of a scientific explanation, this finding affirms her hypothesis and makes her 
realize “we were all virus children” (262). 
The imaginative sequences each have their own levels of intensity. Mitch’s dreams connect 
him to prehistory in uncanny ways, causing him to oscillate between past and present, dream 
and reality. Kay’s epiphanies position her towards the future, producing in her a disconcerting 
yet strangely intimate feeling of vertigo, leaving no distinctions between science and spiritual-
ity, personal and collective. Mitch “recalls” what has essentially been forgotten–that humans 
were, and will be, another species–while Kay literally carries the future of humanity inside her 
body. I read these sequences not as flights from reality but as encounters with the problem 
represented by SHEVA, encounters that are inseparable from the characters’ scientific adven-
tures. These sequences testify to an essential aspect of nomad science: it throws scientists 
into problematic events they cannot control, events affecting every part of their lives. If these 
passages consist mostly of chance events and passions, they are not therefore chaotic. Rather, 
they follow a nomadic route, connecting hitherto separated areas of research and introduc-
ing scientific ideas that have not yet been accepted by the mainstream scientific community. 
Moreover, Mitch and Kay’s passages of intuition lead to crucial decisions–first and foremost 
the decision to have a child. 
Significantly, epiphany in DR is not merely “about” evolution–rather, it constitutes an evo-
lutionary signal. In a short commentary entitled “Caveats” at the end of Darwin’s Children, Bear 
interprets Kay’s epiphany as follows:
As Kay experiences her epiphany, she is made aware that her caller is not talking just to 
her, but to other minds within and around her. Epiphany is not limited to our conscious 
minds, or even to human beings. Imagine epiphany that touches our subconscious, our 
other internal minds–the immune system–or that reaches beyond us to touch a forest, or 
an ocean … or the vast and distributed “minds” of any ecological system. (476)
Bear’s interpretation is highly speculative, but not unheard of in contemporary bioscience (Lip-
ton).17 I read DR as an exercise in thinking societal turbulence at the turn of the 21st century in 
ecological and evolutionary terms. Bear’s novel supports what biologists Scott Gilbert and Jan 
Sapp and philosopher Alfred Tauber call “a symbiotic view of life,” a view that changes the clas-
sical definition of an immune system: 
The “defensive” role of immunity, so prominent in the medical and agricultural contexts, 
must be balanced from evolutionary and ecological viewpoints. Immunity does not merely 
guard the body against other hostile organisms in the environment; it also mediates the 
body’s participation in a community of “others” that contribute to its welfare. (333)
This participation in “a community of others” is what makes the body sensitive to calls from the 
outside. Could it be that in times of upheaval, strong stress signals induce genetic transforma-
tions that are accompanied by emotionally intense experiences and imaginative ideas?
conclusion
Every event in DR, from the scientific explorations in competing research consortia to the love 
between Kay and Mitch that leads to one of the first virus children, is part of the situation that 
SHEVA has triggered. However, as I have tried to show, SHEVA is not a biological “cause,” but a 
bifurcation point in a chain of different processes. Far from a commodified “package,” the nov-
elty that Bear unleashes is an experimental, collaborative exercise involving a literary novum 
(SHEVA), scientific theories, biopolitical practices, and ethical responses. The narrative event of 
metamorphosis-through-contagion connects humans horizontally to other species and eco-
systems, and vertically to the “genome time” (Clayton, “Genome”) of its past and future becom-
ings. While in Bear’s novel the actions of characters and groups are crucial to the ways in which 
the central problem unfolds, there is also a movement away from characters’ intentional and 
controlled actions, a suspension of “suspense” (in the sense of intrigue), a gesture of opening up 
to the “organic tendencies” that, as Margulis and Sagan contend in Acquiring Genomes, are the 
forebears of what we today call “conscious choice” (99).18 Exploring the inhuman processes of 
evolution, Bear proves Margulis and Sagan’s point that “no whodunit could be more spellbind-
ing than some of these cases of symbiogenesis” (xii). 
In DR the dynamics of control and nomadism are played out in various ways: determinism 
vs. complexity, control vs. affirmation of change, critique vs. collaboration, secrecy vs. open-
ness. Control science is intent on determining discrete causes, while nomad science, conversely, 
throws certainty into question by confronting a life capable of radical and momentous change. 
Nomad science follows and affirms the flows of life, not for personal gain but in and through 
collaboration. It navigates a world that is fluid and unpredictable, resisting habits, identities, 
established meanings and values associated with dominant epistemology. For nomad thought, 
the question is always: how much world can one include in one’s map without falling into 
chaos? As the novel dramatically shows, the price to pay for intellectual overstretch is not just 
scientific incredulity, but impending mental and physical collapse and social exclusion. Dedi-
cated to truth yet unfaithful to control science’s entrenched ideas, nomad scientists in Bear’s 
novel actively participate in a process of contamination–not to cause misery, but to reveal 
or bring about a transformation, to open up science to a different world. In Bear’s novel, it is 
exactly the coupling of hitherto largely separated fields of research–archaeology, evolutionary 
biology and genomics–that provides the key to understanding a complex event. Serendipity, 
rather than protocoled experiment, plays a great role here: it is only when Kay and Mitch’s 
knowledge coincidentally comes together that science becomes capable of seeing SHEVA in a 
larger evolutionary context.
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This chapter shows that DR, for all of its provocative discourse about internal mechanisms 
of evolution, is not a work of biological determinism, but a literary demonstration of Margulis 
and Sagan’s idea that health is “less a question of resistance to invasion from the outside and 
much more an issue of ecological relationships” (Acquiring 19). Indeed, as Stacy Alaimo has ar-
gued, DR “enacts a powerful posthuman environmental ethics, in which human bodies–from 
the prehistorical past through unknown futures–are inextricably connected with material 
worlds” (25). With SHEVA the environment “returns” as a delayed effect of symbiogenesis, al-
tering humanity from within. At the same time, the presence and significance of the environ-
ment is left somewhat implicit in the novel. Being offered only scant speculations about the 
circumstances that may have triggered SHEVA, the reader is stuck with a somewhat abstract 
sense of “environment.” In spite of Bear’s allegiance to complexity, it is easy to read into DR a 
dichotomy between a dynamic “social environment” and a pre-programmed biological core. 
A key challenge of minor bio-sf, I concur, is to zoom in and out, capturing in narrative form 
Margulis and Sagan’s suggestion that “we are composed of smaller selves, and we form parts 
of the more inclusive selves (“The Uncut” 28). In the chapters that follow, the idea of “environ-
ment” multiplies and enters sf narrative in a more forceful way, making tangible the ecological, 
planetary and even cosmic nature of evolution.
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Unnatural participations or nuptials are the true Nature spanning the kingdoms of 
nature.
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari –
introduction
Alien encounter, one of the most popular themes in sf since H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds, is 
paradigmatically undergirded by a telos of preserving human autonomy (Malmgren)1, often 
amounting to warfare.2 In a way, many of these stories are not really about encounter at all, 
but about evading encounter. Only rarely do sf authors develop stories of genuine human-alien 
contact in which humanity is allowed to transform. In what can be seen as a form of genre cri-
tique, Octavia Butler’s sf trilogy Lilith’s Brood (LB)3 starts off after an alien life form called Oankali 
has rescued humanity from a world that has become inhospitable to humans due to pollution 
and atomic warfare. The human survivors have been brought to an animate space ship where 
they stay in “suspended animation” while being studied. After a while, human survivors are 
awakened and placed in separate cells. Unfortunately, the moment that the Oankali present 
themselves and explain the situation, humans respond with disbelief, fear, panic and aggression. 
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When offered a choice to cooperate or to return to their inert state, humans consistently opt 
for the latter. After many of these trials, Lilith Iyapo, a middle-aged American anthropologist, is 
the first human who is successfully “conditioned.” Without offering an explanation, the Oankali 
declare to Lilith that they are desperately in need of “trading” their genes with humans–their 
own survival depends on it. They promise Lilith that together with a group of humans to be 
awakened by her, she will eventually be brought back to earth to establish a new civilization, 
one that is more durable than the previous. Later, when the experiment is in full swing, Lilith 
discovers the true goal of the trade: a long-lasting, symbiotic relationship resulting in a brood 
of human-Oankali hybrids. 
LB recounts the evolving relations between humans, Oankali and their offspring, relations 
characterized by physical and emotional dependency and divergent philosophies of life. Afraid 
of losing their autonomy, most humans refuse to even listen to the Oankali; they become 
known as “resisters.” The Oankali, while insisting that the only viable future is a shared one, 
are unwilling to force humans to live with them. From the Oankali’s point of view, resistance 
against encounter and transformation is a genetic trait of the human species, a trait they label 
as “the human contradiction.” The Oankali maintain that the dominance of this trait is bound 
to lead to the extinction of the human species unless it is overcome through genetic trade. 
There is no easy way out of this paradoxical situation. When a character in the first book 
named Joseph suggests that the Oankali might as well engage in a trade with cloned humans, 
the Oankali Nikanj rejects this solution:
A partner must be biologically interesting, attractive to us, and you are fascinating. You are 
horror and beauty in rare combination. In a very real way, you’ve captured us, and we can’t 
escape. But you’re more than only the composition and the workings of your bodies. You 
are your personalities, your cultures. We’re interested in those too. That’s why we’ve saved 
as many of you as we could. (154)
As this statement demonstrates, for the Oankali, all is not in the genes: rather than a single 
procedure of genetic exchange, a successful trade must be achieved through multiple genera-
tions of human-Oankali life. 
Scholars have analyzed LB as an allegory of relations among human “aliens,” notably racial 
tensions in the US and the Cold War (Jameson, Archaeologies; Peppers) and as a meditation on 
genetics and symbiosis (Clarke; Peppers). Stacy Alaimo has praised Butler for trying to forge 
an eco-centric narrative that takes the far-reaching possibilities of the biosciences seriously 
without relapsing into genetic determinism (“Cyborg”). Similarly, Cathy Peppers has argued 
that Butler’s engagement with genetics is aimed at “changing the sociobiological story from 
within” (52).4 Building on these (partially) science-inflected analyses, I want to show that, with 
the help of science, evolutionary sf narratives like LB can also be analyzed without reverting to 
allegory. In LB, the shock of difference experienced by the characters does not only lead to a 
reconfiguration of social relations, but also to new physiological traits and ecological relations. 
Butler’s narrative demonstrates that such biological becomings always occur in ongoing, mu-
tual relationships with other bodies and with the environment. If this is a utopian moment, it is 
decidedly not of the program type–born from nostalgia and aimed at a particular state of being 
in the future. Rather it composes what Haraway has called a “cyborg ontology” (Simians), a per-
manent reminder of the unforeseeable co-evolution of matter, organic life, and technologies.
The Oankali’s extraordinary genetic engineering abilities seem to make them all-powerful 
arbiters of (human) life and ultimate exponents of control science. As the story progresses, 
however, the image of the trade as a controlled experiment begins to lose validity. The Oankali 
are utterly dependent on human cooperation. Furthermore, the success of the experiment 
hinges on unforeseen transformations, some of which are the result of mistakes. The protago-
nists’ journeys can be seen as nomadic practices of problematization: explorations of the prob-
lem of species encounter. Whereas in Bear’s Darwin’s Radio elements of nomad science become 
apparent in a search for new knowledge and understanding (see chapter 4), in LB nomad sci-
ence is expressed foremost in practices, attitudes and desires which precede and exceed knowing. 
As such, LB testifies to Deleuze and Guattari’s statement about the “nonscientific activities” of 
nomad (“ambulant”) science:
In the field of interaction of the two sciences, the ambulant sciences confine themselves 
to inventing problems whose solution is tied to a whole set of collective, nonscientific 
activities but whose scientific solution depends, on the contrary, on royal science and the 
way it has transformed the problem by introducing it into its theorematic apparatus and 
its organization of work. (413)
I interpret the experiment of genetic trade in LB as such a nomadic “invention of problems,” a 
nonplanned yet rigorous search for ways of living together, which only at the very end appear 
to culminate in a new “organization of work,” a fusion of human and Oankali ways of thinking 
and living. However, the story ends rather abruptly, so that the reader does not know for sure 
whether a solution has in fact been reached. 
In the following I will demonstrate that the trilogy can be productively read alongside 
the recent work of Donna Haraway as a story of species encounter, one that shows resem-
blances to encounters between humans and other animals in food industries, health care, 
science, sports and other areas. Butler and Haraway are at their strongest when they explore 
the emotional, embodied, affective dimensions of species encounter. Apart from performing 
modes of intimate interaction, their work also allows us to think co-evolution as a continu-
ous, nonlinear process that is inherently embedded or, as Haraway calls it, “worlded.” From 
this perspective, Butler’s trilogy is not so much an allegory as a literary experiment in which 
characters construct and dwell in multispecies contact zones that are uncomfortably prob-
lematic. Each in their own way, Butler and Haraway create topologies of nomadic ideas, de-
sires, attitudes, and practices centered on problematization without solution. However, these 
topologies are not devoid of elements of control: even the most “nomadic” characters in LB 
experience episodes where control becomes a dominant tendency. To illustrate this, I will 
first discuss some elements of Butler’s trilogy that scholars have interpreted as instances of 
genocetrism and (liberal) eugenics, elements that can be understood through the concept of 
control science.
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oankali biocaPitalisM
Butler has pointed to Margulis’s theory of endosymbiosis, Lovelock and Margulis’s Gaia hy-
pothesis, as well as E.O. Wilson’s book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) as key inspirations 
for her work.5 While Margulis’s work, as argued in the previous chapters, has strong nomadic 
traits, Wilson’s sociobiology can be seen as a key example of control science, with its emphasis 
on the genome as the origin and essence of life. In LB, genocentrism and ecocentrism some-
times occur within a single sequence, for example when the Oankali Jdahya tries to explain 
to Lilith that cancer is “the result of a tangled combination of factors that only begins with 
genes” (39), while a few moment later he qualifies genes as “the essence of ourselves” (40). 
Butler’s meshing together of partially contradictory sources becomes clear in Jdaya’s image of 
the Oankali as “natural genetic engineers,” 
We do what you would call genetic engineering. We know you had begun to do it yourselves 
a little, but it’s foreign to you. We do it naturally. We must do it. It renews us, enables 
us to survive as an evolving species instead of specializing ourselves to into extinction or 
stagnation. (40)
On the one hand, the Oankali’s gene trade resembles the lateral gene transfer explored in 
Margulis’s work on symbiosis, in which case the Oankali can be seen as akin to bacteria. The 
Oankali also resonate with Haraway’s “cyborg,” a figuration embodying the synthesis of biol-
ogy and technology (Clarke; Peppers). On the other hand, Oankali life is presented here as 
something that inheres wholly in the genome. This genocentrism becomes the ground for a 
seemingly impeccable knowledge. As Jdaya explains to Lilith, the Ooloi know “everything that 
can be learned about you from your genes” (22). The Oankali deploy knowledge and technology 
to modify humans, the most incisive interference being sterilization, which is designed to get 
rid of the last (vainly) hope for a human future.
Notwithstanding the initial stage of controlled experimentation on humans in a state of 
suspended animation, I would argue that the model of eugenics, a top-down control over 
human life and death, is inappropriate for describing the story of LB. Significantly, the Oankali 
never kill human beings, nor do they force them to comply in an immediate, coercive way. 
Butler’s story-world comes closer Deleuze’s “control society,” a more flexible mode in which 
human bodies and behaviors are constantly monitored and modulated in non-coercive ways 
(Postscript). More specifically, the trilogy can be read as a rumination on what has been called a 
“liberal eugenics,” the soft strategies of enhancement and control operating through corpora-
tions and states (Rose).6 The benefits that Lilith and her companions receive include life-time 
extension, genetic therapy, tissue regeneration, and longevity. The resisters, apart from being 
deprived of their fertility, are faced with enormous health challenges in a world without tech-
nology, putting optimal pressure to succumb to the Oankali way of life. 
Several scholars have compared Butler’s trilogy, written in the late 1980s, with contempo-
rary biotechnology and biocommerce. According to Slonczewski, LB presciently sketches the 
trading of bodily assets such as ova as commodities (“Octavia”). Molly Wallace more broadly 
compares the Oankali’s genetic trade to neoliberal capitalism, and particularly to the con-
temporary merger of venture capital and biology in biotechnology and in research fields such 
as genomics. For Wallace, the air of innocence, wisdom and benevolence around the Oankali 
obfuscates their unilateral imposition of the trade:
Though the Oankali do not explicitly use the language of property, their control over 
the reproducibility of life, both human and non-human, has the effect of ownership. The 
Oankali have altered human biology with a gene that makes humans (re)productively 
reliant, and having thereby acquired a kind of biological patent on human DNA, the Oankali 
protect their investment. (119)
In other words, the Oankali do not trade opportunistically, but with the intent of spreading 
and continuing their way of life. In each encounter, humans are subjected to temptation-cum-
manipulation. As Nikanj explains to the ex-resister Tino, although the Oankali cannot “read 
minds,” they can “stimulate sensations and send your thoughts off in all sorts of directions” 
(293). Oankali communication can be interpreted as an allegory of contemporary marketing’s 
saturation of the public sphere, in which people’s desires are continually molded to secure the 
success of new products, while neo-liberalism’s official story is that entrepreneurs only pro-
duce what customers demand. Contemporary capitalism has much to offer (especially to those 
with money), but the choice for another system is made almost impossible.
The image of ubiquitous control turns the whole experiment of the gene trade into a prod-
uct of control science. For several reasons, this seems a valid assessment: the Oankali comprise 
a unified group working in a planned way; their activities seem strictly oriented toward a single 
outcome (a successful trade); and they are obsessed with genetics as a key to success. Control 
science is perhaps best illustrated with the Ooloi’s discovery of cancer, a special human “talent,” 
which they have incorporated to instill new capabilities:
They get real pleasure from healing or regenerating, and they share that pleasure with us. 
They weren’t as good at repairs before they found us. Regeneration was limited to wound 
healing. Now they can grow you a new leg if you lose one. They can even regenerate brain 
and nervous tissue. They learned that from us, believe it or not. We had the ability, and they 
know how to use it. They learned by studying our cancers, of all things. It was cancer that 
made Humanity such a valuable trade partner. (294)
From this description cancer is a “solution” to the problem of the trade, the result of a well-
planned experiment. If for humans cancer is a disease, a chaotic growth that destroys the 
body’s balanced organization, the Oankali redefine it as a mechanism that can be used in a 
constructive manner. As Cooper notes, the properties of cancerous cells–proliferation, migra-
tion and transformation–resemble those of embryonic stem cells, which can still differentiate 
into any kind of cell–brain, blood, skin, and so on (139). Cooper argues that in embryonic stem 
cell research, a scientific fascination with life’s mutability and perpetual “surplus” tends to re-
territorialize on a capitalist incentive to create ever new promises for new biomedical applica-
tions and commodities, promises that can be banked on through patents. Is this interpretation 
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also applicable to LB? Does Butler’s story culminate in a situation in which life, understood as 
a potential for differentiation, is finally understood and controlled? I want to argue that this is 
not the case, and that the dominant mode in LB is nomad science. In the following, I will work 
towards an analysis of nomad science in a roundabout manner, by examining the trilogy’s af-
fective moments of encounter and practices of worlding.
unnatural ParticiPations
Although LB is a story about encounter, throughout the trilogy a deep abyss divides the spe-
cies. Most humans try to resist the Oankali while secretly or subconsciously craving contact 
with them, a situation that is so disturbing that they can only perceive it as unnatural–as 
something that should not and cannot be happening. The experimental encounter between 
Oankali and humans is focalized first through Lilith, and subsequently through her son Akin7 
(in the second and third volumes). At Lilith’s first encounter with an Oankali called Jdaya, her 
body stiffens with fright, and she is hardly able to bear the specter of its tentacled appearance. 
Lilith has to search for words to express her disgust: “Medusa children. Snakes for hair. Nests 
of night crawlers for eyes and ears” (43). Lilith makes clear that she would rather return to the 
inert state she had been in for the past 250 years than endure the horrors of alienness. After 
repeated encounters, however, Lilith’s gets used to Jdaya and follows him outside her cell. The 
Oankali world turns out to be a living entity spectacularly called Chkahichdahk (imagine But-
ler’s joy inventing these names). The reason why Lilith is brought to consciousness is to learn 
to live with the Oankali and to instruct the other humans how to do so. After having spent 
some time with an Oankali family, and especially with the Oankali child Nikanj, she is sent 
to a special room where thirty people lie in suspended animation, waiting to be awakened 
by her. In batches of ten, Lilith awakens the people and tells them about the Oankali’s plans. 
Many of them refuse to believe Lilith, until the Oankali finally appear to them. Although at 
first repelled, the humans gradually get used to the Oankali, who seem to be attaining a more 
human shape, as if adapting to their symbiotic partners. Human heterosexual couples develop 
a strange, irresistible attraction to a specific kind of Oankali, the Olooi8, who are neither male 
nor female. This leads to sexual encounters that are as frightening as they are pleasurable 
(not unlike any first sexual experience), for example between Lilith, her human mate Joseph, 
and Nikanj:
Lilith saw Joseph’s body stiffen, struggle, then relax, and she knew Nikanj had read him 
correctly. He neither struggled nor argued as Nikanj positioned him more comfortably 
against its body. Lilith saw that he had closed his eyes again, his face peaceful. Now he was 
ready to accept what he had wanted from the beginning. (190)
This is not an ordinary ménage-a-trois. Although erotic encounters between humans and 
Olooi are not further explained in the narrative, for most humans it is clear that something 
“improper” transpires. Despite their continuing attraction to the Olooi, they fiercely resist the 
trade, seeing the Oankali as enemies who want to transform humanity according to their own 
designs. The resisters, who accuse Lilith and others of being traitors, indulge in multiple acts 
of violence, including beatings and even the murder of Joseph. The first part of the trilogy ends 
with Lilith being told by Nikanj that he has made her pregnant using Josephs sperm (allegedly 
in a modified form). 
Moments such as those cited above are the main reason why LB is such a gripping book, 
and a superb example of sf estrangement (how is it possible that Jameson, in his seminal Ar-
chaeologies, merely mentions LB off-handedly as an “allegory of race,” thus ignoring its gender, 
sexual, biotechnological and ecological dimensions?).9 In the irreducibly paradoxical situation 
of symbiotic encounter, nothing appears “natural” anymore: all is artificial, experimental, a gro-
tesque reality show in which everyone has to play a part. Yet from a Deleuzian perspective, this 
situation demonstrates that evolution is an experiment. As Bruce Baugh explains, experimen-
tation for Deleuze is a vital effort 
to reveal the effects of combinations of different bodies and elements, and especially 
whether these combinations or encounters will increase the powers of acting of the 
elements combined into a greater whole, or whether the combination will destroy or 
“decompose” one or more of the elements. (91) 
In other words, for Deleuze, thought-experiments are tests determining what a body or group 
of bodies is capable of. As both LB and Deleuze’s work illustrate, such experimentation is never 
an opportunistic, individualistic affair as in the notions of “free competition” and “level playing 
field” in neo-liberal economics, which have been applied to evolution ( I will return to this issue 
below). For Deleuze, true thought goes beyond representation–the imposition of a founda-
tional schema in which a rational human subject re-presents to himself a messy, nonhuman 
world as well as his own interiority.10 Thought is an expressive immediacy, an a-personal affect 
or percept (art), function (science) or concept (philosophy), that short-circuits attempts at 
distancing and self-reflection. 
From a Deleuzian point of view, the encounters in LB are not “unnatural” or “artificial” in the 
sense of being uncommon, fabricated or wrong. Rather these events express a tendency in life 
toward migration, variation and transformation. A major difference between Deleuze and phi-
losophers of technology such as Bernard Stiegler and Graham Harman is that the paradox of 
an artificially altered or “extended” nature is not reserved to the human realm.11 Rather, artifice 
or “unnaturalness” is the hallmark of life, whose fundamental tendency is to differ from itself, to 
become, in a way that is not dictated by heredity:
Propagation by epidemic, by contagion, has nothing to do with filiation by heredity, even if 
the two themes intermingle and require each other. The vampire does not filiate, it infects. 
The difference is that contagion, epidemic, involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous: 
for example, a human being, an animal, and a bacterium, a virus, a molecule, a microorganism. 
Or in the case of the truffle, a tree, a fly and a pig. These combinations are neither genetic 
nor structural; they are interkingdoms, unnatural participations. That is the only way Nature 
operates–against itself. (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 266-7)
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The focus on “contagion” rather than “filiation” is accompanied by a focus on populations (or 
ecologies) rather than species. This same focus is found in LB where, as Wald has argued, fixed 
species-being is replaced with a notion of population, offering “an alternative in which hybrids 
embody the breakdown of exclusionary categories, social as well as biological” (“Cells” 262). 
Although the trilogy ends with the promise of a hybrid population and thus a potentially suc-
cessful “trade,” this situation is not at all peaceful or self-evident. What Deleuze and Butler’s 
work share is a tendency not so much to go “beyond” rigid categories to arrive at a utopia, but 
to precede them and to move between them, expressing a potential to become-other.
butler Meets haraway
Human-Oankali relations can be seen as a model or prelude to another form of living together 
with other species that Haraway calls for in When Species Meet, fostering “the capacity to feel 
and think with other mortal beings, not just about them” (6). When humans become with other 
species, this amounts to a trading of traits that affect both parties in the short and the long run. 
Several scholars have gone before me in connecting the works of Butler and Haraway (Bol-
linger; Clarke; Goss and Riquelme; Greenwald Smith; Peppers; Wallace), but they have focused 
on Haraway’s former, rather than her more recent work. A strong connection between the 
two is the feminist critique of patriarchy and phallocentrism. Lilith is given the privilege of co-
creating a new world, but as the mother of a new race, she bears the brunt of radical disloca-
tion and transformation like no other. She laments that resisters–predominantly males–hold 
her responsible for the loss of human dignity, calling her “a second Satan or Satan’s wife or 
some such idiocy” (297). Lilith’s ordeal mirrors the fate of many mythological and real women 
in history. Her name is an immediate reference to the myth of Lilith, allegedly Adam’s first wife 
who after being banished from Eden for disobedience slept with demons, producing a brood of 
monsters. Another example can be found in histories and myths of colonization, where women 
have often been blamed for facilitating the destruction of the indigenous culture through their 
alleged disloyalty and promiscuity.12 What Butler makes excruciatingly clear through literary 
means, Haraway persuasively argues in practically all of her scholarship: the Enlightenment, 
phallocentric strategy of self-preservation through domination, fencing off the human from 
the nonhuman world, is self-defeating. There is a need for new ways of thinking humans, 
other species and technologies together. This requires a transformation that is neither fully 
controlled nor an event one undergoes passively, but rather a challenge that encompasses all 
dimensions of biological and social existence.
If LB criticizes phallocentrism, racism and speciesism, it is not a critique that dreams of a 
world without asymmetrical relations. In LB, an important factor in the asymmetry of species 
relations is that the Oankali seem to understand humans better than humans do themselves. 
Moreover, humans have great trouble fathoming Oankali modes of communication–spoken, 
pheromonal, tactile, neuronal and genetic–even if they do participate in these modes. The 
paradox is fleshed out in a sequence where an adolescent Akin quite suddenly finds himself in 
an intimate situation with an Olooi: “It was delicately controlling his nervous system, stimu-
lating the release of certain endorphins in his brain-in effect, causing him to drug himself into 
pleasurable relaxation and acceptance” (454). The encounter is almost traumatic in its perplex-
ity, but simultaneously exhilarating and joyous. In his struggle to communicate in strange new 
ways, Akin ultimately resists resisting, accepting the “self-dissolving closeness” (455) and thus 
affirming his own singularity as a mixed species and a body-in-becoming. 
On the one hand, the Oankali’s direct neuronal communication is reminiscent of scenarios 
of totalitarian biopower such has Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Animal Farm. Human 
beings find themselves in a highly artificial experiment that they have not chosen and from 
which they cannot escape. For example, when Lilith is first introduced in her Oankali family she 
is continually monitored and cannot even open doors, which makes her wonder: “How was a 
pet supposed to feel? How did zoo animals feel?” (58). But as Stacy Alaimo has noted, the per-
vasiveness of tactile and other non-verbal communication in LB can also be read as a feminist 
critique of distance in the dominant western traditions of optical epistemology: “the Oankali 
do not perceive the world through vision, which separates the knower from the known, but 
through sensory organs that, with a certain eroticism, taste and feel the world around them” 
(144). Furthermore, Oankali communication cannot be reduced to the expression of pre-exist-
ing plans and ideas by rational individuals. Rather, it reveals a regime of machinic (a-signifying) 
communication that connects bodies in immediate ways, expressing affects (capacities-in-re-
lation) rather than pre-formed messages.13
Especially in Haraway’s recent work, feminist and Marxist critique smoothly merges into a 
critique of speciesism. In When Species Meet Haraway tries to imagine what a sequel to Marx’s 
Capital would be like if it would take into account animals as laborers and consumers. Har-
away’s relationship with her dog Cayenne is her point of entry into dog biopolitics, where dogs 
are consumers of food, health care (physical, mental) and entertainment, subjects of training 
and learning, as well as workers in science, care, and the police force. Haraway rejects the 
trenchant habit of framing non-human animals as objects only capable of “reaction” (rather 
than conscious response) and only valuable from the perspective of humans. Marx’s categories 
of use-value and exchange-value, Haraway proposes, ought to be expanded with that of “en-
counter-value.” Rather than constructing a full-blown theory of “encounter-value,” Haraway 
offers it as an intuitive concept describing “relationships among a motley array of living beings, 
in which commerce and consciousness, evolution and bioengineering, and ethics and utilities 
are all in play” (46). For Haraway, a critical analysis of contemporary trans-species encounter-
value would lay bare the “practices through which working animals (and their people) are 
rendered incompetent in order to render them valuable” (Azzaredo 4), thus pointing to new 
responsibilities. These responsibilities, for Haraway, are not reserved to human subjects–ani-
mals are also responsible, i.e. able to respond: “responsibility is a relationship crafted in intra-
action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being” (71). Butler’s trilogy, in 
which humans and Oankali’s literally work together to create a new viable society, can be seen 
as a literary version of Haraways’s views. I would argue that both authors suggest a shift from 
Marx’s historical materialism14 towards a posthumanist materialism (Braidotti, Transpositions; 
Van der Tuin and Dolphijn) in which change is simultaneously social and biological.
LB dramatizes the loss of autonomy of western man, not just in an allegorical encounter with 
its racial or sexual others, but by suggesting that other species have, in a sense, participated in 
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a domestication of humans. The invention of agriculture and stockbreeding gave rise to the city-
state in which, according to Sloterdijk, people started cultivating themselves in a very broad, 
evolutionary sense of the word. This self-cultivation, paradoxically, involved a process of (intel-
lectual) distancing from other animals, which according to the philosophers of the time did not 
belong in the polis (Ten Bos 19). This anthropocentrism was affirmed by Christian dogma and 
expanded on philosophically by Descartes, Kant and others. In the meanwhile, not only have 
nonhuman animals been directly involved in all kinds of practices such as food production, hous-
ing, surveillance and exploration, but their sheer closeness has affected human bodies geneti-
cally. In Haraway’s description of her intimate relationship with her dog Cayenne in A Compan-
ion Species Manifesto (2003), genomics, biopolitics and love share a space of potential infection: 
I’m sure our genomes are more alike than they should be. Some molecular record of our touch 
in the codes of living will leave traces in the world, no matter that we are each reproductively 
silenced females, one by age, one by surgery. Her red merle Australian shepherd’s quick and 
lithe tongue has swabbed the tissues of my tonsils with all their eager immune system 
receptors. Who knows where my chemical receptors carried her messages or what she took 
from my cellular system for distinguishing self from other and binding outside to inside? 
(A Companion 2)
The almost erotic intimacy exhibited by Haraway is akin to the encounters in LB. Ultimately, as 
Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis shows, such encounters have an impact on the genetic lev-
el and may even lead to new species. Importantly, Haraway stresses that the mutually trans-
formative relations between humans and other animals should not be seen through a New 
Age philosophy of final peace: “Symbiogenesis is not a synonym for the good, but for becoming 
with each other in respons-ability” (“Sowing Worlds” 9). 
As in LB, Haraway’s serious consideration of inter-species collaborations puts a different 
spin on common understandings of ethics and responsibility vis-à-vis nonhuman animals. Both 
authors discard any position of innocence: humans are not divinely or otherwise ordained to 
dominate other animals, and nonhuman animals are not “innocent” victims. Without providing 
a ready-made plan for the future of interspecies relations, they complicate trenchant ways of 
thinking about them and suggest possible directions for thinking otherwise. Here, domestica-
tion is neither wrong, nor good as in the Christian doctrine of stewardship. It also isn’t a neutral 
fact, but rather a biopolitically and ethically asymmetrical practice. Haraway asks:
What if we do not regard or treat lab animals as victims, or as other to the human, or 
relate to their sufferings and deaths as sacrifice? What happens if experimental animals 
are not mechanical substitutes but significantly unfree partners, whose differences and 
similarities to human beings, to one another, and to other organisms are crucial to the 
work of the lab and, indeed, are partly constructed by the work of the lab? What happens if 
the working animals are significant others with whom we are in consequential relationship 
in an irreducible world of embodied and lived partial differences, rather than the other 
across the gulf from the One? (72)
This struggle to sustain asymmetrical relations without reverting to the simplified category of 
sacrifice is also prevalent in LB. The Oankali try at all times not to kill anybody, even if they are 
attacked. No life should simply be wasted. Nothing could be further removed from the Oankali 
ethos than the logic of sacrifice, the subordination of life to transcendental laws and goals–
religious, scientific, or otherwise.15 Haraway and Butler demonstrate how the logic of sacrifice 
represents a blockage to thinking about shared suffering and mortality, sanctifying the slaugh-
ter of animals and, in the case of genocide, of human beings, as a kind of indisputable ritual, a 
precondition for the survival of an elect people. 
worldings
LB’s logic of immanence applies not only to interspecies relations, but to the story-world as 
such. Rather than a product of “vertical” causation within particular boundaries, the narrative 
develops in the manner of horizontal “infection” on a planetary, and ultimately cosmic scale. As 
Bruce Clarke puts it, the theme of Butler’s fiction is “the interpenetration of individual, social and 
planetary changes” (162). LB exemplifies a nomadic or “minor” sf writing, continuously redrawing 
the narrative world through the unfolding problem of metamorphosis. To put it another way, 
the multiple migrations in Butler’s trilogy, from earth to the Oankali’s ship, from individual cells 
to the training grounds, and back to earth, are inseparable from the novum of metamorphosis. 
Instead of telling a narrative taking place in a world, the narrative becomes what Haraway calls a 
“wordling,” a topological space for continuous mutual adaptation and transformation. Remark-
ably, Deleuze and Guattari already used this same term in their chapter in A Thousand Plateaus on 
becomings: “Becoming everybody/everything is to world, to make a world” (308). I would argue 
that Deleuze and Guattari’s usage is not so very different from Haraway’s, rather expressing its 
extreme consequence: an intimate relation to one’s pet or garden is only the most ordinary in-
stance of our connectedness to the entire cosmos.16 As I will show, an analysis of metamorpho-
sis in LB is best suited with a combination of the mundane and cosmic versions of “worlding.” 
 Haraway celebrates Butler’s work along with other feminist bio-sf questioning autonomous 
subjectivity through literary worlding (the work of Vonda McIntyre, Joanna Russ, Marge Piercy, 
and others). Although in a recent interview Haraway calls worlding “an sf term” (Jeffrey Williams 
148), it is not exclusive to literary texts. In fact, the origins of Haraway’s term lay partially in her 
background as a biologist. From studying embryology, “the profuse development of topological-
ly ever more complex things through time out of interaction,” it became clear for Haraway that 
“you never have organism and environment” but rather “intra-actions that construct the enti-
ties all the way down” (Jeffrey Williams 148). Yet this kind of worlding in science is immediately 
related to narratives about relationality “that don’t know how to finish” (Haraway, Sowing Worlds 
9). Worlding conjoins action and imagination, technoscience and fiction, in a single gesture. 
 In a recent book chapter entitled “Sowing Worlds”, Haraway presents her concept of “world-
ing” as an urgent task of redesigning the world in ways that are responsive to other species, 
ecosystems, and the planet as a whole. This endeavor requires new kinds of narratives that 
deal with relations rather than revolving around the feelings of protagonists, narratives which 
Haraway finds in particular in feminist science fiction. In the following quotation Haraway 
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refers to sf writer Ursula Leguin’s trope of the “carrier bag” as a useful way to think about such 
narratives. I shall cite Haraway at length to catch the richness of her prose and to explicate the 
concept of worlding: 
Tool, weapon and word: that is the word made flesh in the image of the sky god. In a tragic 
story with only one real actor, one real world-maker, the hero, this is the Man-making 
tale of the hunter on a quest to kill and bring back the terrible bounty. This is the cutting, 
sharp, combative tale of action that defers the suffering of glutinous, earth-rotted passivity 
beyond bearing. All others in the prick tale are props, ground, plot space, or prey. They don’t 
matter; their job is to be in the way, to be overcome, to be the road, the conduit, but not the 
traveler, not the begetter. The last thing the hero wants to know is that his beautiful words 
and weapons will be useless without a bag, a container, a net. (…) How do such lowly things 
keep the story going? Or maybe even worse for the hero, how do those concave, hollowed 
out things, those holes in Being, from the get-go generate richer, quirkier, fuller, unfitting, 
ongoing stories, stories with room for the hunter but which weren’t and aren’t about him, 
the self-making Human, the human-making machine of history? The slight curve of the 
shell that holds just a little water, just a few seeds to give away and to receive, suggest 
stories of becoming-with, of reciprocal induction, of companion species whose job in living 
and dying is not to end the storying, the worlding. (2; my emphasis)
The carrier bag is a worldly metaphor: a figure for non-heroic, life-sustaining activities. It high-
lights the significance of the historical roles of women as caretakers, housewives, and gath-
erers and relativizes the dominant structure of narrative and myth revolving around (male) 
individuals. The carrier bag can also be seen as a metaphor for a home, a place where species 
gather, a worlding, or a body which lends itself as a habitat for other species. 
For Deleuze and Guattari worlding is never a familiar experience taking place at home. This 
is not to say that their understanding of the term is incompatible with Haraway’s, but that they 
locate it “elsewhere,” namely in the realm of potentiality or “the virtual.” When philosophers or 
artists reach the domain of the virtual, which precedes representational forms, they enter into a 
series of becomings that go beyond the “man” form–becoming woman, child, animal, etc.–a se-
ries that ends in a becoming-world.17 They explain this final, most intensive becoming as follows: 
By process of elimination, one is no longer anything more than an abstract line, or a piece 
in a puzzle that is itself abstract. It is by conjugating, by continuing with other lines, other 
pieces, that one makes a world that can overlay the first one, like a transparency. Animal 
elegance, the camouflage fish, the clandestine: this fish is crisscrossed by abstract lines 
that resemble nothing, that do not even follow its organic divisions; but thus disorganized, 
disarticulated, it worlds with the lines of a rock, sand, and plants, becoming imperceptible. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 308-9). 
As I understand it, here “elimination” refers to a molar entity, an organism, which becomes 
absolutely dependent on its environment through a mixture of “other pieces,” producing zones 
where a body is no longer discernible because it merges with its world. In this situation, there 
are no longer distinct forms but only abstract, molecular lines, a cosmic web.
Encapsulating in literary form Deleuze and Guattari’s and Haraway’s ideas, LB presents 
worlding as a continuous, non-linear process in which characters are embedded in a series of 
test-environments in which they come to endure the tensions of changing living conditions. 
However simulated these sites may appear, they constitute real ecologies.18 The early stages 
of the encounter can perhaps be best understood through Haraway’s usage of worlding. I will 
limit my analysis to the stage when humans and Oankali descend from the ship to a tropical 
forest area in the Amazon basin. To the Oankali’s disappointment, the majority of humans 
abandon them immediately and start building strictly human villages. Lilith and a small number 
of followers decide to stay with the Oankali, trying to make the situation work. They live in an 
animate village called Lo, a growing and developing super-organism akin to the Oankali ship 
Chkahichdahk, where everything that happens simultaneously affects the inhabitants and the 
place. Lo develops symbiotically, “according to the desires of its occupants and the patterns of 
the surrounding vegetation” (303). Everyone is dependent on everyone for their well-being. 
Compared to human society, Lo is deterritorialized: it has no rigid organization of biological, 
economic or social functions, no natural “ground” or socio-economic “base,” and literally no 
fixed temporal or spatial horizon. As Butler’s trilogy illustrates, worlding is a messy border-
zone of imagination and knowledge, thought and action, biology and sociality.
The precariousness of the trade becomes most pertinent in the third part entitled “Imago” 
(a biological term referring to the final stage of a metamorphosis), and here Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s understanding of worlding becomes more apt. In this part, Jdaya discovers that Akin is 
becoming an Olooi, something he had not anticipated. Akin is renamed “Jodahs.” The Oankali 
suspect that Jodahs is in the process of developing wholly new capabilities for genetic manipu-
lation, capabilities which he will only master once his metamorphosis is complete and which 
could do great damage to Lo in the meantime. After his first metamorphosis, Jodahs’s body has 
become highly plastic, continually adapting itself to new environments “like those chameleon 
lizards that used to change color” (501). At the same time, Jodahs’s starts to inadvertently 
manipulate his environment, triggering cancerous growths. Jodahs himself suffers from the 
pollution he is causing. He decides to leave for a remote area, following his desire to be closer 
to humans yet keeping a safe distance as long as he is uncertain about his own powers. This 
balancing act, in which Jodahs literally loses himself in the dense, dark forest and in the disturb-
ing process of transformation, without allowing himself or his environment to be destroyed, 
can be seen as an ultimate example of Deleuze and Guattari’s worlding. In this episode of 
metamorphosis, Jodahs performs or “repeats” the symbiotic encounter as a whole, embodying 
a cancerous, infectious life that cannot be contained. It is this precarious situation of solitary 
wandering, vainly following his ill-understood desires and withstanding his frightening final 
stage of metamorphosis, that will make a new future for the Oankali and humanity possible. 
But at no point is the future sealed. LB exemplifies Margulis and Sagan’s warning that “at any 
time the association may dissolve, the partners may change or even destroy each other, or the 
symbionts may be lost. Outcomes that involve very different live organisms are not fully pre-
dictable, and terms like ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ are not very useful” (Acquiring 90). 
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noMadisM
Despite the fact that influences from and resonances with bioscience are centrally important, 
LB does not recount a quest for knowledge. The metamorphosis is not a problem to be solved 
scientifically. Akin’s adventures exemplify Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that unscientific prac-
tices are constitutive of nomad science (A Thousand 413). In that sense, the preservation of nar-
rative tension in LB is entirely different than, for example, in novels of the thriller genre, where 
the central organizing question suggests a clear and definite answer waiting to be found. The 
detective novel may be seen as exemplary: once a case is opened, the plot leads inexorably to 
its closure (while residual curiosity about the details of the case may linger on). In LB, some 
characters keep wondering about the truth behind the trade as if it were a kind of conspiracy, 
but they find no answers. As Oankali family member Kahguyaht assures Lilith, “Your children 
will know us … You never will” (112). LB is not about knowing, or, for that matter, about sci-
ence. Rather than having a special status, science sinks into existence, as in the Oankali’s idea 
of “natural” genetic engineering. This means that the boundaries between self and world, sub-
ject and object, fade away–the whole universe becomes an experiment, and Jodahs is “both 
the scientist and the laboratory” (60). 
In place of a transcendental logic of understanding and solving, Butler’s trilogy operates ac-
cording to an immanent logic of problematization that is foremost expressed in what Deleuze 
and Guattari call affect: “an ability to affect and be affected” (A Thousand xvii). Lilith explains 
the challenge of the trade to her son Akin exactly in terms of affect, or the capacity to affirm 
difference:
Humans persecute their different ones, yet they need them to give themselves definition 
and status. Oankali seek difference and collect it. They need it to keep themselves from 
stagnation and overspecialization. If you don’t understand this, you will. You’ll probably find 
both tendencies surfacing in your own behavior … When you feel a conflict, try to go the 
Oankali way. Embrace difference. (329)
Although this challenge to “embrace difference” occurs at various moments in different indi-
viduals, it is never really an individual issue. In LB, the problem is raised from the level of a single 
“case” to the level of species and even the planet, thereby making the world itself unstable, 
problematic. Since the problem is unfolding, under construction, it cannot be traced, let alone 
isolated, and no one can be blamed for causing it.
Wallace has argued that the presentation of Oankali ideas and practices as “natural” is mis-
leading, and mirrors capitalist ideology. Although Wallace’s comparison between the Oankali 
and capitalism is rather convincing in many respects, she misreads the status of genetics in LB 
when she maintains that for the Oankali “there is no ambiguity in the coding of DNA” (96).19 
One could even argue that, by the third part of the trilogy, the image of a scrupulously de-
signed, controlled experiment turns out to have been a figment of the human imagination 
from the onset. The Oankali are driven towards migration, encounter and transformation, 
events that are simultaneously necessary, risky and pleasurable. As Slonczewski has argued, 
the Oankali are not superior beings who have gained control over life:
Paradoxically, because the Oankali are such successful genetic engineers, they tend to 
engineer themselves into an evolutionary dead end; losing all genetic diversity, they lose the 
ability to adapt to change. The only way they can recover genetic diversity is to interbreed 
with an entirely new species, which contributes new genetic strengths–and weaknesses. 
(“Octavia”)
Therefore, while genetic engineering forms a critical aspect of Oankali life, and while the intent 
is certainly to try to preserve the human population for the sake of survival, the genetic trade be-
comes an open experiment, depending on unpredictable, contingent events. Rather than a par-
ticular issue to be solved, the science involved in the trade is directed at a nomadic, never-ending 
problem: How to become intimate with a life form whose appearance and conduct is so deeply 
disturbing? How to develop new ways of life based on mutual dependence and a shared habitat? 
 The vicissitudes of Akin reveal the untenability of explaining it as control science. What 
Akin’s body is capable of was not programmed in advance, but rather emerges out of his con-
tact with his family as well as other Oankali and human beings. Akin is able to speak and to 
understand many things almost immediately from birth, and he can use his tongue to retrieve 
genetic information from his surroundings. In the following sequence he “tastes” Lilith’s flesh in 
pleasurable curiosity:
He investigated the DNA that made up the genes, the nucleotides of the DNA. There was 
something beyond the nucleotides that he could not perceive–a world of smaller particles 
that he could not cross into. He did not understand why he could not make this final 
crossing–if it were the final one. It frustrated him that anything was beyond his perception. 
He knew of it only through shadowy and ungraspable feelings. When he was older he came 
to think of it as a horizon, always receding when he approached it. (257)
I consider Akin’s investigations as an example of nomad science’s desire not just to bear witness 
to, but to immerse in the world, without ever reaching the “essence” of life. Apart from shat-
tering the image of the genome as an ultimate source of identity, Akin’s tactile perceptions 
obliterate the correlate vision of the independent, in-dividual human subject: “He was Akin. 
Yet he came to know that he was also part of the people who touched him–that within them, 
he could find fragments of himself. He was himself, and he was those others” (255). Akin soon 
learns that to “read” his environment through touch is not an innocent operation, and that “he 
would share any pain that he caused” (257). To be immersed in one’s environment means to 
participate in a worlding. 
Contra Wallace, I would argue that Butler, in her creation of Lo as an organic landscape 
that merges the urban, the suburban and the natural, imagines the advent of a radical kind of 
bio-based economy, one that does not incorporate biological life into capitalism but adapts 
economics to co-evolutionary worlding.20 At his first encounter with Lo, the resister Tino ex-
presses grave disappointed to Lilith: “Except for your garden–which barely looks like a gar-
den–you don’t grow anything. Except for your shacks, you haven’t built anything! And as for 
building yourselves, the Oankali are doing that. You’re their clay, that’s all” (282). He soon finds 
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out that Lo is not an a-biotic space populated by living beings, but a living entity adapting to its 
Earthly conditions and depending on a fine balance between itself, Oankali, humans, and other 
species. After a few decades Lo enters a new phase, able to “learn to incorporate Earth vegeta-
tion, sustain it, and benefit from it” (313). In Lo, literally nothing is wasted, and there is nothing 
that Lo cannot modify to make it function within its environs. The whole system functions in 
the mode of sustainability–its expansion is slow and non-violent. Lo stands in stark contrast 
to the wasteful resister settlements scattered across the Amazon basin, where resources are 
increasingly exhausted in an attempt to uphold a sense of human autonomy (implicitly based 
on masculinity).21 Whereas the resisters use the little technology they have in the service of 
producing and trading goods, fortifying their villages, and salvaging plastic figurines and other 
commodities from the ruins the old world, the inhabitants of Lo trade themselves in an evolu-
tionary process that collapses nature and technology, subject and world.
As the Oankali explain to Lilith early on in the experiment, the difference between humans 
and Oankali is ingrained in their biological constitutions. The “human contradiction,” as they 
call it, is a flawed combination of two incompatible traits: the “entrenched,” “terrestrial” trait of 
hierarchy, and the more recently acquired, flexible trait of “intelligence” (39). Human inability 
to deal with cancer is symptomatic for this genetic contradiction. The role of cancer in LB can 
be understood along the lines of Brian Goodwin’s reflections on the subject in Nature’s Due 
(2007). Here Goodwin detects a tension in cancer research between a dominant view that un-
derstands cancer as a failure of certain genes to control mutation, and a holistic view “that sees 
it as a disturbance in a complex network of relationships within cells and with the body” (50). 
Goodwin favors the holistic approach that affirms the malleability and ecological connections 
of cancer cells:
A cell that has gone through the process of genetic destabilization and has arrived at a 
fully cancerous state of continuous cell division and invasiveness has effectively developed 
into a new type of cell. It has a unique genetic organization and specific protein markers 
on its surface, but it shares with all other cancer cells the ability to propagate its kind in a 
particular environment, that of its host. It has effectively become a new species of cell, a 
stable genotype with a corresponding cellular phenotype … So we may see cancer as an 
expression of the innate tendency of the living process to explore the possibilities open to 
it and to express successfully new forms of life in available habitats. (53)
Of course, cancer’s “success” in destabilizing and transforming life is accompanied by death. LB 
is as much about evolutionary novelty as about a loss of the (perceived) integrity of the human 
species and human civilization. What matters in the light of Goodwin’s perspective is that the 
chief impetus for the trade is not a “power over life” (potestas), but a desire for life (potentia).22 
By affirming flexible, nomadic intelligence and moving away from hierarchy and control, hu-
manity is able to overcome its “contradiction.”
Jodahs’s metamorphosis, resulting from an experiment with cancer, leads to a potentially 
viable new species and a new society. Jodahs and his brother Aor succeed in gaining the trust 
of a community of humans that have spontaneously become fertile again, but whose offspring 
are severely malformed (another proof that Oankali technoscience is fallible). From the “vast 
genetic memory” that Jodah’s had received from Nikanj, he extracts a cell which has the poten-
tial “to divide and grow into a kind of seed” (744-5). Jodahs plants the special seed in a particu-
larly fertile soil to grow a new town for humans and Oankali to live in–a literal instantiation of 
Haraway’s idea of “sowing worlds” (“Sowing”). Yet as Greenwald Smith argues, this outcome is 
far from utopian:
Replacing the logic of market liberalism with a logic of life, as Xenogenesis shows, is not 
to do away with pain, loss, inequality, and violence. To the contrary: the dynamism of 
life offers hope for change precisely because it destabilizes elements of the present that 
support the status quo. These structures, however, also offer security. The loss of that 
security carries with it profound danger even as it promises new ways of life. Butler’s trilogy 
is compelling in its capacity to portray the end of humanity as ethically and ecologically 
crucial, while at the same time emphasizing the pain of evolutionary usurpation. (561) 
 
Butler’s audacity lies in aligning biology and politics in a radical way, but not, as Peppers notes, 
“in the way we usually think” (4). Her work prefigures how genomics and other sciences may 
play important roles in a biopolitics of control, but also reveals the potential of bioscience to 
affirm the nonhuman life pervading the human, and the necessity of transforming rather than 
merely surviving.
conclusion 
In their journeys in and toward new worlds, the protagonists of LB learn that there is no begin-
ning or end point to life, no original home, and no essential humanity–time, space and sub-
jectivity are infinitely folded. The past is ever present, and the present already past, arousing 
feelings of loss and nostalgia. At the same time, there is a continual sensation that a new world 
is actualized, under construction. The old returns in the new, embodied in Jodahs, for instance, 
and in the seed he plants. But this is not a new Eden. The initial title of the trilogy, Xenogenesis, 
means “strange beginning,” indicating that the result of the trade is hardly a secure or pristine 
world. LB is a strange event, a literary introduction. What Butler offers is the vision, neither 
utopian nor dystopian, of a turbulent world where biotechnoscience pervades life. While the 
impulse of control is there as a “fact of life” (overtly in humans and paradoxically in the Oank-
ali), there is also a sense in which science is no longer a manipulative tool but a carrier bag, a 
practice of selecting and conjoining species and traits. For Butler and Haraway, what makes 
us happy and healthy, and what makes us transform, is our propensity to enter into rela-
tions with others, including nonhuman others. Living together, we trade traits, becoming-with 
one another. This becoming can be quite direct: for example, the smooth, playful and sensual 
movements of cats may help us to become more relaxed. But as Deleuze and Guattari warn 
in A Thousand Plateaus, the essence of becoming is not merely “becoming alike,” an operation 
of copying. The traits that are transferred from one species to the other are not pre-organized 
images or genes coding for specific traits:
inorganic stratum fades into the background. Significantly, the new village planted by Jodahs 
is destined to leave earth as a “ship,” because it overgrows and destroys the native organisms, 
and will need to migrate to other worlds to find new fertile grounds. In the following chapter 
we will explore a nomad science that fuses a concern for ecosystems with the evolutionary 
significance of light, gravity, soil and atmosphere, more thoroughly unearthing the planetary 
and cosmic dimensions of nomad science.
It is no longer a question of the organs and functions, and of a transcendent Plane that can 
preside over their organization only by means of analogical relations and types of divergent 
development. It is a question not of organization but of composition; not of development or 
differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness. It is a question of elements 
and particles, which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage. (282)
In other words, becoming is not an interplay between material mutations and abstract selec-
tion leading to reproduction: selection and mutation occur in a single, ongoing movement, 
immanent to an emergent potentiality. Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on the contingencies 
of fluctuations which determine the outcome of encounters resonates strongly with the con-
tingencies of the human-Oankali trade. The Oankali arrived just in time to save small, scattered 
human populations from their doomed situations and possible extinction. In the end, Jodahs’s 
discovery of the village with fertile humans occurs just in time to guide him through metamor-
phosis successfully and start a new society. 
Butler’s trilogy makes palpable that, paradoxically, humanity can only survive if it trans-
forms. It shows that the dominant attitude of control over organisms, ecosystems and the 
planet will have to be abandoned if we want to live up to global problems. Nomad science in LB 
may be treated as intuitive cues for meeting the entangled challenges of deforestation, climate 
change, food crises, pandemic threats, massive diasporas, militarization, financial crises, and so 
on. This complex experiment is risky, but what is the alternative? Science needs the audacity of 
a nomadic explorer like Jodahs who becomes the lab and the experimenter at once. Interest-
ingly, LB presents nomadism not just through the prism of individuals-in-becoming, but also 
in the guise of a hybrid “multiplicity,” a meshing of populations. Paradoxically, it is this strange 
image of scientific experiment as simultaneously collective and nomadic, organized and dis-
organized–like the orderly chaos of a swarm of bees–that continually raises the specter of an 
imperialist governance of life. For most humans in the story, the wondrous capacities of the 
Oankali are diabolical, unnatural traits, and their messages are aimed at indoctrinating humans 
with the false belief that the end of humanity is inevitable.
Each committed to their own trade, Butler and Haraway offer repositories of stories and 
though-experiments in which science comes alive as a force fully ingrained in human exis-
tence, destined to create new habitats, engage in new symbiotic relations, and spur new capa-
bilities. Butler’s narrative can be understood as the result of an epistemological trade between 
literature and science, where science becomes a vital ingredient for literature, and literature 
explicates tensions in science that usually remain under the surface. LB resonates with science 
studies à la Haraway in which critique-from-a-safe-distance is replaced by “thinking with.” It is 
a kind of fictional ethnography of species encounter focalized through Lilith, an anthropologist, 
and later through the “posthuman” perspective of Jodahs. Likewise, throughout her work Ha-
raway deploys posthumanist sf figurations such as the cyborg and the carrier bag as genuine 
perspectives rather than mere illustrations. Both authors perform an experiment with science 
from within–as symbionts, as it were. Their greatest strength is to connect intellectual and 
political dilemmas to the mundane, embodied existence of living creatures. Yet their strength 
inevitably also becomes their weakness: by focusing on human and nonhuman species, the 
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M A R S  T R I L O G Y
Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to the point  
where this calls for a new earth, a new people. 
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari –
introduction
In Kim Stanley Robinson’s acclaimed Mars trilogy1, a group of one-hundred scientists is sent on 
a mission to Mars to explore the planet and build the first human settlements. Well before the 
scientists even reach Mars, they concoct a variety of plans that envision a much more intense 
and long-term presence on Mars than initially intended. Physicist Sax Russell, one of the key 
characters, unfolds a plan to modify the atmosphere of Mars in order to make it breathable by 
introducing genetically engineered, oxygen-excreting microorganisms. Covering a period run-
ning from the 2020s to the 2210s and counting over twenty-three hundred pages, the trilogy 
takes the reader through a metamorphosis of Mars from its familiar rocky surface (Red Mars) to 
a planet covered by plants, mosses, trees and even animals (Green Mars) and finally to a planet 
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with vast oceans not unlike the Earth (Blue Mars). Thanks to gerontology (life extension) and 
other biomedical innovations, scientists in Mars are able to successfully execute mass-scale 
projects–for example, excavating huge areas of land to prepare an intricate system of canals, 
lakes and seas, and bringing into orbit around Mars a “soletta”: a gigantic sail made of nano-
materials that reflects sunlight to heat up Mars’s atmosphere. While the initial designs are 
based on experiences from Earth, the longer the scientists live on Mars, the more they become 
aware of a unique “spirit of place” that needs to be understood and cherished. What began as a 
more-or-less controlled process of terraformation (an attempt to create a copy of the Earth), 
gradually transforms into areoformation (Ares being the Greek name for Mars) in which the 
planet and humans themselves transform in unforeseen ways.
Most scholars have analyzed the Mars trilogy as a social experiment involving scientific, 
commercial and political agents. Jameson regards the Mars trilogy as a superb example of 
a “polyphonic”2 work that “includes the struggle between a whole range of utopian alterna-
tives, about which it deliberately fails to conclude” (410). A similar point is made by William 
Dynes, who praises Robinson’s ability to convey “the contingency of each character’s particular 
perspective on Mars and what is happening there” (Dynes 154). This sense of collective strife 
and cooperation in Mars also applies to its accounts of science, which is not a monolith, but a 
loose assemblage of scientists from many different disciplines, including biology, physics, geol-
ogy, chemistry, medicine and psychology. However, what interests me here are not so much 
disciplinary and cultural differences, as fundamental politico-scientific attitudes of control and 
nomadism. The trilogy narrates a continuous battle between states and “transnationals” (cor-
porations) over the mineral resources and carrying capacity of Mars in a time when societies 
on Earth are jeopardized by overpopulation and ecological disasters. Against this power play, 
various resister groups on Mars–mainly members of the first hundred and their children–at-
tempt to build a Martian society from the bottom up. Under the scientific and spiritual leader-
ship of the biologist Hiroko Ai, these nomad scientists work on an emergent, intuitive science 
of “areology” attuned to the unique circumstances on Mars. Epitomized by an unidentified 
narrator’s claim that “terrain is a powerful genetic engineer” (Green 13), areology is a science 
of interaction and transformation, tempering the hubris of terraformation and human en-
hancement. Hiroko’s underground movement can be analyzed as a “deterritorialization” of the 
terraformation project, refiguring the mission in terms of an ongoing historical-evolutionary 
transformation process in which human and nonhuman agents work together.3 As Robinson’s 
trilogy progresses, this nomadic perspective becomes more dominant, revealing that the key 
player in processes of transformation is not humanity but Mars itself (Markley 782).
In order to analyze the contours of nomad science in Mars, I will analyze it alongside evolu-
tionary psychologist Susan Oyama’s concept of “constructive interactionism” (Evolution’s Eye). 
In congruence with Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, Oyama’s concept points to a messy 
network of factors composing a system, or assemblage of systems, lacking a common ground 
or center. This spatio-temporal topology, I would argue, is not a scientific “solution,” but rather 
a nomadic mode of problematization, a weapon against claims in molecular biology that the 
“essence” of life inheres in a particular substance (DNA) or coded message (genetic instruc-
tions). As Manuela Rossini has demonstrated, Oyama’s constructive interactionism is also rel-
evant for the Humanities, showing how bodies are constructed not just socially and discur-
sively but also biologically, without falling into biological determinism (“Coming Together”).4 In 
a similar vein, I want to demonstrate that Oyama’s concept helps to understand the processes 
of planetary and human transmutation occurring in the Mars trilogy in ecological terms, thus 
complementing the abovementioned analyses of social polyphony. After analyzing the central 
projects of terraformation and human enhancement as control science, and discussing the role 
of scientific content in scholarly analyses of Mars, I will introduce Oyama’s constructive inter-
actionism as an adequate model for understanding the entangled processes of human and 
planetary transmutation in the trilogy. 
terraforMation and huMan enhanceMent
In Red Mars, the central projects of planetary and human transformation are framed as more 
or less conscious attempts at control. The most significant alchemical experiment5 is the engi-
neering of biomaterials by the terraformation group led by Sax, who believes that “the planet 
is the lab” (Red 263). His team disseminates all kinds of genetically engineered microorganisms 
over the surface of Mars, organisms that excrete oxygen, thus gradually modifying the atmo-
sphere so that more and more terrestrial life forms are able to survive there. By the end of the 
twenty-first century Mars has attained a green look because of microorganisms, algae, mosses 
and plants living on its soil. By this time, even insects and animals, such as bees and moles, are 
introduced, reshaping the soil and creating ecoscapes akin to terrestrial tundras and savan-
nahs. This sense of total control is expressed in the following passage (undoubtedly inspired 
by the Human Genome Project which was taking place when Robinson wrote the trilogy) in 
which the narrator describes how new organisms are genetically engineered:
The array of restriction enzymes for cutting, and ligase enzymes for pasting, was big and 
versatile; the ability to line out long DNA strings precisely was there; the accumulated 
knowledge of genomes was immense, and growing exponentially; and used all together, 
this new biotechnology was allowing all kinds of trait mobilization, promotion, replication, 
triggered suicide (to stop excess success), and so forth. It was possible to find the DNA 
sequences from an organism that carried the desired characteristic, and then synthesize 
these DNA messages and cut and paste them into plasmid rings; after that cells were washed 
and suspended in a glycerol with the new plasmids, and the glycerol was suspended between 
two electrodes and given as short sharp shock of about 2,000 volts, and the plasmids in the 
glycerol shot into the cells, and voilà! There, zapped to life like Frankenstein’s monster, was 
a new organism. With new abilities. (Red 205)
As in Craig Venter’s “artificial life” project (see chapter 3), the assumption is that life is a set of encod-
ed traits made by “DNA software” (Venter “What is Life”). Once the operations of DNA software are 
understood, it is suggested, nature can be made “anew.” Robinson’s trilogy is partly based on ge-
nomics and on the scientific concept of terraformation, a line of research instigated by NASA in the 
1970s which speculates about finding, and possibly creating, planets with Earth-like conditions.6 
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Following Deleuze and Guattari, the basic outline of the terraformation project can be charac-
terized as control science: an attempt to take control over life, yielding new technological solu-
tions that render the world habitable and predictable. If Mars potentially represents a “smooth 
space” open to novel experimentation, in Red Mars it is transformed into a terrain in its most lit-
eral sense: an earthly, human landscape subservient to the demands of states and corporations. 
 From the get-go it is clear that the mission to Mars is not innocent–it is a politically contro-
versial experiment with finding new modes of living in a strange environment. Geologist Ann 
Clayborn is the most vocal representative of a “Red” group that is skeptical of any form of ter-
raformation: “We’ll all go on and make the place safe. Roads, cities. New sky, new soil. Until it’s 
all some kind of Siberia of North-West Territories, and Mars will be gone and we’ll be here, and 
we’ll wonder why we feel so empty. Why when we look at the land we can never see anything 
but our own faces” (Red 158). For Ann, terraformation means destroying the native landscape 
and overcoding it with human ideas and values. Despite the Reds’ concerns, the Martian land-
scape is transformed in rather drastic ways. The scientists build a nuclear reactor and several 
factories to produce building materials in the hometown of Underhill. In an area known as 
the Alchemist Quarter new materials are produced through “alchemical operations” such as 
making diamond out of carbon: “all their window glass was coated in a molecular layer of 
diamond to protect it from the corrosive dust” (Red Mars 220). These physical engineers are 
crucial for large projects such as the “Solleta”–a nano-sail built to heat up Mars’s atmosphere–
and the “space elevator”: a nano-engineered cable guiding elevator cars between the surface 
of Mars and a small asteroid called Clarke just outside the orbit of the moons Phobos and Dei-
mos. The purpose of the elevator is to speed up and lower the costs of transport between the 
Earth and Mars, allowing more people and materials to move back and forth. Yet the project 
of terraformation is stunted on various occasions by resisting groups such as the Reds, who 
try to liberate Mars from the straightjacket of terrestrial interests. As Daniel Cho has analyzed, 
all three installments of the trilogy work toward a revolutionary event, “each time taking on 
a different, more alien, form” (Cho 66), with the final revolution being completely nonviolent 
and so slow that it is even imperceptible (I will return to this gradual, imperceptible transfor-
mation below). 
As in alchemical experiments, the scientists in Mars are part of their own set-up. While the 
planet is being modified, humans are biomedically enhanced to withstand low gravitation, ex-
treme cold and increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation levels. Life under the harsh Martian 
conditions does not come easy: apart from physical hardship, the scientists are pestered by 
homesickness, estrangement, memory loss, permanent déjà vu, and depression. As biologist 
Nadia Chernyshevski realizes, it is not just a matter of a different physical environment, but 
also a different temporality: “human circadian biorhythms had been set over millions of years 
of evolution, and now suddenly to have extra minutes of day and night, day after day, night 
after night–no doubt had its effects. (Red 124). The development of an anti-depression drug 
by the mission’s biotech team can only temper the consequences of living in a radically differ-
ent environment. Apart from enhancing the quality of life, scientists also manage to increase 
its quantity through a gerontological (anti-aging) treatment, a genetic therapy developed by 
Ursula Kohl and Vlad Taneev’s biomedical team:
Ordinary aging is mostly caused by cell-division error. After a number of generations, ranging 
from hundreds to tens of thousands depending which cells you’re talking about, errors 
in reproduction start to increase, and everything gets weaker … The division errors are 
caused by breaks in DNA strands, so we wanted to strengthen DNA strands. To do it we 
would read your genome, and then build an auto-repair genomics library of small segments 
that will replace the broken strands. (Red 288)
The gerontological therapy, which according to Ursula “had its origins in the genome project” 
(Red 289), can be seen as a radicalization of a central aim of the HGP–to understand, and thus 
potentially eradicate, all disease at the base. It intervenes in the very fabric of life itself, post-
poning or even stopping an inclination towards death. Thanks to the treatment, many of the 
characters presented at the beginning are still there by the end of the trilogy.
At its introduction, the long-term medical effects of the longevity treatment are still com-
pletely unknown; as Ursula makes clear to Sax, “We ourselves are the experiment” (Red 288). 
What is evident from the beginning, however, is that the treatment has revolutionary poten-
tials and will seriously affect population growth. As Ursula explains, “It’s very possible you could 
inoculate everyone on Earth. But the population problem down there is already critical as it is. 
They’d have to institute some pretty intense population control, or else they’d go Malthusian 
really fast” (Red 289). Ursula’s premonition proofs valid, for during the trilogy population density 
grows rampant on Earth. Access to the costly treatment, which is to be rehearsed every few 
years, is much more difficult in developing countries, and Sax fears “a kind of physicalization of 
class–a late emergence or retroactive unveiling of Marx’s bleak vision–only more extreme than 
Marx, because now class distinctions would be exhibited as an actual physiological difference 
caused by a bimodal distribution, something almost akin to speciation …” (Green 279). Genetic 
enhancement becomes the physical substrate of social status, but now possibly leading to de 
facto speciation as in H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895).7
science as Politics
As with the novels discussed in the previous chapters, the characters in Mars find themselves 
in a strange, problematic situation that refuses to stabilize. Sax Russell, the head of the ter-
raformation project, has a rather simplistic understanding of the situation. His objective is to 
alter the atmosphere of Mars, without thinking about the wider political consequences for 
people on Mars or on Earth. For Sax and for many others, the vast space of Mars is a paradise 
in the sense that it allows them to conduct their experiments without any political interfer-
ence or societal context. Politics occurs elsewhere–on earth. Even if Sax predicts that “being 
on Mars will change us in an evolutionary way” (Red 88), he does not see how this make the 
whole project political: “We’re a scientific station … It doesn’t necessarily have much politics 
to it” (Red 60). On the other side of the spectrum we find the radical leftist Arkady Bogdanov8: 
“Everything is political … Nothing more so than this voyage of ours. We are beginning a new 
society, how could it help but be political?” (Red 60). For Arcady, planetary and human trans-
formation are inherently political:
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“We have come to Mars for good. We are going to make not only our homes and our food, 
but also our water and the very air we breathe–all on a planet that has none of these 
things. We can do this because we have technology to manipulate matter right down to 
the molecular level. This is an extraordinary ability, think of it! And yet some of us here can 
accept transforming the entire physical reality of this planet, without doing a single thing to 
change ourselves, or the way we live. To be twenty-first century scientists on Mars, in fact, 
but at the same time living within nineteenth-century social systems, and seventeenth-
century ideologies. It’s absurd, it’s crazy, it’s-it’s … unscientific! And so I say that among all 
the many things we transform on Mars, ourselves and our social reality should be among 
them. We must terraform not only Mars, but ourselves.” (Red 89)
What is significant about Arcady’s statement is that it politicizes the situation in scientific terms. 
From his view, the political stakes are not an add-ons to an otherwise neutral scientific proj-
ect–instead, on Mars, science rediscovers its practical raison d’être, namely changing the world 
(much in the same way that Marx in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach declares that “philoso-
phers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”). I would argue 
that Arkady figures as a mouthpiece for Robinson in calling for a new science more attuned to 
social demands.
 Jameson praises Robinson for his sophisticated use of scientific ideas, but still argues that 
“any first scientific reading of the Mars trilogy must eventually develop into a second allegorical 
one, in which the hard sf content stands revealed as socio-political” (396). In one sense, then, 
Jameson seems to echo both the character Arkady and Robinson himself in his emphasis on sci-
ence as politics. Yet at the same time, Jameson’s assessment allows him to neglect the content 
of science-as-politics and focus almost exclusively on the struggles between (cultural) groups. 
Given the essential role of technoscience in Robinson’s narrative–not just socio-politically, but 
also biophysically–I would argue that scientific content deserves more critical attention. On 
the one hand, the Mars trilogy is unabashedly positive about science as such, “revitalizing,” in 
the words of Carol Franko, “the myth of science and scientists as hero” (545). Yet importantly, 
Robinson’s celebration of science is not a naïve stance–it is critical in at least two ways. First, 
as demonstrated above, scientists only become true heroes in Robinson’s work when they de-
liberately plunge into the messy world of politics. In other words, for Robinson, political agency 
is integral to science. As Robinson argues in two recent interviews, the scientific method is “ac-
tually a way of praxis” (Robinson, “Kim Stanley Robinson” 89), making it “the equivalent of the 
most powerful leftist politics we have ever had” (Canavan, Sklarr and Vu 204). Scientists should 
be more aware of their power and dedicate their skills to transforming society for the better 
of all, including future generations as well as nonhumans. Second, even if Robinson evidently 
appeals to all scientists and to the scientific method as such, science in Mars “is not science as 
traditionally conceived and practiced” (Leane 99). Robinson seems to be convinced that great 
challenges require ambitious global experiments. As I will demonstrate, Mars promotes a more 
daring science, not just in the sense of creating even bigger geo-engineering projects, but by 
allowing itself to change under the influence of new insights, in particular insights about the 
unpredictability complex systems. 
Robinson is critical of sf writers reproducing an instrumentalist view of science, in which 
science is corrupted by politics, leading to a loss of experimental control and hence disaster.9 
In the Mars trilogy, introducing new technologies is never an easy feat. Projects like the space 
solleta and the space elevator prove extremely vulnerable to sabotage: they need to be con-
tinually modulated and reconsidered in the light of new developments in order to make them 
work. The various perspectives on terraformation amount to a scientific “polyphony,” a radical 
interdisciplinarity. In an interview with the journal Science Fiction Studies, Robinson reconfigures 
biologist E.O. Wilson’s idea of “consilience” between the sciences, which states that the human 
sciences are reducible to biology, and biology reducible to physics. Rather than following this 
reductionist logic, Robinson argues for systemic holism: “Sociology, anthropology, psychology 
and the rest of the human sciences are also consilient with biology, chemistry, and physics, and, 
though the questions are harder, the methods are the same and the answers, when achieved, 
are part of a whole system” (Canavan, Sklarr and Vu 212). This is exactly what is conveyed in 
the Mars trilogy: the image of a scientific continuum of interacting research fields, a process 
that is political through-and-through in the sense that it harbors possibilities for control and 
nomadism. Robinson’s work can be regarded as a call to scientists to discover the revolutionary 
potential of their work and explore all kinds of connections to other disciplines. What kind of 
model could do justice to this radical interdisciplinarity, without risking to become a totalizing 
theory of everything?
constructiVe interactionisM 
One possible route for thinking about interdisciplinarity and scientific content in the Mars tril-
ogy is Oyama’s Developmental Systems Theory (DST) first developed in The Ontogeny of Infor-
mation (1985) and reworked in Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide (2000). 
In her work Oyama asserts that the concept of information, as used in the biosciences, needs 
to be reconsidered in order to reclaim the primacy of the whole organism-in-development. 
Central to Oyama’s work is a desire to think of the living as immanent to many entangled fac-
tors within and without the cell:
As the notion of centralized control of development gives way to the developmental system, 
the view of heredity is enlarged beyond the germ cell to encompass other developmental 
means or resources. (…) this increases the number of ways in which developmental 
influences can act transgenerationally, altering the relationship between developmental 
and evolutionary processes. (Evolution’s Eye 207)
By including many environmental factors, Oyama suggests that the developmental paths of 
organisms and the long-term processes of evolution are much more profoundly related than 
the dominant neo-Darwinist/molecular paradigm allows. Denouncing the famous nature-
nurture debate, Oyama argues that traits in organisms are never caused by nature or nurture, 
neither are they partly natural and partly cultural. This dichotomy, so Oyama argues, represents 
a failed attempt to determine the causes of life as if they were attributable to given substances 
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and/or learned habits, when causality is in fact a heterogeneous and emergent phenomenon 
pertaining to organisms and ecosystems (Oyama Evolution’s Eye; “Terms in Tension”). 
DST has been developed by many other scientists working in the fields of evolutionary 
biology, developmental biology, and psychobiology. It replaces dualisms such as information-
organism and genotype-phenotype with a topological model, i.e. a model of continuity and 
connection. As Rehmann-Sutter explains about DST, “the information which in-forms devel-
opmental steps, does not pre-exist the processes that give rise to it. Information, in the sense 
of developmentally relevant information, is produced in the course of the interactive processes 
of the cell, the organism and the environment”(43). Oyama calls this “constructive interaction-
ism,” distinguishing her approach from “weak interactionisms” prevalent in the biosciences and 
beyond, which stress the ways in which the environment has a role to play, but merely as an 
external (often distorting) influence (Evolution’s Eye). Weak interactionism reaffirms the idea 
of a relatively stable natural essence (genetic information) that is only secondarily regulated 
or selected. Constructive interactionism represents a immanentist approach in which ecologi-
cal systems are irreducible to genomes and cannot be measured against an environmental or 
evolutionary background. The environment and evolution are not external entities, not things 
we are “in”; space and time are parameters rather than conditions of systems. Oyama’s im-
manentist approach to the living resonates strongly with Deleuze’s work, in particular with 
the notions of “the virtual” and “the actual” which Deleuze takes from the biologist and phi-
losopher Henri Bergson. In DST, the organism is never reducible to a past or present state: it 
is implicated in virtuality or potentiality. This potential cannot be pin-pointed–for example, it 
is not “internal,” “biological” or “genetic.” The notion of virtuality is exemplified by the embryo, 
an emergent body whose contours are highly vague and that has not yet developed into a 
self-sufficient organism. However, the same holds for ontogeny and phylogeny in general: as 
Bergson pointed out, even mature organisms are characterized by “the insensible, infinitely 
graduated, continuance of the change of form” (19).
The notion of constructive interactionism gives rise to an extended view of inheritance: 
organisms do not inherit just DNA, but a developmental system in which the genome plays 
one part (Griffiths and Gray 421-22). Important precursors of this extension are Von Uexküll’s 
ethology and Lewontin’s work on ecological niche-construction, which have demonstrated 
that organisms actively select and modify their environments rather than being passively se-
lected by their environments. The relatively static opposition between organism and environ-
ment breaks down and is replaced by a nested ecology of systems (hormonal, neural, cognitive, 
social, etc.) that link individual stretches of DNA, proteins, organelles, cells, organs, organisms, 
and ecosystems. This epigenetic field determines what can be done with genes (Griffiths and 
Stotz). As Karola Stotz explains, “The fact that even the structural identity of a gene is created 
by genome regulatory mechanisms and its environmental conditions makes it very difficult to 
draw a clear boundary between ‘gene’ and ‘environment’” (Stotz, “With Genes” 914).10 The idea 
of extended inheritance suggests a rethinking of the organism-environment dualism: rather 
than there being one neutral environment exerting influence on individuals, each individual 
uniquely expresses potentials that inhere not “in” its body or “in” the environment, but in em-
bodied and enacted relations.
Where the work of Oyama pushes the boundaries of inheritance through philosophical 
and scientific argumentation, the Mars trilogy provides a literary scenario in which these ideas 
come to life, as it were. The genetic engineering of organisms and the chemical engineer-
ing of Mars’s atmosphere effectuate a speeding up of processes, revealing that development 
and evolution are much more intimately related than neo-Darwinism allows them to be. In 
Mars, inheritance is not subdivided in the modern categories of nature and culture, but rather 
becomes a continuum of physical, biological, social, political, technological and psychological 
evolution. Ultimately, it is really the problem-event called “life on Mars” that evolves: apart 
from documenting the adventures of human individuals and populations, the trilogy is also a 
non-anthropocentric story about relations between systems. Thus history becomes infused 
with those biophysical processes that are so often pictured as mere decorum to human ac-
tion, while simultaneously the meaning of human existence is placed in a planetary if not cos-
mological order of things. It is this entanglement of physical, biological and anthropomorphic 
processes that necessitates the collaboration of scientists in Mars. 
As we shall see below, the connection between Mars and Oyama’s work can be discerned 
on the level of (quasi-)scientific descriptions of transformation, but equally important is the 
dimension of a non-anthropocentric ontology that resonates with what Braidotti calls “a no-
madic eco-philosophy of multiple belongings,” which produces “an enlarged sense of inter-
connection between self and others, including the non-human or ‘earth’ others” (Transposi-
tions 35). The trilogy recounts, and calls for, a transition from anthropocentric thought to an 
ecological paradigm.
froM red to green
In Red Mars, it is mission leader John Boone who is most aware of the fragility of the experi-
ment in which scientists of various (cultural) backgrounds need to cooperate. He participates 
in rituals and celebrations of all the different Martian communities, exchanging ideas about 
the future of Mars. Like Arkady, John wants to think of the First Hundred as “a collection 
of friends” (Red 365) working with different sets of ideas but for the same goal: a viable 
Martian society. In a time when the UN has become a body dominated by super-states as 
well as transnational corporations, John is in search of a new type of political unity from the 
bottom up. He organizes a constitutional congress, which he provocatively describes as an 
occasion to determine “the genome of our social organization” (Red 379). His speech given 
at the advent of the gathering is relevant for my argument because it highlights a moment 
when the link between biology and sociality can only still be articulated in metaphorical terms: 
Now I know I used to say we had to invent it all from scratch but in these last few years 
traveling around and meeting you all I’ve seen that I was wrong to say that, it’s not like we 
have nothing and are being forced to conjure forms godlike out of the vacuum–we have 
the genes you might say, the memes as Vlad says meaning our cultural genes, so that it’s 
in the nature of an act of genetic engineering what we do here, we have the DNA pieces 
of culture all made and broken and mixed by history, and we can choose and cut and clip 
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together from what’s best in that gene pool, knit it all together the way the Swiss did their 
constitution, or the Sufi’s their worship, or the way the Acheron group made their latest 
fast lichen (Red 379)
John is assassinated just before the break-out of revolutionary turmoil in which the space 
elevator is destroyed, separating Mars from Earth for decades to come. Many people are killed 
and a police force takes control; the revolutionaries flee into hitherto uninhabited regions. 
What was designed by John as a first, small step towards a new society, emanating organi-
cally from the people on Mars, turns out a vain attempt to impose the image of “a collection 
of friends” on a still immature Martian society. In Green Mars it will become clear that a true 
“cultivation” of Mars must be social and biological: based on a greening of the world and a 
new, transformed Homo ares. This new human being will not only be the result of biotech-
nological intervention and “social engineering” (the title of a chapter in Green Mars), but also 
of gradual, largely imperceptible transformations. As John’s daughter Jacky will formulate it 
years later: “We terraform the planet … but the planet areoforms us” (Green 457).
While William White typifies Red Mars as “a kind of prologue, the final failure of an old 
political paradigm” (585), I would add that it also demonstrates the dangers of control science 
and marks the birth of nomadic approaches to life on Mars. In the opening passage of Green 
Mars, which was also cited in chapter 1, the narrator opens up the neo-Darwinist paradigm to 
the agency inherent in the ecological environment:
Of course all the genetic templates for our new biota are Terran; the minds designing 
them are Terran; but the terrain is Martian. And terrain is a powerful genetic engineer, 
determining what flourishes and what doesn’t, pushing along progressive differentiation, 
and thus the evolution of new species. And as the generations pass, all the members of 
a biosphere evolve together, adapting to their terrain in a complex communal response, 
a creative self-designing ability. This process, no matter how much we intervene in it, is 
essentially out of our control. Genes mutate, creatures evolve: a new biosphere emerges, 
and with it a new noosphere. And eventually the designers’ minds, along with everything 
else, have been forever changed. (13)
After the disastrous events at the end of Red Mars, this introductory statement sets an entirely 
different tone. It indicates that a real transmutation of Mars will not transpire as a result of the 
“guided” terraformation initiated in Red Mars. What started as a statist and corporate mission 
develops into story about a new world, a situation in which Mars and its inhabitants are “con-
stantly undergoing alchemical transmutations” (Markley 794). The birth of nomad science is 
obscure, occurring beyond the disputes between Greens and Reds that linger out throughout 
the trilogy. By the end of the Blue Mars, the two protagonists representing these antagonistic 
positions, Sax and Ann, finally come together as lovers and the debate appears to be resolved, 
synthesized in a new color for Mars: blue or purple. There is a weakness in this debate which 
sometimes makes it quite tiresome to follow it: from the beginning it is obvious that Ann’s 
position–the preservation of Mars as it was–is simply untenable. Even just by participating 
in the mission, Ann is acting against her own views. It is not surprisingly that her following 
is unable to become a constructive ally to the other groups, only able to say “no” and to de-
stroy what is being built. There are two characters who, remaining outside this polemic, are 
able to perceive and construct a new, truly different Mars: Hiroko Ai and Desmond Hawkins. 
 Hiroko is a biologists working mainly on agriculture for the purpose of food production. 
From the beginning she is an intriguing outsider with a mystical bent, keeping mostly silent 
and occasionally outing statements such as “Mars will tell us what it wants and then we’ll 
have to do it” (Red 115). During the political unrest, she flees with her team and remains un-
der the radar of the mission leaders and the police. Hiroko had been responsible taking a 
stowaway on board, her former lover Desmond who on Mars becomes known as Coyote.11 
Coyote is not a scientist, but an adventurer scavenging Mars who falls in love with the planet. 
Both Hiroko and Coyote are nomadic figures whose lives remain largely unknown to other 
characters and to the reader. They are, however, hardly absent: Hiroko is the key figure in the 
birth of a native Martian underground, and Coyote becomes a crucial mediator connecting 
the myriad islands of the underground, building up a new “eco-economical” society on the 
principles of Hiroko’s ideas. The ideas and actions of Hiroko’s underground movement do not 
so much oppose the dominant order in the way Ann’s red movement does, as modulate it.
The reader first learns about Hiroko’s rather literal “underground” by the very end of Red 
Mars, when Coyote escorts a group of scientists fleeing the (anti)revolutionary violence. After 
a hazardous voyage to the Martian icecap, the party enters into a tunnel that leads them into 
a large dome “several kilometers in diameter” (572). The dome’s floor is covered with a red 
soil, vegetation, and it accommodates an entire village made of bamboo as well as a big lake. 
In the dramatic last sentence of Red Mars, Hiroko greets the refugees with the words, “This is 
home … this is where we start again” (572). In the underground village, named Zygote, the 
group not only encounters Vlad and Ursula’s biomedical team and other members of the First 
Hundred, but also a group of children. The children are called “ectogenes”: they were born 
through ectogenesis, that is, in an artificial uterus. During spirito-sexual ritual, Hiroko had 
collected the semen of many of the First Hundred, which she then used to give birth to her 
own children. Few moral questions are raised in the trilogy considering Hiroko’s experiment.12 
Hiroko’s spiritual ideas are encapsulated in her concept of viriditas13, a “ greening fruc-
tiparous power within” (Red 229). This is how Hiroko explains her concept to the children at 
Zygote through the example of a seashell: 
The dappled whorl, curving inward to infinity. That’s the shape of the universe itself. There’s 
a constant pressure, pushing toward pattern. A tendency in matter to evolve into ever 
more complex forms. It’s a kind of pattern gravity, a holy greening power we call viriditas, 
and it is the driving force in the cosmos. (Green 20-21) 
Resisting the reductionist tendency to dissect the world into ever smaller units, the notion of 
viriditas expresses connectedness and continuity. In scholarship on the trilogy, Hiroko’s ideas 
are often characterized as a mystical, for example by White who dubs Hiroko “the high-priest-
ess of the areophany” (586), and by Jameson, whose argues that Hiroko “negates empirical 
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reality in the spirit of an ideal” (Archaeologies 405). This way, scholars have overlooked Hiroko’s 
role as scientist. While acknowledging Hiroko’s spiritual bent, I argue that Hiroko’s ectogenet-
ic experiment can be theorized as nomad science, for it escapes and simultaneously radical-
izes the projects of human enhancement and terraformation. The creation of artificial wombs 
and of a large womb-like cavity in the ice may suggest that Hiroko is conducting a controlled 
experiment, but this is evidently not the case. Rather, Hiroko’s exile is the only way to escape 
from the demands of governments and industries. Within the confines of the underground, 
both human enhancement and terraformation become de-instrumentalized experiments of 
becoming without a pre-set goal. Life on Mars is placed in the cosmological context of plan-
etary evolution and spreading viriditas throughout the universe.14 
Hiroko’s nomad science can be further illuminated by juxtaposing it with the control sci-
ence of Sax, who despite some significant transformations remains the quintessential rep-
resentative of “ultra-reductionist scientism” (Leane 95). In a conversation with psychologist 
Michel he typifies science as “a system for generating answers” (Green 502): in the end, for 
Sax, anything can and should be understood by science. Sax is increasingly frustrated by the 
fact that the process of terraformation does not follow the trajectory he had calculated at its 
incipience. Michel, tells Sax that he is suffering from monocausotaxophilia: “the love of single 
causes that explain everything” (503). Undoubtedly inspired by Hiroko, Michel tries to per-
suade Sax to follow another line of thinking:
The scientist’s job is to explore everything. No matter the difficulties! To stay open, to 
accept ambiguity. To attempt to fuse with the object of knowledge. To admit that there 
are values shot through the whole enterprise. To love it. To work towards discovering the 
values by which we should live. To work to enact those values in the world. To explore–and 
more than that–to create! (506).
Only after having been confronted with (anti)revolutionary violence, Sax experiences a partial 
conversion to a more nomadic mode of science, no longer able to neatly separate science 
and politics. He departs from his central position within the terraformation project, travelling 
about in search of new forms of ecological development and new ideas, open to what the 
planet might teach him.
I would argue that in Hiroko’s case, spirituality is an integral part of nomad science, allow-
ing her to think the planet itself as agential and thereby challenging the idea that terraforma-
tion can be controlled by humans. According to Hiroko’s areaology, Mars is not merely a site for 
colonization but rather the home of a new humanity. In some ways, Hiroko’s ideas are actually 
more sober than those of Sax: DNA is not a holy grail leading to perfect knowledge and endless 
opportunities for control. Like Oyama’s constructive interactionism, areology can be seen a 
form of thought that resists transcendental “hidden” truths, desiring openness. Oyama’s plead 
to “reinsert ourselves into the world” resonates strongly with Robinson’s literary experiment: 
Can it be that if we really reinsert ourselves into the world, see our development, 
investigations, and technological control as actions within a network that we support 
and alter and that supports and alters us, see freedom and responsibility not as denials of 
causality but as a particularly human acknowledgement of it, if we see nature, including 
our own, as multilayered and constructed in development, not prior to it, if we see the 
world as truly our home … with all the loving reliance, multiple attachments, pride, and 
farsighted maintenance that “home” entails, is it possible that we will no longer need a 
mystical hidden message? Is it possible that the only message is our lives in our world and 
the life of our world in its universe? (Oyama, The Ontogeny 193)
Hiroko’s areology is exactly a way of reinserting, introducing, humans–not in the world, but in a 
world–to discern the networks we participate in. Much more forcefully than the novels discussed 
in the previous chapters, Mars presents the idea of the planet, and even the cosmos, as a home and 
a laboratory, linking scientific, social, psychological, biological, physical and chemical processes. 
greening Power
The Mars trilogy can be read as a thought-experiment with planetary science and politics in 
which personal, historical, evolutionary and cosmic processes begin to coalesce. I agree with 
Markley that the cosmological aspect of Mars is presented not merely as an ideological sauce 
accompanying the technoscientific main dish, but as a matter-of-fact investment in “an eco-
centric turn toward holism” (773)–or, as mission leader John Boone phrases it, “thinking seven 
generations back and seven generations forward” (Red 379). This concern with the long term 
also motivates Arkady–although as a Red, he seems to be more concerned with socio-political 
dynamics rather than with ecology:
Shortness of life was a primary force in the permanence of institutions, strange enough 
it is to say it. But it is so much easier to hold on to whatever short-term survival scheme 
you have, rather than risking it all on a new plan that might not work–no matter how 
destructive your short-term plan might be for the following generations. Let them 
deal with it, you know. And really, to give them their due, by the time people learned 
the system they were old and dying. And for the next generation it was all there, 
massive and entrenched and having to be learned all over again. But look, if you learn 
it, and then stare at it for fifty more years, you will eventually be saying: Why not make 
this more rational? Why not make it closer to our heart’s desire? What’s stopping us? 
(Red 340)
The “normal” human life cycle, Arkady suggests, is simply unfit for grappling with the dynam-
ics of a rapidly developing technoscientific society. Human lives on Mars need to be synchro-
nized with humanity’s terraforming ambitions. The same type of argument is developed in 
Green Mars by members of the underground on a more ecological note: human society ought 
to be synchronized with long-term planetary dynamics, including climatological systems, wa-
ter systems, and ecosystems, a process that cannot simply be modeled “in advance” but must 
be modulated in the midst of things. 
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In Green Mars, a new society and a new planetary ecology emerges, with its own native 
inhabitants. This transmutation of humans is largely epigenetic, in other words, induced by 
influences of the environment on the genome. As a narrator recounts, the difference between 
the generations is that the second one is truly Martian: 
they were different, sharing interests and enthusiasms perfectly incommunicable to 
any other generation, as if genetic drift or disruptive selection had produced a bimodal 
distribution, so that members of the old Homo sapiens were now cohabiting the planet 
with a new Homo ares, creatures tall and slender and graceful and utterly at home. (592)
What was designed as a project expanding the reaches of humankind, turns out to be the ad-
vent of a “bimodal distribution”–the splitting of populations over multiple locations, resulting 
in genetic variations–a phenomenon already described by Darwin, most famously in the example 
of different variations of finches on the Galápagos islands. A narrator even suggests that novel 
variations are the beginning of a “new species” of humans (628). The rather immediate emergence 
of variations is also manifested on the level of behavior. For Martian natives, enormous projects 
such as creating a sea “the size of the Caribbean” are completely normal: “It was their work, their 
life–to them it was human scale, there was nothing unnatural about it” (593). While the scien-
tific validity of Robinson’s account of epigenetic transmutation can be debated, I am more con-
cerned with a number of mutually constitutive assumptions undergirding his trilogy as well as 
Oyama’s work: (1) species can and do change in response to their environments, (2) species and 
environments are interactively constructed, (3) acquired mutations in the genome are heritable. 
 The relevance of constructive interactionism for understanding the Mars trilogy is evinced 
in two key concepts evolving from Hiroko’s experiment: eco-economics and ecopoiesis. The 
former term is an attempt to go beyond economic models that take the environment as a con-
struction site and a reservoir of resources: ecology becomes an integral element of economy. 
Eco-economics involves a systems of gifts and barter, where value is expressed not in some-
thing as abstract as money, but in calories, and efficiency is measured by the input/out rate 
of calories (Green 463-66). In eco-economics, the value existing in the environment and the 
wastefulness of human behaviors can no longer be neglected. In eco-economics one never 
invests solely in oneself, a company or a nation–one invests in an ecology. As Markley has ar-
gued, eco-economics can only be a viable option because the barriers between behavior and 
being, sociality and biology, have been broken down in historical experience: “Viriditas, then, 
is not a simulation or thought experiment imposed on Mars but the embodied experience of 
participating in the evolution of green life on a red planet … Conscious political intentions and 
philosophical positions are acted upon and sublimated by the land itself, fostering complex 
processes of ideational as well as genetic evolution” (786). Similar to the “trade” in Lilith’s Brood 
discussed in the previous chapter, eco-economics is a nomadic practice which, rather than 
imposing a grid on the world, affirms the potentials for transformation inherent in the world–
viriditas– allowing oneself to become part of a cosmic, evolutionary trade.
The aptitude and desire to live in a new Martian world is most evident in the character of 
Nirgal, son of Hiroko and Coyote. Nirgal is able to sense the temperature with incredible accu-
racy and, even more incredibly, has some kind of ill-understood control over temperature. Dur-
ing one of his trips, Nirgal is able to save Sax’s life, who had become trapped in a blizzard while 
studying new mutant species, by raising Sax’s body temperature–he “poured into Sax every bit 
of viriditas he could muster” (Green 354). Although in the trilogy the capacity to sense and con-
trol temperature is only exhibited by Nirgal, the entire native generation has become physi-
ologically adapted to Martian gravity and more skilled at navigating the Martian landscape. 
This is evidenced in a new, unnamed sport that somewhat resembles the French phenomenon 
of parcours (a free run through the city ignoring designated paths and involving acrobatic ma-
neuvers). First performed by Nirgal, the new sport is simply about reaching a particular place, 
typically hundreds of miles away, before the other contestants do. The matches last for days 
or weeks and require not only endurance and running skills, but an ability to choose the right 
routes, to read the landscape, and to survive. A quick comparison between Nirgal, Coyote, and 
Art (a terrestrial immigrant who joined the resistance) is revealing: “Coyote knew the land, 
and ran in short mincing dance steps, efficient and clean. Art bombed over the landscape like 
a badly programmed robot, staggering often as he hit wrong in the starlight, but keeping up a 
pretty good head of steam nevertheless. Nirgal ranged in front of them like a dog” (360). The 
narrator also compares Nirgal to a tiger, a cheetah-bear and a springbok (363). Living in the 
open as a nomad clearly requires being more attentive to one’s surroundings than humans 
have come to be. It seems that Mars offers not so much a clean start as a trigger to actualize 
latent capacities for sensation and movement in a new ecological context. The match between 
Nirgal, Coyote and Art is emblematic for the relationship between the new generation and 
their terrestrial ancestors: there is a friendship, but differences produce a distance between 
the generations that is often experienced as painful by both. When Nirgal tries to bridge that 
distance by getting to know his father, and later on visiting Earth, he ends up disillusioned. On 
Earth he contracts a virus that makes him ill and his body aches from the change in G force. 
Coyote and Nirgal, whose relationship is one of dispassionate respect, lead their lives as no-
mads without a sense of belonging.
The eco-economic network of underground communities that emerges around Zygote, 
characterized by one ectogene as “a kind of Polynesia” (427), is by no means under centralized 
control by Hiroko, Coyote or anyone else. The network is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
detteritorialized: rather than uniting the community within certain legal, political and eco-
nomic structures, it remains a “movement” –diffuse and incipient, but effective nonetheless. 
Eco-economics can be seen as a reframing of the “eco”/oikos in economics: a deterritorialized 
home, in which the human body is not primarily a consumption machine but rather construc-
tive and transient, and where nonhuman bodies play important roles. In order to gain mo-
mentum for their utopian ideas, the Greens strike an alliance with a terrestrial supranational 
organization called Praxis, that wants to invest in Mars’s ecosphere. As Praxis delegate William 
Fort explains, “Essentially it’s infrastructure investment, but at the most basic biophysical level. 
Infra-infrastructure, so to speak, or bio-infrastructure” (112). Fort stresses that Praxis’s model is 
non-capitalist, in the sense that it is not based on expansion, but an investment in communi-
ties and landscapes, and an effort to connect the two in constructive, durable ways: “We need 
to grow inward, to recomplicate” (480). The ideas developed by Praxis and the underground 
are Robinson’s own. In an interview he states that our capitalist economy is in many ways 
continuous with feudalism, and that economy as a discipline needs to be restructured in or-
der to be “not just the astrology of the ruling class but actually a way of calculating costs and 
benefits” (Buhle 89).
 In Mars, thinking “big” is complemented by local practices emerging from the underground 
and eventually proliferating in a climate that has become less oppressive. In Blue Mars, when 
Nirgal returns from his voyage to Earth he discovers to his joy that all over Mars, new agricul-
tural native communities of are flourishing, so-called “gardeners” toiling the land in innovative, 
sustainable ways not to make profit, but to make a living and to develop Mars: “They followed 
the inclination of the land, as they saw that some plants prospered, and others died. Co-evo-
lution, a kind of epigenetic development” (Blue 91). The methods of gardeners are not claimed 
to be more “natural.” What matters is that they nomadically “follow the inclination of the land,” 
attending to the singularities of living systems rather than modifying the alleged “essence” of 
a particular species. The gardeners advocate the idea of “ecopoiesis,” which, as one gardener 
explains it, is terraformation “redefined, subtilized, localized. Transmuted into something closer 
to Hiroko’s areoformation. No longer powered by heavy industrial global methods, but by the 
slow, steady, and intensely local process of working on individual patches of land” (Blue Mars 
91). Importantly, the gardeners’ communities do not represent utopias in which all science has 
become nomadic. The spread of these local communities was made possible by the terrafor-
mation project, which had led to the partial melting of Mars’s icecap, creating new oceans and 
seas and more wild life, and the engineering of the atmosphere, which has become breathable 
for human beings and other animals. But the role of biotechnology has been modified, much 
in the way that Vroom, Ruivenkamp, and Jongerden have argued for the need to “endogenize” 
(22) agricultural biotechnology according to local circumstances.
conclusion
Although the romantic joining of Ann and Sax in the final part of the trilogy seems to symbolize 
a new balance, the prospects for Mars are neither comfortable nor clear. Martian society has 
been able to pass through episodes of revolutionary fervor, negotiating the terms of gover-
nance and the status of Mars vis á vis the Earth, partly because immigration of terrestrials has 
been restricted. Eco-economic living on Mars is still inchoate and vulnerable, and it is unclear 
what will happen if terrestrials start pouring in, now that the Red resistance to terraformation 
has waned. Mass immigration of terrestrials is a real option, since the political and physical 
climates on Earth are radically destabilized. Nirgal, cultural icon of the new Mars, is in favor of 
an open attitude toward Earth. For him it is clear that, just as the experiments of the under-
ground resistance flow over into Martian society as a whole, the Martian adventure as such is 
a “simulation” whose lessons must be applied on Earth to save its societies and ecologies from 
collapse. The two worlds cannot be separated. The utopian “moment” in Robinson’s trilogy is 
nomadic: open and in becoming, a problematization that cannot be framed as a problem in/of 
 Mars or the Earth, nature or culture, the sciences or the Humanities. To cite again the words 
of Deleuze and Guattari at the beginning of this chapter, in Mars revolution is “absolute deter-
ritorialization,” effectuated not by the oppositional politics of the Reds, but through Hiroko’s 
radicalization of terraformation, her experiment-in-an-experiment, that gives birth to “a new 
earth and a new people” (What is Philosophy 101). To put it in Nietzschian terms, absolute deter-
ritorialization cannot be achieved by saying “no” or by clinging onto an original Martian iden-
tity: it means saying “yes” in the manner of a risky transmutation of values and of humanity 
itself, an affirmation of nonhuman life pervading the human.
Immensely enthusiastic and critical about the potentials of science, Robinson puts a no-
madic spin on E.O. Wilson’s notion of “consilience,” deterrirorializing the sciences as well as 
the divisions between the sciences and the Humanities to establish non-hierarchic, experi-
mental relations. This leads to hybrids such as eco-economics, which goes beyond atomistic 
(individualist) models, pointing towards a new relational economics that takes the community 
and the environment as primary (Daly and Cobb). Implicated with eco-economics, another 
mode of bioscience emerges in Mars that studies organic life as an open system, in continu-
ous constructive interaction with the physical and anthropomorphic strata. Robinson’s mesh-
ing of scales and dimensions, while uprooting modern divisions between personal, historical, 
spiritual, evolutionary, and cosmic temporalities, never ends up in either chaos or a theory of 
everything. Instead, the event of transformation becomes the locus of a new, socially robust 
biotechnoscience as well as a new “biohumanities” (Stotz, Bostanci and Griffith 5) endowed 
with the challenge of rethinking human affairs within expanded planetary and temporal ho-
rizons. Reinserting biology into the world and connecting evolution to history, Oyama’s and 
Robinson’s constructive interactionisms constitute calls for nomadic interdisciplinarity, a call 
much needed in a time when interdisciplinarity has become a norm.
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Today we live in an evolutionary universe, where change is endemic to how we see  
the universe and ourselves.
– Dorion Sagan and Eric D. Schneider –
introduction
More than ever before, science is becoming a collective enterprise, increasingly organized in 
interdisciplinary and international research consortia and networks. Yet there are still indi-
viduals and small scientific communities who operate relatively independent from such struc-
tures, and it is these scientists who are more apt to produce truly nomadic ideas beyond the 
immediate goals of control science. Like nomad writers and philosophers, nomad scientists 
are, to a certain extent, what Deleuze calls “private thinkers” as opposed to “public profes-
sors” (Difference 7-8). Paradoxically, it is this privacy that is the precondition for cultivating 
new forms of belonging. Referring to Kafka’s short story “Investigations of a Dog,” which re-
counts one dog’s relentless questioning of his surroundings and experiences, Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “If the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile com-
munity, this situation allows the writer all the more possibility to express another possible 
community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility; just 
as the dog of ‘Investigations’ calls out in his solitude to another science” (Kafka 17).1 If the task 
of individual thinkers is to invent a new world and create the conditions for another “possible 
community,” then this can be translated in biological terms as creating new modes of relating 
(desires, attitudes, practices, ideas) to the human species and its ecological environments. 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, this reinvention of biology crucially involves 
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a planetary and, ultimately, cosmic perspective, decentering the role of the human as well as 
the genome.
The crucial role of individuals in science is foregrounded in the sf novels discussed in this 
thesis. In DR, genomicist Kay Lang and archaeologist Mitch Rafelson are expelled by their sci-
entific communities, pursuing the problem of retroviral activation (SHEVA) in secret. Their sci-
entific intuitions and encounters lead to the birth of a different human being with new cogni-
tive capabilities, adapted to a world radically transformed by technoscience. In LB the prospect 
of a viable (post)human future also, ultimately, depends on individual efforts. If the extrater-
restrial Oankali seem to shift between control science and nomad science, carefully monitor-
ing yet deliberately leaving open the experiment of species merger, a real break-through is 
reached by the human-Oankali hybrid Akin, who becomes the pioneer of a new community. 
Robinson’s Mars trilogy finally, moves toward a sustainable planetary system mainly due to the 
controversial yet much admired biologist Hiroko Ai, who disappears to become the biological 
and spiritual mother of a new underground community of Homo ares raised on principles of 
sustainability. To understand nomad science and its relation to life, it seems logical to zoom in 
on the practices and attitudes of these protagonists, seeing how they affect the future of hu-
man populations and their environments.
It should be clear, however, that the analysis of individual actions is not intended to imply 
individualism–the mythic image of a genius who single-handedly transforms science–or an 
attempt to rigidly categorize scientists as either nomadic or collectively organized. Scientists 
working within institutions and disciplines can be propelled by nomadic desires. As observed in 
the discussion of Craig Venter’s work in chapter 1, the image of the scientific pioneer often pre-
sented in popular accounts of science has clear nomadic features, but it all too often amounts 
to a reterritorialization on state interests, profit, or personal gain. As Stengers argues in Cosmo-
politics II, nomadism and control need to be evaluated in particular contexts:
It is not a question of identifying “nomadic” and “sedentary” individuals but of identifying 
them only in relation to a given interaction, of creating a contrast whose scope does not 
exceed that interaction. Those who appear as sedentary on the basis of a given interaction 
may well take risks in an elsewhere foreign to the “nomads” who judge them. Within such 
spaces, these nomadic judges may seem as hopelessly sedentary, desperately tied to a 
territory that assigns limits and conditions to the risks they boast of. (364)
What Stengers conveys here is that the nomad-sedentary distinction is not a simple opposi-
tion, but an asymmetrical, paradoxical pair that applies to dynamic “interactions.” In the light 
of this dynamic understanding of nomad science, it is undesirable to use the concept of nomad 
science in a mode of (self-)identification. Control and nomad science are not simply labels, but 
tendencies that can be seen in various degrees in individuals and groups Accordingly, nomad 
science and “nomad scientist” should not be read as universal types nor as (personal) identities, 
but as a assemblages of desires, attitudes, practices and ideas.
The present chapter draws together and expands on observations about nomad scientists 
and nomad science in the previous chapters. It is not my ambition to provide an exhaustive list 
as if Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts perfectly map onto the works of the writers and scien-
tists discussed. Because of its fluid and vague nature, nomad science resists attempts at neat 
delineation or synthesis. Rather, I assemble associated notions in clusters that capture certain 
aspects of nomad science. For example, the series “following–opening up–interacting” con-
veys various ways in which nomad science stays intimately close to its objects of study, while 
remaining open and responsive to them.
In the first part of this chapter I gather desires, attitudes, and practices of nomad science 
from the literary texts. Nomad science, here, is first of all a style or way of doing science. Minor 
sf dramatizes the desires, attitudes and practices of nomad science through the adventures of 
its protagonists, who investigate and participate in a complex transformation of humanity and 
its world. Rather than trying to survey and control the situation, these protagonists become 
implicated in the unfolding problem-event, roaming a no-man’s land between knowledge and 
the unknowable. The second part of the chapter goes on to analyze the fundamental ideas of 
nomad science particularly on the question of life. Here I shift the focus to the contributions 
of scientists analyzed in the previous chapters, for whom life is inherently creative, not just 
reproducing its conditions of production but exploring new possibilities for recombination and 
transformation. In making a distinction between desires, attitudes and practices on the one 
hand, and fundamental ideas on the other hand, I do not mean to suggest that these aspects 
are separable in an absolute sense. It would be interesting to see if and how the nomadic 
desires, attitudes and practices in the novels also exist in real scientists; this would require 
biographical, ethnographic and other types of research that transcend the scope of this thesis. 
The reason for the present chapter structure is entirely pragmatic: the sf novels appear to be 
especially useful for gaining insight into the ways of a nomad scientist, while science writing 
provides thickly described scientific content. The conclusion to this chapter will reflect on the 
differences and contradictions between the different texts.
Part i: what is noMad science?
Mobility — encounter — disappearance
Deleuze and Guattari argue that if nomad scientists obtain a certain independence from (state) 
power, this independence is ephemeral because the state is continuously looking to bind them 
to their goals: “Ambulant procedures and processes are necessarily tied to a striated space–
always formalized by royal science–which deprives them of their model, submits them to its 
own model, and allows them to exist only in the capacity of ‘technologies’ or ‘applied science’” 
(411). Yet nomad science is not always containable. As the novels show, nomad scientists’ un-
quenchable thirst for problematization takes them beyond the confines of institutions and re-
search communities. In DR, Kay and Mitch are expelled by their scientific communities for pur-
suing scientific questions that are politically sensitive. They travel around the country, trying 
to remain invisible to the authorities while looking for alliances with scientist, journalists and 
others who are willing to support their research. Kay places their journey in a scientific tradi-
tion, comparing it with the struggles of Darwin and Margulis (88). Scientists in the Mars trilogy 
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are equally mobile–the mission itself can be seen as a great scientific field trip without return. 
The prospect of a new society on Mars founded on scientific principles spawns a myriad of 
utopian plans. On Mars mission leader John Boone travels between the various research teams, 
trying to create a sense of conviviality in the Martian colony by promoting the idea of a new, 
truly Martian society uncontaminated by terrestrial politics. In the revolutionary turmoil Boone 
is assassinated. The mission, which first seemed to veer away from immediate terrestrial con-
cerns, reterritorializes. However, a small group of scientists under the leadership of Hiroko 
manage to disappear and set up an underground community under the ice, invisible to radars.
In Butler’s trilogy the motifs of mobility, encounter and disappearance attain hyperbolic 
status. LB offers a glimpse of the mobile existence of the Oankali, who on their animate “ship” 
Chkahichdahk look for new life forms that will allow them to recombine, transform and dissemi-
nate. The Oankali’s encounter with humanity can be seen as an “evolutionary experiment” that 
is scientific, but never fully controlled. They proceed carefully, exposing themselves to humans 
in a sequence of simulated environments. This leads to many (attempts at) escape by humans, 
including Lilith, who eventually acquiesces in a life with the Oankali. Her hybrid son Akin also 
passes through various environments and disappears several times. Akin’s flexibility, which ex-
ceeds that of the Oankali, is crucial for his experimental field work that will take him through 
several stages of transformation and towards a (precarious) new beginning.
following — opening up — interacting
Closely related to mobility is the notion of following, which is important in Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s description of nomad science. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari propose that 
nomad science has a special sensitivity to the singularities of matter. In the case of working 
with materials such as wood, “it is a question of surrendering to the wood, then following where 
it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of imposing a form upon matter” (451; 
my emphasis). I would argue that the idea of following is not just applicable to materials, but 
to any phenomenon. Thus in DR, Kay and Mitch follow the unfolding of SHEVA without imme-
diately reaching conclusions, faithful to its complexity and open to any possible consequences. 
This practice of opening up to the object of research is also prevalent in LB. Although it some-
times appears that the Oankali are orchestrating the encounter, the success of the experiment 
depends on all participants’ ability to open up to the other. Humans are not simply repositories 
of genetic material for Oankali science, but active partners in co-evolution. The necessity of 
opening up becomes most intense with the adventures of Akin, who disappears from Lo and 
starts following human settlers. In a series of metamorphoses, Akin’s body becomes increas-
ingly malleable, adapting to his environments in chameleon-like ways. When coming near hu-
man beings, Akin’s body attains a more human, less repulsive form. Akin is finally able to break 
the “terrestrial characteristic” of hierarchy that kept humans in their oppositional and doomed 
positions (39). Butler’s narrative is a utopian narrative not in the sense of offering a synthe-
sis, but in showing the importance of coping with differences in a non-hierarchical manner. 
 The same kind of interaction with the environment is found in Mars. The mission is an incred-
ible challenge for its participants in terms of adapting to the circumstances on Mars–climactic, 
gravitational, social and so on. Hiroko is the architect of areoformation, a social and scientific 
model akin to what Oyama calls “constructivist interaction,” which is placed against the domi-
nant model of terraformation based on controlled (genetic) modification. Hiroko’s son Nirgal 
becomes a symbol of Martian identity and the prime mouth piece of her ideology. He has 
strange capacities including the ability to sense and control temperature, which supposedly 
emerged as response to Martian climate (although such explanation is not given in the trilogy). 
In a speech he dramatizes the physical and emotional impact of place: “Our bodies are made 
of atoms that until recently were part of the regolith … We are Martian through and through. 
We are living pieces of Mars. We are human beings who have made a permanent commitment 
to this planet. It is our home. And we can never go back” (Green Mars 739-40). The concept 
of areology, which will give rise to sustainable modes of relating to the Martian environment 
(“ecopoiesis”), instantiates Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that nomad science has a great sensi-
tivity to the singularities of matter.
risk — secrecy — resistance
The novels under scrutiny arguably reveal that nomad science entails risks on the part of sci-
entists and whole populations. The nomad scientist is an adventurer, choosing, in Isabelle 
Stengers words, to “detach herself from her beliefs in order to challenge them and to follow a 
problem wherever it may lead” (Cosmopolitics II 363). In comparison, the experiments of control 
science are organized in such a way that (health) risks are minimized. In Mars, the work of 
psychologist Michel, the development of enhancement drugs and the introduction of the ge-
netic longevity treatment all contribute to the health and stability of the Martian communities. 
Likewise, in LB the Oankali carefully prevent the diminished human population from succumb-
ing to disease or social conflict. In both trilogies, individuals arise who, often in secret, radical-
ize the experiment, creating nomadic ways of living and allowing life to transform without 
top-down control. Thus Hiroko takes her ex-lover Desmond (“Coyote”) on board the Ares as a 
stowaway. Coyote will become a vital element in the resistance, a messenger and pioneer in 
eco-economics and “guerilla climatology” (Green Mars 321). In Butler’s trilogy, Akin’s secret life in 
the forests around Lo, wandering the environs in search of humans, is also an act of resistance 
against the Oankali. As the only human-born Oankali-human hybrid, Akin’s life is vital to the 
success of the species trade, and the Oankali are afraid that he will get hurt or even killed dur-
ing this vulnerable stage of his metamorphosis. 
In DR, Kay and Mitch’s choice to conceive a child, an in vivo experiment of sorts validating 
their evolutionary explanation of SHEVA, is an act of resistance against the US government’s 
biopolitical control. Another example of resistance against containment in DR is a scene in 
which virus specialist Christopher Dicken suddenly climbs over the barricades set up around 
the Task Force’s headquarters and ventures into the surrounding crowd of protesters: “It was 
time to catch this fever and understand the symptoms. Better to be one of the troops on the 
front line, part of the mass, ingest its words and smells, and come back infected so that he 
could in turn be analyzed, understood, made useful again” (318). If there is something irra-
tional and pathetic in Dicken’s rush towards the infected masses, it also expresses audacity. 
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His perilous act forms a necessary step in the scientific struggles over what SHEVA really is: not 
a virus to be “hunted” but an unfolding event that is not just biological, but also social. Against 
the background of massive health problems, forced abortions, and increasing violence against 
infected women, these acts of purposeful contamination become signs of a profound sanity. 
Moreover, like LB, DR exemplifies the idea foregrounded by Deleuze and Guattari that disease 
and contamination, while threatening existing life forms and ways of living, can also be thresh-
olds toward evolutionary change (see chapter 2 of this book).
fascination — imagination — intuition 
Nomad science is closely connected to a moment of strong “affect,” of being engrossed by the 
grandeur of the cosmos–experienced not as a peaceful, symmetrically ordered unity, but as 
chaosmos. Yet nomad science would be hopelessly unproductive if it did not somehow act on 
this fascination. In other words, if fascination is a moment of being overwhelmed by something 
greater than human, then nomad science is a pragmatic, active response to this experience, 
which prevents the situation from ending up in stasis. In control science, I would argue, fas-
cination is manifested quite differently. Firstly, when nature is experienced in its astounding 
complexity, control science is quick to retreat to the steady grounds of institutions and re-
ceived knowledge. Consequently, control science’s fascination with the world remains rather 
superficial, expressed in semiotically dense images and metaphors such as “the book of life” 
that mysteriously stand in for complexity (Roof). Secondly, when invoking a sense of wonder 
about life, control science inevitably rechannels this feeling so that what emerges is not the 
grandeur of life, but of science itself. This is an example of Kant’s idea of sublime experience: 
being engulfed by the powers of nature, the subject regains a sense of autonomy in the act of 
rationally reflecting on these powers. With control science fascination retains its etymological 
layer of hardiness: the Latin fascis means a bundle of wooden rods, which in Roman times was a 
symbol for unity and power. In nomad science, fascination denotes a much more flexible mode 
of attachment that refuses to cling onto subjects, objects or signifiers, something that might 
be called “fluid fascination.” 
The concept of fluid fascination can be clarified by looking at how bewildering events in 
the novels spark practices of scientific intuition.2 Kay and Mitch’s scientific response to SHE-
VA is manifested in brain-storm sessions in which they creatively imagine the evolutionary 
and historical significance of SHEVA and its future potential. Their intuitions are informed by 
vivid dreams and epiphanies through which they become emotionally, affectively attached 
to SHEVA-infected people and to the event of species transmutation as such. The primitive 
people in Mitch’s dreams, castigated for their SHEVA-triggered physiological differences, seem 
to call upon Mitch for help. Kay’s epiphanies feature a “caller” whose spiritual presence seems 
to forebode great change. These intense experiences work to open up the scientists to the 
psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions SHEVA. In Mars the intuitive thoughts of Hiroko 
constitute a similar practice of opening up to the outside of science, the great unknown. Her 
vitalist ruminations on the planet Mars and the role of humans allow the underground to 
imagine another Mars, beyond the short-term interests of states and corporations. Hiroko in-
vents new rituals in which humans become attached to the Martian landscape, thus lending a 
cultural and even spiritual aura to the mission. Her fluid fascination can be contrasted not just 
to the concept of terraformation, but also to the position of the Reds, who stick to the idea of 
preserving the original Mars, a kind of sanctification of the red rock. Ann, leader of the Reds, is 
a prime exemplar of the fact that scientific resistance can be just as rigid as control science. As 
Michel, the mission’s psychologists explains to Ann, “I think you’re afraid. Afraid of attempting 
a transmutation – a metamorphosis into something new … You will never stop loving Mars. 
After metamorphosis the rock still exists” (257). By the end of the trilogy, oppositions have 
weakened due to what Hiroko describes as a “symbiotic” relation between terraformation and 
areoformation (Green Mars 37).
Fluid fascination, imagination and intuition also play significant roles in LB. As the Oankali 
Nikanj explains to Lilith and her mate Joseph, “A partner must be biologically interesting, at-
tractive to us, and you are fascinating. You are horror and beauty in rare combination. In a very 
real way, you’ve captured us, and we can’t escape” (154). The mutual dependency of humans 
and Oankali is often painful and restricting, but it is also a source of joy and new possibilities. 
Successful species encounters come with fluid fascination and require soft skills–notably care-
ful verbal and tactile communication. What the Oankali seem to be lacking is an imaginative 
plan for the future. It is Akin, the first human-born hybrid, who designs such a plan and tries 
to convince others to follow him. Having no scientific or social scenarios at his disposal, Akin 
follows his intuition. As the creator of a new society and a new world, Akin conjoins the role of 
the scientist with that of the artist and the philosopher, but also the mystic, the prophet, and 
the shaman.
Problematization — cooperation — introduction
Nomad science is described by Deleuze and Guattari as a science of problems, but is it not 
true that science as such revolves around problems? What distinguishes a nomadic mode of 
problematization, I would argue, is that the problem becomes a kind of cancerous growth that 
keeps returning and dissipating. Rather than isolating a problem in a controlled environment, 
nomadic problematization is a desire and a practice that pushes the researcher far into com-
plexity. While Deleuze and Guattari stress the nomadic potentials of individual journeys, their 
joint writings are evidence that cooperation is a crucial element in problematization. Hence in 
Mars, interdisciplinary collaboration in conferences and congresses is vital in the development 
of a new society. These gatherings are sites of deterritorialization–open experimentation with 
ideas–but they also reterritorialize on new solutions and plans. Nirgal describes well the disen-
chantment felt when such meetings come to an end: “The future becoming the past: there was 
something disappointing in this passage through the loom, this so-sudden diminution from in-
finity to one, the collapse from potentiality to reality which was the action of time itself” (Green 
159). Continual questions, problems, and discussions: this is what drives nomad science as well 
as Robinson’s trilogy itself, which does not want to end. The danger of this desire speaks from 
the various failures of scientists to come to a workable plan for Martian society. The complexity 
of the discussions sometimes tips the scales toward pure chaos.
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Although the nomad scientist’s desire for complexity verges on the pathological and often 
culminates in unpolished ideas that lack immediate use-value, interdisciplinary brain-storm 
sessions may also produce veritable leaps of understanding. We can see this happening in DR, 
where the problem of SHEVA is problematized when Kay and Mitch combine their biological 
and archaeological findings and ideas. This critical moment introduces a story that is much 
richer than the official account promulgated by the government task force: a story of planetary 
and evolutionary proportions. Although these insights instill a sense of victory on the part of 
Mitch and Kay, the repercussions are neither clear nor comfortable. A similar kind of complex-
ity and open-endedness characterizes the scientific experiments in LB and Mars, which take life 
not just beyond the human, but beyond the planetary. The Oankali are conducting a long-term 
experiment whose dimensions are impossible to fathom for humans. In spite of their perva-
sively genetic discourse on life, the Oankali’s experiment is holistic, encompassing all aspects of 
species encounter. In Mars, Hiroko’s vitalism surpasses common scientific and social theories, 
representing the mission as a true evolutionary step for humanity, other species and for Mars. 
For Hiroko, the mission does not end on Mars; life is destined to reproduce and disseminate 
into the cosmos in a series of introductions.
immersion — self-experimentation — becoming
Holistic images of life confront researchers with the impossibility of an “objective” scientific 
process purged of social, political and ecological aspects. Nomad scientists are acutely aware of 
their own (humble) role in these processes. Moreover, they immerse themselves in the problem-
atic events they are exploring, returning from thought-experiments not with fitting solutions, 
but with insights that may transform their fields of research and even science as a whole. In DR, 
the question is not Where can SHEVA be located? (on the genome, in populations, in history), 
but rather Which new ideas about human beings and evolution does the event called SHEVA 
(retroviral activation) provoke? In LB, Akin’s strange encounters generate a feeling of “self-dis-
solving closeness” (455) that testifies to a kind of escape from coarse self-identity, a moment 
of becoming. I argue that in place of an epistemology of spatial distance between subject and 
object, nomadism produces becomings in which difference is affirmed, creating the conditions 
for another science and another humanity. 
The most obvious example of self-experimentation is Kay and Mitch’s decision to have a 
child, which results in the first SHEVA-newborn. Kay and Mitch use their bodies as laboratories. 
This is not just a personal event; after Kay and Mitch publicly announce that SHEVA babies will 
be born alive when the mother is not anaesthetized, a new future opens up for a new type of hu-
man being, who in the sequel Darwin’s Children develop their own means of communication and 
social order. In LB and Mars organic and planetary bodies become laboratories for (co-)evolu-
tion. The name Oankali literally means “traders,” but in an unusual sense of the word: they trade 
themselves, their bodies (24). In Red Mars, geophysicist Nadia notes that as soon as the scientists 
will land, micron-sized dust will be “getting into everything, our lungs, our blood, our brains” 
(104), implying that there will be no way to escape the influence of their new environment. 
Later, Sax’s plans for terraformation lead him to the conviction that “the planet is the lab” (263). 
If this idea is born from state and corporate-driven control, in the course of the trilogy Sax 
drifts towards a more nomadic mode of science, restlessly roaming the Martian landscape 
studying new life forms and putting himself to the test, almost freezing to death. Sax’s desire 
to immerse in the planetary lab becomes greater than the will to control.
For Deleuze and Guattari, all escape from identity through becoming must pass through 
becoming-woman (A Thousand 306). This conviction may sound unnecessarily restricting, but 
in the present context it does resonate with the central role of female scientists. I argue that all 
three works portray a becoming-woman of science. In LB, Lilith is the first to cooperate in the 
Oankali experiment and becomes the first mother of a new race of hybrids. Lilith’s joyous as 
well as painful exchange with the Oankali stands in stark contrast to the male-dominated hu-
man villages which keep an oppositional, violent stance towards the Oankali and other human 
settlements. As an anthropologist trained to be critical of her own culture, Lilith is motivated 
by the idea that “there must be saner ways of life” (132). Her ordeals make her an exponent of 
what Nietzsche called “great health”: the health of an active affirmation rather than the health 
of reactive (defensive) life. A similar analysis can be made for Hiroko’s role in Mars. As Coyote 
notes in his own crude way, Hiroko is the founder of a “proto-Minoan matriarchy” promoting 
feminine values such as compassion and care, as well as a feeling for materiality.3 Finally, in DR 
the main protagonist is a woman who diverges from the male-dominated science of control. 
Kay’s theory suggests that species metamorphosis is triggered by an evolutionary “radio” in 
the mitochondrial DNA, receiving stress signals caused by a fast-changing environment (over-
population, explosion of communication streams). Her expertise shows that the maternally 
inherited mitochondrial DNA, floating around in the cytoplasm, is crucial to the evolution of 
species, more important perhaps than the DNA in the cell’s core.4 Moreover, Kay’s research and 
her pregnancy are motivated by a compassion for women around the world facing denial and 
persecution, and express a desire to transcend the short-sightedness of a control-obsessed 
scientific elite dominated by men. The important roles of women in the novels reflect a rela-
tively recent historical development in which women begin to participate in science, and even 
outnumber men in some instances (albeit mostly in the lower ranks). What will happen to the 
male-dominated sciences once women participate in its remaking? 
Apart from becoming-woman, there is also a persistent becoming-child of science in the 
novels, at least in the case of Mars and LB. In the Martian underground the children of Hiroko 
ask questions all the time. In a science class given by Sax they keep asking “Why Sax, why?” 
until he can no longer provide explanation (Green Mars 25-6). With their unrelenting curiosity 
the children challenge Sax’s science that proclaims to know the world. Against this backdrop 
Nirgal’s nomadism can be understood as the yearning for a knowledge that resists the urge 
to control and fully understand. When one has no steady territory, the alternative is becom-
ing: “His home was crushed under a polar cap, his mother had disappeared without a trace, 
and every place since then had been just a place, and everything everywhere always changing. 
Mutability was his home” (192). Nirgal’s non-identity or becoming keeps him flexible, youth-
ful. His favorite sport–skillfully running through the Martian landscape for days on end–can 
be seen as an exemplar of what Deleuze and Guattari see as the ultimate form of becoming: 
merging with the land and “becoming-imperceptible” (A Thousand 308-9). Braidotti has defined 
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becoming-imperceptible spatially as “the point of fusion between the self and his or her habi-
tat, the cosmos as a whole” and temporally as “an eruption of desire for the future” (Transposi-
tions 261). The same intense awareness of the environment and desire for the future can be 
detected in the meanderings of Akin in LB, whose sensibility and flexibility affirms the nomadic 
aspects of his parents and is vital for the advent of a new people and a new world.
Part ii: what is noMad biology?
Nomad science, rather than being the privilege of minor sf as a kind of discursive exile, is pres-
ent in contemporary science as well. Indeed, minor sf on the one hand and the biosciences on 
the other should not be seen as opposites, but rather as interlocking endeavors that challenge 
one another. Therefore I will now shift my focus to contemporary bioscientific discourse, no-
tably to point out possible ideas of a nomad biology as a counterpoint to control science. Apart 
from discussing ideas from Margulis, Haraway, and Oyama, I will add a number of key insights 
from the biologist Stuart Kauffman which, in my view, neatly illustrate the nomadic preference 
for becoming. Concise references to the sf novels under study make clear that these scientific 
ideas can function as (components of) literary novums, bringing science to life.
Multiplicity — immanence — nested scales
One obvious way to begin to distinguish nomad bioscience from control science is by its re-
sistance to contemporary reductionist approaches to life such as Craig Venter’s idea of “DNA 
software” (“What is Life”), which proposes that biological life can be translated into a digital 
code and reproduced (see chapter 1). Usually the reasons for reductionism are entirely prag-
matic. As biologist Richard Lewontin puts it in his foreword to the 2000 edition of Oyama’s 
The Ontogeny of Information, “when the wrong question is being asked, it usually turns out to be 
because the right question is too difficult. Scientists ask questions they can answer” (vii). Re-
ductionism allows science to arrive at solutions and to gain a degree of control over bodies and 
environments, but it can also lead to oversimplified, premature or even wrong conclusions that 
impede nomadic thinking. Nomad science counters reductionism not by merely criticizing con-
trol science, but by carefully unfolding ever new factors in a web of life that ultimately cannot 
be controlled. Nomad science prizes the fact that nature is excessive, something that is readily 
perceivable in the astonishing diversity of organismal forms, but also becomes apparent on the 
molecular level, where the “redundancy of genetic and molecular pathways” allows for “great 
flexibility and adaptability to unexpected environmental changes” (Capra, “Complexity” 40).
Oyama’s Developmental Systems Theory, first formulated in the Ontogeny of Information 
(1985), articulates the idea that biological life must be approached as a set of interlocking sys-
tems that are continually constructed in interaction with one another. The title of Oyama’s 
book is meant to suggest that the idea of information as pre-programmed in the genes is 
mistaken: information “neither preexists its operations nor arises from random disorder” (3). 
Oyama intends to remove the focus in biology from a bottom-up molecular approach to a 
multi-scalar systemic one. The genome is displaced, but only in order to purge its transcenden-
tal status as an “unmoved mover”; it remains a crucial factor in the developmental system (The 
Ontogeny 156). Oyama’s idea that nature is nothing other than the development of forms (phe-
notype) effectuates a move towards immanence: “Seeing natures as developmental products, 
and thus as phenotypic rather than genotypic, turns us away from the search for transcendent 
reality and back to the processes and products of development” (Evolution’s Eye 66). As Alber-
to Toscano has pointed out, Oyama’s conception of information as a developmental process 
resonates with Simondon’s theory of individuation, which had a major influence on Deleuze’s 
(bio)philosophy of difference.5 Deleuze and Oyama share a reluctance to articulate genes and 
environments as limitations on what a body can do; rather these are enabling elements of 
developmental systems. As Oyama argues, there is no opposition between nature and nurture, 
biology and history, or genes and environment, where the first denotes something internal, 
determined and constraining and the second something external, contingent and developing. 
Instead, all traits are acquired and inherited, environmental and genetic, in equal manner (86).6 
Oyama’s systems view concords with Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence –thinking “a life” 
without transcendent cause or telos. It suggests a flat ontology of interlinked processes across 
micro, meso and macro scales, without thereby invoking a classical notion of cosmic order 
as composed of symmetrical scales. What returns at each level is not the same structure, but 
difference itself. The principle of immanence steers away from questions of sameness and re-
semblance and towards difference and connection. Moreover, it curbs the desire to find central 
control or causality in a particular location towards a view of nature as an abstract process of 
creation: a machine. In a world that is connected at multiple levels like a giant, all-encompass-
ing machine, nomad science wants to reveal how seemingly disparate phenomena relate to 
one another. In conformity with Deleuze’s principle of immanence, Oyama qualifies her Devel-
opmental Systems Theory as a style of thinking that “moves with a certain fluidity among scales 
and measures” (Evolution’s Eye 209). Oyama’s work suggests that the environments of cells and 
organisms are not passive “backgrounds,” but active components of developmental systems. 
 One of the most potent images to date of the interlinkage of processes at multiple scales is 
the Gaia hypothesis, which Margulis co-developed with James Lovelock during the 1970s. Here 
the earth is envisioned holistically as a living thermodynamic system in which the biosphere 
regulates the composition and temperature of the atmosphere. Although human technologies 
have the ability to affect the planet in unprecedented ways, for Margulis, neither humanity 
nor technology should be placed on some kind of meta-level. In analogy to Haraway’s analysis 
of the cyborg as a cultural figuration for the contemporary entanglements of silicon-based 
technologies and living systems, Margulis and Sagan argue that technology is entirely natural, 
immanent to one and the same world: 
On a sensual level it is easy to imagine a conception of the human environment as 
beginning with the fingernails, hair bones, and other substances no longer considered to 
be body parts because they are bereft of sensation. Conversely, technological introjection 
exemplified by devices such as tele-vision (video, movies, et cetera) and tele-portation 
(automobiles, airplanes and so forth) suggest a topological extension of the human into 
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what formerly would have been considered the environment. Therefore the body, the 
material or corporeal basis for “self,” has no absolute time-independent skin-encapsulated 
topological fixity. (“The Uncut Self” 19)
One consequence of this view is that, in Deleuzian terms, there is nothing inherently “organic” 
about life: an organism is merely one actualization of life’s potential. Technology is an exten-
sion of an organism’s capacities (perceptive, motoric, and so on), and these abilities evolve 
and proliferate throughout the natural world, so that now humans wield the bacterial ability 
of gene recombination. Another important consequence of this view is that human interven-
tions through science and technology should always be assessed as part of, and limited by, 
conditions that are not human-controlled. This view is exemplified by the literary novum of 
terraformation in Mars, where transformation is produced by biotechnological enhancement 
and bioengineering in interaction with non-human process, making the project ultimately un-
controllable.
relation — interaction — co-evolution
Margulis’s theory of endosymbiotic evolution is an alternative to genocentrism as well as to a 
neo-Darwinist understanding of evolution as the gradual accumulation of random DNA mu-
tations subject to natural selection. In Acquiring Genomes Margulis writes that the genesis of 
new forms out of existing ones cannot be explained by examining genomes or species in isola-
tion: “Animal evolution resembles the evolution of machines, where typewriters and televi-
sion-like screens integrate to form lap tops, and internal combustion engines and carriages 
merge to form automobiles. The principle always stays the same: well-honed parts integrate 
into startling new wholes” (172). Margulis’s work examines the ways in which symbiotic rela-
tions between animals, for example bacteria living in the guts of mammals, are often useful, 
thus offering counterweight to the dominant idea of a competition between species. Radical 
transformation of species is simply unthinkable in neo-Darwinism, which focuses too much on 
vertical transmission and thereby “misses the symbiotic forest for the genetic trees” (201). Mar-
gulis’s work on symbiotic co-evolution resonates strongly with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of the rhizome, which instantiates the primordiality of relations. In other words, the elements 
of a system are entirely immanent to the relations that compose it. 
Oyama shares Margulis’s concern about individualist approaches in biology, such as the 
paradigmatic ideas of competition and natural selection, which lead biologists to treat relations 
as secondary to identities. Criticizing dominant science’s “obsession with detachment, isolation 
and independence,” Oyama looks for “metaphors of engagement, connection, and interdepen-
dence,” ways of knowing with a preference for “mutuality over domination, systems of influ-
ences over single causes, openness over closure, loops over lines” (151-52). Her way out of the 
conundrum of individualism is “constructive interactionism”: a mode of interactioni that moves 
beyond the idea of an external influence on (or, worse, “perturbation” of) an internal essence. 
All interactants are on equal footing, and “internal” and “external” are but epistemological, 
political, and, if we follow Barad, ontological effects of interactions. The instability of inner 
and outer worlds is expressed in Bear’s novel with the novum of infected genomes, and in the 
novels by Butler and Robinson by the continuous (re)construction of organisms and worlds.
While Oyama and Margulis reach far into micro and macro-levels, none has gone further 
than Haraway in analyzing the lived experience of relations between humans and other spe-
cies. Haraway’s ethnographic work on interaction between species in science (primatology, 
medical genomics), animal agility sports, as well as agriculture and bio-industry, render con-
crete the idea that species evolve together. For Haraway, domestication is a mutual process in 
which humans and animals influence one another: the realms of anthropology and ethology 
converge in human-animal ethnography (“Multispecies”). Human-animal relations are cul-
tural, in the sense of being embedded in and mediated by discourse and technology, but they 
are also biological, leading Haraway to invent hybrid terms such as “material-semiotic” and 
“naturecultures.” She amplifies the ethico-political dimension of co-evolution also present in 
Oyama’s and Margulis’s work, arguing that science should nurture “the capacity to feel and 
think with other mortal beings, not just about them” (6). Calling research animals “significantly 
unfree partners” (When 72), Haraway reveals the problematic nature of binary oppositions such 
as human-animal–without letting go of these terms altogether, for that would obfuscate the 
existing asymmetries existing between them. For Haraway, who is an ardent reader of Mar-
gulis’s work, it is clear that her relation with her dog Cayenne affects their lives and their ge-
nomes: “sympoiesis displaces autopoiesis and all other self-forming and self-sustaining system 
fantasies” (9). In her latest works on species encounters, Haraway’s ideas reverberate strongly 
with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and his insistence on the ontological primacy of rela-
tions: “The relation is the smallest unit of analysis, and the relation is about significant other-
ness at every scale” (The Companion 24). While the relations between species are made palpable 
by all three of the novelists, the intimacy of such relations is most explicit in the encounter 
between humans and Oankali in LB.
embodiment — fluidity — folding 
Geneticists mostly investigate exons (the bits of DNA that code for proteins) and until recently, 
introns (non-coding DNA) were referred to as junk-DNA. This practice illustrates a desire in 
control science to eradicate redundancy and noise, leaving only clear and clean bits; notions 
of “good data,” “elegant theories,” and “beautiful results,” all imply this sense of cleanliness. The 
desire for order ultimately results in a binary opposition between polished essences and messy 
materiality. In the genocentric view, the genes are solely responsible for generating form and 
function (Fox Keller, “Beyond” 292). The idea that biological life can be captured in a digital 
code, substituting wetware for dryware, may be one the most extreme examples of producing 
a polished essence and disregarding the messy body. In this light, Oyama criticizes the notion 
of “substrate neutrality” proposed by thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, where “programs can 
be instantiated in brains, silicons, or tin cans” (Evolution’s Eye 283). This critique can be placed 
in a tradition of feminist critiques of science of which Donna Haraway is a key figure, which 
shows that in science and Western culture as a whole, the body has consistently been coded 
as impure, deceptive, and so on.7 In Butler’s trilogy, the Oankali strangely entertain a symbiotic-
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developmental view and disembodied genetic essentialism. However, genetic manipulation by 
the Oankali is merely an aid, not a means to control co-evolution.
Nomad bioscience, rather than seeking solid causal essences, looks for fluid connections. 
Jesper Hoffmeyer argues that bioinformation is not a genetic blueprint or program but an ac-
tive process in which “the cell interprets the DNA” (156). In other words, the cell as a whole is 
the doer. Instead of acting solely on the membrane of the nuclear DNA, on which most geneti-
cists focus, the cell’s activities are “topologically connected to the membranes of mitochon-
dria, chloroplasts, the nuclear envelope, the Golgi apparatus, ribosomes, lysosomes, and so on” 
(165). Instead of a mechanistic movement from genotype to phenotype, gene expression is a 
complex event dispersed over an “extended membrane,” which, for Hoffmeyer, becomes “the 
principle locus of life itself” (165-6). The notion of an extended membrane is a clear example 
of a nomadic approach to the body as topology: a fluid entity for which notions of inside and 
outside are unstable. For Oyama, too, the body is a fundamentally open structure:
If we follow our skin to its transition to the mucuous membrane of the mouth and throat 
and beyond … we can ask whether our gut symbionts are inside or outside us. A particle of 
food could be considered inside once it has been absorbed into the bloodstream or into a 
cell, but one of our cells similarly resolves, if we look closely enough, to a maze of structures, 
channels, and pores, constantly changing their configurations and traversed by frantic 
traffic. (“Boundaries”279)
In a similar vein, Margulis and Sagan emphasize that the membrane is “a self-maintained and 
constantly changing semipermeable barrier” that allows them to “jump organizational levels, 
from intra-organismic cell to cellular organism to organismic ecosystem and biosphere” (“The 
Uncut Self” 17). 
Of all three novels, perhaps DR most vividly imagines the body’s openness to the outside. 
Here, evolution does not occur merely as a result of selection from the outside, but through an 
internal “radio” receiving signals from the environment. As Oyama argues in Evolution’s Eye, we 
are not unities but multiplicities: “Many natures (“organisms-in-transition”) constitute a spe-
cies, rather than some single species essence, and an organism has as many natures as it has 
situational and developmental moments” (181). Organisms are not merely selected, but they 
select and co-create their own environments. Furthermore, many organisms can offer food 
and shelter for a great number of other species. Margulis and Sagan identify a tendency in life 
to “literally incorporate more and more of its environment into itself” (“Welcome” 81). Trans-
lated in Deleuzian terms, this means that the inside is merely a fold of the outside (The Fold) and 
that organisms are temporary forms in a fluid world. The idea of biological multiplicity (derived 
from the Latin word plicare, meaning to fold) affects psychological, sociological and philosophi-
cal conceptions of self, which attain a non-anthropocentric stature; as Margulis and Sagan put 
it, “we are composed of smaller selves, and we form parts of the more inclusive selves” (“The 
Uncut Self” 28). Haraway looks to Margulis’s endosymbiogenesis as a source for thinking a 
“paradoxical individuality,” another mode of subjectivity beyond the model of liberal humanism 
in which the human individual is pictured as autonomous (“Otherworldly” 146). For Haraway, 
embodiment and materiality are keywords for going from an abstract individuality (implicitly 
based on standards created by and for white heterosexual males) to the multiplicities of our 
bodies and our material and spiritual connections to (non-)human others.
instability — nonlinearity — transformation 
Nomad science is attracted to complex problems, and the phenomenon of transformation is 
perhaps the most enigmatic problem thinkable. As philosopher François Julliens has recently 
argued, although transformation is everywhere, it eludes measurement:
Between the moment when it has not yet reached the visible and that in which it will 
henceforth be too widely distributed and confused in the midst of the visible still to be 
discerned, the transformation offers only a narrow chink of perceptibility; this is why it is 
necessary for it to be “examined” with so much vigilance. (80)
What better phenomenon is there to be relentlessly “followed” by nomad science than a trans-
formation that never really begins or ends, that is neither here or there? This is what the nov-
els by Butler and Robinson express most forcefully, by creating novums of species encounter 
and constructive interactionism: a sense of ongoing development, proliferation and change. 
Transformation is everywhere, but it is not “neutral” or random: it is an achievement, a solu-
tion to problems. As Haraway argues in When Species Meet, evolution is not a neutral or blind 
process of natural selection, as neo-Darwinism has it, but a straining, creative exercise of “be-
coming with” (16). The novels analyzed in this thesis illustrate that species transmutation can 
occur when an organism, symbiotic assemblage, or ecosystem is under extreme pressure and 
becomes unstable, for example because of food shortages or changes in climate. The literary 
event of transmutation and the struggles it entails double Margulis and Sagan’s argument in 
Acquiring Genomes that “most genetic takeovers and acquisitions, mergers and fusions ensue 
under conditions of environmental hardship” (42). Evolutionary and developmental problem-
events are inherently nonlinear, unpredictable: they can bring catastrophe, but also trigger 
innovation, creativity, and cooperation. Often destruction and creation coincide. For example, 
when about 2.4 billion years ago oxygen produced by cyanobacteria through photosynthesis 
began to accumulate in the atmosphere, nearly all anaerobic organisms on earth were wiped 
out, while, simultaneously, the conditions were created for the arrival of life forms that still 
thrive today. 
Instability is a key concept in the biological systems theories of Stuart Kauffman and Brian 
Goodwin, where the units of development and evolution are not genes, organisms or species, 
but the systems which coincide with particular bodies. From this perspective, the expression of 
genetic material is highly contingent on systemic conditions that are unstable and, thus, unpre-
dictable. Any particular body is overdetermined by a host of factors that embed it, connect to 
it, move through it. For example, in spatial terms, the development of an ant is constituted by 
its insides (genes, cells, gut symbionts, etc.) and outsides (the colony, other animals, plants, cli-
mate, and so on). This inside-outside topology is forever changing: the outside is incorporated 
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(for example through food consumption and learning) while the inside is extended or external-
ized (through technologies such as building and writing). Moreover, time becomes nonlinear. 
A living system’s development at a particular moment depends on an accumulated history 
of developments that still have a relative bearing on the present and that co-constitute the 
possibilities for future developments. Yet the virtual potentials for becoming are not given in 
the present–as if there were fixed repositories of futures–but emerge in a feedback loop with 
actual conditions. Systems dynamics can be periodic (hormone cycles, migration patterns, and 
so on), gradual (growth, learning) , or they can approach a bifurcation point where the system 
makes a phase transition (reaching puberty, metamorphosis, death). These systems dynamics 
have been deployed beyond biology, and can be virtually applied to any given system (Delanda, 
Intensive). The discovery of nonlinearity at the heart of matter marks a crucial threshold in 
which science is forced to abandon, as Ilya Prigogines argues in The End of Certainty (1997), the 
search for final causes.
The problem of thinking life as nonlinear and nonrandom becoming is explored by Kauff-
man, who argues that complex systems are permanently poised at “the edge of chaos” (At 
Home 209), and therefore continually undergoing transformation. This means that nonlinearity 
and instability are not synonymous with random chaos: they are aspects of complex systems 
that are exceptional on a cosmic scale, but entirely normal for our biosphere. Doing battle with 
chaos, life is forced to be creative, and the external force of natural selection is insufficient to 
account for this creativity in evolution. Life is neither reducible to parts (mechanism ) nor an 
omnipresent, mysterious force (vitalism) but, as Kauffman phrases it, a series of co-evolving, 
self-organizing systems or “ways of making a living” operating in some yet to be understood 
relation to natural selection (Investigations 134-35). Kauffman argues that self-organization is 
a feature of life as such and applies to everything from physical to economic systems. While 
the idea of self-organization was first conceived within the context of living organisms, theo-
rists have shown that it conceptualizes mechanism-independent processes that apply to complex 
systems in general (Delanda, Intensive; Goodwin, How the Leopard; Kauffman, Order). It is clear 
that Kauffman’s introduction of the colloquial notion of “making a living” into the non-human 
sphere is neither a mere metaphor nor a gesture of anthropocentrism. Kauffman’s idea of sys-
temic “ways making a living” is a scientific transmutation of the original saying that results in a 
decentering of the human, making life and work immanent to the universe in ways similar to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of nature as machine or “process of production” in Anti-Oedipus (3). 
Kauffman’s idea that the future emerges unpredictably as process of selecting “adjacent pos-
sibles” resonates strongly with Deleuze’s ontology of the virtual and the actual.8
Most of Kauffman’s career has been at the service of discovering underlying laws of self-
organization or “emergence” in evolution using mathematical models such as Boolean net-
works, as if trying to fuse control science and nomad science. Recently, however, he seems 
to have taken a more radical nomadic turn. Together with mathematician Guiseppe Longo 
and biologist Maël Montévil, Kauffman has argued that the desire to discover “entailing laws,” 
originating predominantly in physics and mathematics, has been erroneously forced upon the 
other sciences. In biology, evolution has no foundational causes or laws, but rather operates 
through regimes of “enablement” which are inherently nonlinear and hence unpredictable (“No 
Entailing”). The authors state that while in physics the default state is inertia, in biology it is 
“the never identical iteration of a morphogenetic process, by proliferation and mobility,” and 
that, in this evolutionary process, “an organism, a species, does not need a cause to be active, 
e.g. to proliferate and occupy a new niche” (“No Entailing” 1388). If we follow this line of reason-
ing, molecular biology’s often unquestioned assumption of natural selection as a kind of law 
as well as its fixation on the genome as a primary cause become highly problematic. Moreover, 
Kauffman’s work suggests that whilst during the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries the law-
based thinking of physics strongly influenced biology and the social sciences, biology’s recent 
investigations of self-organization and co-evolution will transform other sciences as well. For 
example, Kauffman perceives the economy as a system “forever becoming, burgeoning with 
new ways of making a living, new ways of creating value and advantages of trade, while old 
ways go extinct … The economy, like the biosphere, is about persistent creativity” (229). Apart 
from drawing an analogy between economics and biology, Kauffman’s work also shows that 
economies are de facto parts of human and planetary evolution. 
Whereas Oyama and Haraway are, perhaps, earthly biologists in search of “a hardy, soiled 
kind of wisdom” (Haraway, “Sowing Worlds” 1), in the work of Margulis and Kauffman, the 
whole cosmos becomes a theater of life. Margulis’s son Dorion Sagan, whose father Carl Sagan 
happened to be a world famous astronomer and author of a bestselling alien contact novel, 
moves even further in this direction. In an essay entitled “The Pleasures of Change,” Sagan and 
physicist-biologist Eric Schneider argue that thermodynamics and the evolution of life are “part 
of a single process of cosmic change” (231).9 Transformation, for them, is what links human 
beings to the cosmos, and, from this observation, becomes an existential goal: “the pleasures 
and challenges of life, both personally and cosmically, are not in achieving some sort of final 
stasis, some steady-state heaven or nirvana of eternally solved problems, but in dealing with 
energy flow and the change it inevitably entails” (233). These intuitive visions, which resonate 
with Hiroko’s cosmic vision of spreading life in the Mars trilogy10, exemplify a key idea in nomad 
biology: life is a process of dissemination and creative becoming that science cannot control, 
but in which it participates nonetheless.
conclusion
This chapter has traced a myriad of overlaps and resonances between various nomadic scien-
tific practices, ideas, attitudes and desires in different genres. Whereas control science seeks 
to find rigid and reliable organization in life and to create new forms of life that respond to the 
wish for utility and predictability, nomad science confronts life in its a-personal and inorganic 
dimensions: life as becoming without origin or end. Open, explorative experimentation is the 
basic practice of nomad science, which is more concerned with tracing new problems and 
unforeseen possibilities than with a final truth. It asks: which are the complex problems that 
make a difference, that will enable us to see, understand and create life anew? Which connec-
tions between the disciplines are required by these complex problems? How many variables 
can be considered without falling prey to chaos? And how do these problems, variables and 
connections transform science and humanity itself? This relentless desire and exhaustive prac-
tice does not lead to some kind of synthesis: nomadic elements do not join in one coherent 
system, and nomad science will never be at peace with control science. At all times elements 
of nomad science can be incorporated into control science, but scientists can also escape the 
regime of control on lines of flight. 
The key observation about the novels analyzed in this thesis is that they all bring to life, in 
a narrative mode, a fundamental vision of nomad biology: the profusion, redundancy and un-
predictability of life. In none of them an ultimate merger of nomadism and control is brought 
about, or a utopian world in which humans are finally at peace with (which usually means: 
in control of) nature. Instead, they produce a plurality of forms and voices. But there are also 
divergences, the most salient ones existing between Bear’s DR, on the one side, and Robinson’s 
Mars and Butler’s LB on the other. On the one hand, Bear’s novel seems exceptionally clear in 
its depiction of an extensive series of nomadic practices, which encompass the protagonists’ 
whole existence, in contradistinction to the control science of the Task Force. On the other 
hand, this clear distinction may obscure the ambiguities of nomadism and control–the way 
one scientists can move from one position to the other–that the other novels portray so well. 
Secondly, Bear’s novel points to a Body without Organs–not our genome but the economy 
of transversal gene exchange through which the genome is always already “infected” –but 
he does not follow the past and future becomings of this state of “being infected” quite far 
enough. Bear’s focus is inwards: on the genome, on the human, and on the US. Questions about 
which changes in the environment, and what kinds of human relations to environments, may 
have triggered human transmutation, are hardly worked out. In this way, Bear’s work partially 
reterritorializes on human subjectivity and on the state: narrative tension inhere mostly in the 
fear of and desire for an “other” that is always already part of the self/nation. Instead, Mars and 
LB narrate continually evolving human-nonhuman relations, thus more thoroughly leveling 
criticisms at anthropocentrism and genocentrism.
Similar kinds of overlaps and divergences can be traced in the analyses of nomadic ideas 
in biology. Apart from the recurring reliance on notions of relationality, nonlinearity and other 
ideas, there is also a shared attraction to other modes of thought: each of the scientists dis-
plays tendencies toward philosophy and art. Notably, all insist on the importance of stories as 
meaning-making devices that can help to flesh out the relational, transformative, and cosmic 
dimensions of life. Haraway stresses the need for “richer, quirkier, fuller, unfitting, ongoing 
stories” where life is unfolded beyond the paradigm of human autonomy (“Sowing” 2). Simi-
larly, Oyama argues that “the organism’s ontogenetic story needs its developmentally relevant 
environment” (“Boundaries” 284). Nevertheless, the various elements and thinkers of nomad 
science do not cohere in any organized sense. Rather than forming a unified nonreduction-
ist camp, Oyama sees relations of friendship as well as discord between her Developmen-
tal Systems Theory and the works of Maturana and Varela, Kauffman, Goodwin, and others 
(“Friends”). Haraway has problems with systems thinking as such, arguing that it is too much 
dependent on discourses of control and autonomy.11 Then there are different levels of analysis, 
and different ways of connecting those levels. In her research Margulis is mostly focused on 
the cell as a unit of analysis, but also considers the connections between organisms and the 
planet as a whole; Oyama wants to promote analysis across scales, with a recurring preference 
for niche-construction; Haraway explores relations between human, animals and machines 
in messy “naturalcultural” situations; finally Kauffman takes biological systems thinking to a 
cosmic level, while also showing its relevance for the technosphere, the econosphere, and so 
on. Undoubtedly, there are many other lines intersecting with and diverging from the ones 
analyzed here, including the lines of nomad science studies–a subject to which I shall tend now.
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B R I N G I N G  S C I E N C E  T O  L I F E
Good stories reach into rich pasts to sustain thick presents to keep the story going for 
those who come after.
– Donna J. Haraway –
Gripping stories entail a migration, a risky adventure into another world. Writers of minor sf 
dwell in science at the risk of losing themselves in a forest of findings and hypotheses. It is only 
when they return from such voyages with a consistent set of ideas, or even just a single idea, 
that these writers are able to tell “good stories” in the sense that Haraway alludes to above: 
sustainable narratives that touch not only “our lives” at present but the lives of our ancestors 
and progeny, the lives of other species, and the lives of ecosystems and planets. Why are such 
stories relevant at all? Why should we care? If we follow Deleuze and Guattari, these skepti-
cal questions concern the birthright of literature as such. As Deleuze and Guattari maintain in 
What is Philosophy, doxa (opinion) reigns supreme in today’s media saturated society. Incessant 
acts of communication divert us from thinking, from connecting with the past and the fu-
ture. We need to engender a healthy “resistance to the present” (108). This is exactly what sf’s 
task, according Samuel Delany, amounts to: to produce “significant distortions of the present” 
(Starboard Wine 26). Resistance to the present means imagining things otherwise, seeing the 
strangeness and artificiality of life, looking into the face of a monster. Sf is able to achieve this in 
two important ways: it explores the actual limits and virtual potentials of science–its attitudes, 
desires, ideas, and practices–as well as of life in its biological, social, physical and abstract nature. 
 As this thesis shows, sf is able to produce rich stories about science–but also with science–sto-
ries that bring out the implicit desires of scientists for control and chaos. By construing narratives 
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on the basis of a novum or problem-event, the sf novels analyzed in this thesis map the dynamics 
of control and nomad science, while at the same time pushing the sciences to their limits, thus 
affirming their nomadic potentials without ever offering simple predictive extrapolations. Ex-
perimentally testing the limits of human understanding and sensation, these narratives manage 
to escape stereotypical feelings and opinions. Bringing science to life, in this respect, means two 
things: showing how science is a theater of dynamic and at times antagonistic forces, but also 
prompting science to escape reductionist axioms, to dare to encounter an untamed and even 
cruel, inhuman life whose excess perhaps only the writer and the artist are willing to submit to. 
 How successful are Bear, Butler and Robinson’s novels in thinking science and life together? 
The writers who are most versed in scientific discourse, Bear and Robinson, may seem to pro-
vide a more thorough grounding of the narrative in contemporary technoscience as well as a 
clearer image of what nomad science may amount to. However, I would argue that Butler’s 
trilogy produces the most intense account of human transmutation, and the most sophisti-
cated investigation of the ethical, biopolitical and epistemological ambiguities and tensions 
animating this event. Butler’s text is more on the side of thinking with science than thinking 
about science. All three authors invent what Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? call 
affects and percepts: compounds of sensation in which “we are not in the world, but become 
with the world” (169). Affects, or “nonhuman becomings of man” (169), occur in sf in the form 
of disrupting events in which characters intuit or sense life as a raw force opening up bodies 
to their insides and outsides, their potential for transformation. More than the other writers, 
Butler has been able to extend affect throughout the text, as if the problem-event is expressed 
in every thought and every action as a continuous vibration. Perhaps Robinson is least con-
cerned with creating affects, and more with creating “percepts,” or “nonhuman landscapes of 
nature” (169). These are not images of a pristine Mars before humans arrived, as desired by the 
ideologue of the Reds, Ann Clayborn. Rather they are images of Mars as becoming in which hu-
mans participate but which they cannot predict or dictate. The strongest percepts are those in 
which humans become-Mars through new ways of living, such as Nirgal’s playful, athletic ma-
neuverings during which he merges into the Martian landscape, becoming imperceptible. The 
trilogy as a whole can be seen as a percept in which Mars-as-becoming is sensed in the subtle, 
gradual changes of its landscape, as well as in bifurcation points such as the introductions of 
humans and microorganisms, or the moment when the atmosphere becomes breathable for 
humans and other animals.
Chapter 2 introduced the idea of “minor sf” as a literary form that thinks nonhuman, plane-
tary, and cosmic life with science, thus opening up space for the joint readings of science and sf in 
the case studies. Building on these reading experiences, we may now once again pose the ques-
tion raised in Chapter 2: What exactly is minor sf? And what exactly is the relationship between 
literature and science in sf from a Deleuzian perspective? I would argue that the three sf works 
analyzed here create affects and/or percepts of the scientific ideas of symbiogenesis, species 
encounter, and constructive interaction. They give a sensible form to these ideas through no-
vums, narratives, and other aspects. We may extend this idea to other minor sf novels to see if 
and how, from a Deleuzian perspective, such novels constitute a transmutation of literariness. 
This thesis can only be the beginning of such an expedition through the minor sf landscape. 
 Sf’s intersection with the sciences has been the key interest of this study. It has become 
clear that the sf writers whom I have studied do not wish to evoke an image of science as a 
supreme caretaker of truth. While the tales of transmutation under analysis all crucially involve 
biology, it is the developing connections between different elements–biological, technologi-
cal, social, physical, etc.–that make the metamorphosis into a “sustainable” narrative event in 
the sense evoked by Haraway above. Some of the characters (and perhaps also some readers) 
may be inclined to emphasize the biological origins of the metamorphosis or to determine 
its evolutionary purpose, but such understandings are problematized by the complexity and 
open-endedness of the narrative and the problem of life that informs it. Minor sf creates capri-
cious narratives that resist rigid emplotment by a center of control, whether scientific heroes 
or “genetic programs,” affirming a life of becoming, in which there is, in Oyama’s words, “no 
centralized repository of ‘information’,” rather only relations that are “part of the developmental 
story” (Evolution’s Eye 118). In minor sf, biology becomes a trigger for transformations affecting 
all the dimensions of existence, from the social to the cosmic, thus creating a literature that is 
no longer “about” any particular aspect of (human) life. Here humanity’s future is not a matter 
of controlled design or engineering, but of participation in evolutionary assemblages.
Minor bio-sf novels can be placed in the wider context of contemporary artistic engage-
ments with biology, biotechnology and ecological crises in film, gaming, and bioart. Minor 
artistic engagements with biotechnoscience are able to bridge the social and the biological 
realms without reducing one to the other. As such, they are deeply involved in an epistemolog-
ical movement within the bio(medical)sciences in which, as Fausto-Sterling argues, the social 
and biological become intertwined:
We need to develop the habit of thinking about genes as part of gene-environment systems, 
operating within networks that produce new physiologies in response to social conditions. 
In this view, bodies are not static slaves to their biology. Rather, it is our biological nature 
to generate physiological responses to our environment and experience. We use genes to 
produce such responses. This understanding of the relationship between the social and 
the biological gives us new epistemological set points that would drive us to seek social 
solutions to health disparities, using technology as an aid but not as the motor. (31)
As due to developments such as epigenetics the social environment is increasingly being re-
garded as a key factor in determining our biological constitution, all social developments and 
reforms potentially attain evolutionary significance. From this perspective, one can understand 
why biologist Fritjof Capra, in his pioneering study The Turning Point: Science, Society and the Ris-
ing Culture (1982), contends that feminism as a social movement “will have a profound effect 
on our further evolution” (11), a speculative argument that resonates strongly with the novels 
analyzed in this thesis. Female scientists, artists, writers and philosophers are teaching us how 
to think and live differently. Sociality is epigenetic, involving feedback between genomes and 
internal as well as external environments, a process in the course of which both bodies and en-
vironments are reconfigured. Although the radical transformations narrated in bio-sf are high-
ly speculative, they do serve as potent demonstrations that the social and cultural phenomena 
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studied by scholars in the social science and the humanities are, in fact, much more closely 
connected to the objects of the natural sciences than most academics tend to acknowledge. 
They also provocatively suggest that, from an epigenetic perspective, all politics is biopolitics.
This brings us to the question of how both (minor) sf and (minor) sf studies can become in-
volved in science studies and even take science studies into new directions. I see two obvi-
ous ways in which this can transpire. First, minor bio-sf can bring science studies to life, as it 
were, by presenting radical examples of thinking with science. Artists and writers are especially 
well-disposed to accomplish this, because they are not bound by disciplinary rules in the way 
academics are. Science studies itself becomes nomadic, I would argue, when it stops thinking 
exclusively “about” science as its disciplinary object, and starts thinking with other sciences 
about common problems and developments. This is exactly what Caspar Bruun Jensen implies 
when he proposes to define science studies in a Deleuzo-Guattarian vein as “a following sci-
ence dedicated to following science” (“Anthropology” 1). When we follow science, whether in 
the field or in discourse, we become implicated in the questions that science asks, just like a 
writer like Robinson writes himself into discussions about terraformation and sustainability. 
Life can no longer be stratified into the social (science studies) and the natural (science), but 
becomes a shared space between academic disciplines as well as the arts, a crossroads of “non-
metaphorical transport” (Mackenzie 50) where one element becomes the milieu of another. 
Of course this does not mean that science studies asks the same questions or applies the same 
methodologies as other fields. What it means is that there is an overlap, a moment of coinci-
dence or linkage. 
In this cooperative endeavor of science studies, is it still possible to be critical? As Latour 
formulates it, science studies needs a rather specific notion of critique: “The critic is not the 
one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from 
under the feet of naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to 
gather” (“Why” 246). Critique thus stops being external and becomes participatory, construc-
tive. This practice of assembling is political, epistemological and ontological, for it means think-
ing, and otherwise creating, the conditions for new worlds. The creation of spaces is intrinsi-
cally a matter of architecture, design, art, and activism: to transform the way things are made 
and done. In this temporalized understanding of space, according to Tim Ingold, scientists can 
come to inhabit the world rather than occupy it: “A world that is occupied, I argue, is furnished 
with already-existing things. But one that is inhabited is woven from the strands of their con-
tinual coming-into-being” (Ingold 1797). The critical task of science studies thus comes down 
to being responsive to environments, to “inhabit” a transdisciplinary milieu rather than survey 
it from outside or from above.
However, being critical in this different sense does not imply a harmonious, efficient coop-
eration. A second aspect that needs to be emphasized is the need for science studies to “slow 
the problem down” (Stengers, Cosmopolitics II 361), to problematize, in ways that run counter to 
the interests of control science. In seeking to slow science down, science studies can benefit 
from engagements with philosophy and art. For example, bio-sf novels may problematize mo-
lecular biology’s relation to life, opening it up to ever other factors and unexpected becomings. 
Art and philosophy provide meandering, nomadic “detours” that slow down science’s descent 
toward the actual, tempting it to stay with the virtual chaos for as long as possible. I am hesi-
tant to argue, as some scholars do, that these interferences will lead to a kind of transmuta-
tion of thought in the near future, reconciling the sciences and the humanities, the East and 
the West, the masculine and the feminine (Capra, The Tao; Goodwin, Nature’s Due). In any case, 
such a utopian prospect cannot be simply deduced from the nomadic tendencies discussed in 
this thesis.
A third and final element of nomadic science studies enriched with aesthetic ingredients 
is dramatization: bringing science to life through narratives, scenes, and songs. This is in fact 
what the popular science texts analyzed in this thesis do when they unfold the adventure 
that is science, mixing the scientific, the personal, and the imagination. But at the same time 
that science becomes a drama, life itself also becomes dramatic. The famous ethologist Von 
Uexküll saw the biosphere as a symphony. Genomics pioneer Susumu Ohno suggested that 
life is a music drama and that DNA is more aptly understood as a musical score, performable in 
multiple ways, than as a “blue print” (Zwart, De filosofie). Recently, Zwart, following thinkers as 
distant as Pythagoras, Hildegard Von Bingen, and Schopenhauer, has proposed that the whole 
universe is music (De filosofie 335). The world is not a mere passive background for human ac-
tion and representation, but rather is itself creative expression, perception, and desire. This 
idea of epistemological and ontological dramatization enters science studies, for example in 
Stengers’s depiction of embryology as “field science”:
The field in this case is the amazing “causal choreography” associated with processes of 
development that had been characterized by both finalists and neo-Darwinists as directed 
by a cause (the final cause or the program). The characterization of the continuously 
self-redefining developmental entanglement mobilizes all the words we have to describe 
encounters that affect the very fate of the encountering terms. From infection or 
mobilization to hijacking, seduction or reciprocal induction, the common feature of these 
narratives is that any simple relation between “cause” and “effect” is lost without regret. 
(Cosmopolitics II 231)
The embryo’s continuous movements are not “effects,” but an emergent staging without a fixed 
script. Although, as Deleuze maintains, the embryo is a hero of sorts, since he “lives the un-
livable,” (Difference 267), this is a heroism devoid of any notion of autonomous subjectivity. 
It concerns a “larval subject” (267), an assemblage of potentialities that does not correspond 
to the notion of an organism or species. It is on the level of interacting particles, bodies and 
environments that the drama of life really unfolds. In the light of this “causal choreography,” 
Shakespeare’s famous line “All the world’s a stage” attains a new meaning, pointing towards 
an eco-aesthetics of existence, where humans perform or play together with others–notably 
with other species–as inhabitants of a plethora of merging habitats. 
As a child I loved a specific exercise at school in which the pupil was offered a brief written 
sketch of a more-or-less problematic social situation, and was asked to “finish the story.” The 
point, of course, is that one does not need to be faithful to the obvious pedagogical intentions 
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of those who designed the exercise, and may suddenly shift to a wholly different situation (“in 
the meanwhile, on Antarctica, Richard was …”) or introduce new elements (“unfortunately, 
he had not seen the giant rooster …”). Creative writing multiplies possibilities that make it 
impossible to bring the story to a closure except by a blunt, arbitrary stop. It opens new worlds 
and ways of living. As a child I experienced that the joy of writing lies in this excess, although I 
was incapable of giving consistency to it. With the waning of the grand narratives of the West, 
we are in desperate need of Harawayan “good stories” that lack beginning or end, intuiting our 
worlding and becoming-with other species, which are at the same time Deleuzian stories that 
express becomings exceeding the human form. Perhaps one of science studies’s important 
tasks is to weave itself into stories of science and life. Become woman, become child, become animal, 
become molecular–such is the alchemical formula whose echoes bring science to life.
154 — a new people and a new earth
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notes chaPter 1
1 For an analysis of the human-induced migrations of plants, see Laura Marks.
2  I use the denomination “science studies” as a shorthand to cover a rather wide area that 
includes science and technology studies (STS), social studies of science (SSS), philosophy 
of science, anthropology of science, cultural studies of science, science and literature, and 
related fields. In lumping all of these fields together, I do not wish to deny the genealogical 
differences between them.
3  The predominantly US-based academic field of literature and science, which has existed as 
a subdiscipline of literary studies since the 1920s but only really came to fruition as a field in 
its own right in the mid-1980s, studies the manifold entanglements between science and 
literature as well as the arts. Rather than being solely or primarily a field for literary scholars, 
its practitioners come from fields including science studies, STS, philosophy, gender studies, 
anthropology, art history, as well as the medical and natural sciences. Scholars of litera-
ture and science are organized in the US-based Society for Literature, Science and the Arts 
(SLSA). In 2008, a European branch of the SLSA was launched.
4  Deleuze’s philosophy was greatly expanded in his joint work with Guattari, with whom he 
wrote four books: Anti-Oedipus (1973); Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975); A Thousand Pla-
teaus (1980); and What is Philosophy? (1993). Nevertheless, throughout this thesis I will refer 
to Deleuze alone, unless citing one of the joint works.
5  Robinson has won a number of prestigious sf awards, including the Nebula award and the 
British Science Fiction Award for Red Mars, Hugo and Locus awards for Green Mars and Blue 
Mars, and a Locus award for his alternative history novel Years of Rice and Salt (2003).
6  Noosphere is generally used to refer to the sphere of human thought. It was probably 
coined by the mathematician-philosopher Édourd Le Roy and developed by his colleagues 
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the Soviet geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky and the French philosopher Teilhard de Chardin 
in the 1920s.
7  While the prospect of living on other planets may seem fantastic, the reality is that terra-
formation is a scientific concept thoroughly developed by NASA in the 1970s. Moreover, in 
2012, the Dutch entrepreneur Bas Lansdorp announced a manned mission to Mars to take 
place in 2023, in which all participants are expected to permanently stay on Mars, with new 
participants joining them every two years. The project is supported by a host of expert advi-
sors from science and industry. 
 For information on the Mars One mission see http://mars-one.com/en/
8  The term “anthroposcene” denotes the era in which man becomes are major determinant 
for planetary systems such as weather systems, climate and ecosystems. The term was 
coined by biologist Eugene Stoermer in the 1980s, only to be developed in the 2000s by 
Dutch chemist and Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen. 
9  Margulis and Sagan’s statement that evolution is “everybody’s story” is backed by evolution-
ary psychologist Susan Oyama, who suggests that the vision of evolutionary existence is not 
just scientific, but a new “origin myth” for humanity in an era of globalization, “a narrative 
that characterizes the present as it names the past” (Evolution’s Eye 171).
10  Eva Neumann-Held and Christoph Rehmann-Sutter define the molecular paradigm as “the 
study of developmental processes through the analysis and manipulation of molecular in-
teractions at the level of gene regulation” (3). See their wonderful edited volume Genes in 
Development: Re-Reading the Molecular Paradigm (2006).
11  For example, the archetype of the explosion in chemistry is also a radical process of trans-
formation. I would argue that often the archetype is a concrete image that stands in for an 
otherwise unimaginable event of transformation, for example the image of the monster 
in biology reminding us of life’s mutability. This is illustrated by Zwart’s observation about 
two images of “Hiroshima” engraved in the cultural imaginary, which represent the im-
perceptible event of the explosion either through its trigger or cause (the atom bomb) or, 
more commonly, its “result” (the mushroom cloud). The transformation as such appears 
unimaginable.
12 For a comparison between Western and Chinese thought about transformation, see Jullien.
13  Deleuze and Guattari seem to borrow the term fabulation from Bergson’s Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, where Bergson argues that fabulation is an ancient faculty at the root 
of art and other forms of creativity. For a useful elaboration of Bergson’s idea of fabulation 
in the context of film, see Mullarkey.
14  As Paul Patton has argued, Deleuzian philosophy is utopian in the sense that it seeks the 
virtual conditions, the immanence, behind actualized states of affairs in history and in the 
present (112-3).
15  A key example of collaboration in science studies is the methodology of “midstream modu-
lation,” where social scientists test ethical, social and other issues in the midst of scientific 
research (for example, in the laboratory) with the intent of incorporating of those issues 
in the daily practices of scientists and fostering mutual learning-experiences (Fisher, Ma-
hajan and Mitcham). I would argue that a similar kind of boundary-blurring approach can 
be found in philosophical science studies. I am thinking particularly of analyses that mix 
scientific, philosophical and literary ideas, for example in the work of Isabelle Stengers and 
Donna Haraway. Before coming to science studies, Haraway earned her PhD in Biology and 
Stengers in Chemistry. In my view, these scholars are particularly well-equipped to address 
complex problems that demand insights from multiple disciplines.
16  The tendency in contemporary science discourse to replace “biology” with “life sciences” 
is telling. In the 1950s biology becomes a molecular science that gathers all the sciences 
(not only biology and its various sub-branches, but also physics, mathematics, informatics, 
chemistry and so on) around “life” as the key object (the object of objects, as it were). As is 
indicated by the omnipresence of the prefix bio-, virtually all the sciences become oriented 
towards understanding, controlling and enhancing life, from the molecular up to the cos-
mic scale (exobiology). While the idea of “life sciences” suggests interdisciplinarity, it also 
binds all these sciences to a particular, genetic understanding of life. If life, as biologists like 
Stuart Kauffman maintain, is something irreducible, more akin to notions such as “world” or 
“cosmos” than with particular field of knowledge, then the term “life sciences” makes little 
sense. I shall therefore use only the terms biology and bioscience. 
17  Compared to previous developments in biology such as the biotech revolution, genomics is 
extraordinary in that it has an auxiliary discourse attached to it in the form of ELSA genom-
ics (ethical, legal and social aspects of genomics). ELSA research explores the knowledges, 
technologies and practices of genomics and their societal repercussions. The same is being 
done in fields like science and technology studies, the social studies of science, the cultural 
studies of science, literature and science, and the medical humanities. Scholars from these 
various fields not only critically analyze how genomic knowledge, data and technology 
function in particular contexts, but also evaluate the tenability and desirability of certain 
ambitions in genomics.
18  Indeed there are a few exceptions to the rule: the so-called monogenetic diseases (such as 
Huntington’s disease and cystic fibrosis).
19  As Alison Pilnick explains, determinism can be attractive for scientists and policy makers 
alike, because it “offers a way of viewing social problems as discrete and controllable, arising 
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as a result of problematic individuals, rather than more widespread societal problems” (36). 
In the same vein, evolutionary psychologist Susan Oyama discerns a hope in biology, shared 
by the wider public, that “an immutable natural ‘core’ will stabilize an increasingly relativis-
tic and uncertain world” (Evolution’s Eye 23). 
20  This thesis uses MLA style in-text referencing, which does not include the year of publica-
tion. However, when the title of an article or book is mentioned in the text, this title is fol-
lowed by the original year of publication (which need not coincide with the version listed in 
the list of references).
21  Barad describes intra-actions as “causal (but nondeterministic) enactments through which 
matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is sedimented out and enfolded in further material-
izations,” stressing that the environment should never be posited as mere background, be-
cause “‘environments’ and ‘bodies’ are intra-actively constituted” (170).
22  Cary Wolfe, who coined the term Posthumanities and is the editor of a book series under that 
name (published by Minnesota University Press), argues that “the blunt theoretical instru-
ment of humanism, which divides the world of the living along the axis of ‘the human’ and ev-
erything else, actively prevents our understanding, for instance, that humans and the great 
apes have far more in common with each other than apes do with most other ‘animals,’ or that 
a blind person and a guide dog form a third, prosthetic kind of subjectivity whose experience 
of the world cannot well be explained by reference to the traditional hierarchy of human vs. 
animal, which belies the complex forms of communication, trust, and mutual dependence 
entailed in such a hybrid relationship” (page) As I see it, a major consequence of Wolfe’s vi-
sion of the Posthumanities is that the queries of genomics and synthetic biology cannot me 
bracketed as mere objects of cultural or social analysis; rather, scholars need to think with 
new understanding and technologies from the New Biology. Moreover, in opening up to the 
natural sciences, Humanities scholars ought to consider the possibility of confronting life as 
something that exceeds the provinces of discourse, history, culture, and human subjectivity. 
23  Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz have coined the name Biohumanities for a field of study 
aimed at four goals, “deepening our understanding of biology itself, engaging in construc-
tive science criticism, creating alternative visions of biology, and achieving critical science 
communication” (44). Analyses of literary texts can contribute to these goals in a way that is 
complementary to work done in the philosophy and history of biology. Sf texts in particular 
offer fictional ethnographies of science (scientists’ dynamic relations to each other, insti-
tutions, procedures, etc.), meeting Griffiths and Stotz’s aim of communicating to a wider 
audience “something of the complexity of the scientific process and the contestability of its 
findings” (38). They also think along with science, exploring various ways of doing biology.
24  In The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, science studies scholar Annemarie Mol ana-
lyzes her experiences as an ethnographer in a Dutch hospital following doctors, patients and 
researchers Her story about atherosclerosis is “not about social causes and consequences 
of the disease, nor about the way patients, doctors, and whoever else involved perceives 
it. But about atherosclerosis itself. What it is” (53). Mol argues that science studies should 
quit focusing on multiple epistemological and social perspectives and become involved with 
ontology: how reality is enacted. In deemphasizing epistemology, Mol emphasizes that “the 
question of what it ‘is’ does not infer some transcendent truth, but a relational, situated, lo-
cal, enacted reality” (54-5). The point of Mol’s argument is to demonstrate “the permanent 
possibility of alternative configurations” (164): the disease is enacted through various prac-
tices, which can and do change.
25  Scholars of science and technology like Caspar Bruun Jensen, Andrew Pickering, Isabelle 
Stengers and Eugene Thacker all draw heavily from Deleuze and Guattari’s work. One of 
the founders of STS, Bruno Latour, argues that his theory of actor-networks, assemblages 
of human and nonhuman actors, could have been named “actant-rhizome ontology,” be-
cause it instantiates Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the often invisible connections between 
assemblages (“Technology”). Recently, the relevance of Deleuze’s work for science studies 
has been brought to academic attention more explicitly in a number of volumes on science 
and technology: Deleuze and science (edited by Marks); Deleuze and New Technology (edited 
by Poster and Savat); and Deleuzian Intersections: Science, Technology, Anthropology (edited 
by Bruun Jensen and Rödje). Studies relating Deleuze’s work to contemporary biology and 
biotechnology include Ansell-Pearson’s Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Gilles 
Deleuze (1999); John Marks’s Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity (1998); Luciana Parisi’s Abstract 
Life: Philosophy, Bio-Technology and the Mutations of Desire (2004); Eugene Thacker’s Biomedia 
(2004); and the volume Deleuze/Guattari and Ecology (2009) edited by Bernd Herzogenrath. 
26  Patricia Ticineto Clough perceives the problem of thinking technologies and futures as fol-
lows: “What technology is unfolding thought anew? Or in what technology are thought and 
its subjects, objects and processes presently enfolded? Such an approach would shift criti-
cism from the ongoing attempts to limit technology, to control it, or anticipate the future 
that technology is purported to bring with it. Instead criticism would precipitate the future, 
setting off mutation in the complexity which technology is giving up to thought” (312). In 
Deleuzian terms, this means becoming implicated in a becoming, and allowing thought to 
transform in the process.
27  Contemporary authors of biologically inflected sf include Greg Bear, Paolo Bacigalupi, An-
drea Barrett, Octavia Butler, Michael Crichton, Paul Di Filippo, Gwyneth Jones, Nancy Kress, 
Marge Piercy, Richard Powers, Kim Stanley Robinson, Joan Slonczewski, Bruce Sterling, and 
Karen Traviss. Although Jameson’s assessment about the rise of bio-sf seems pertinent in 
the period from the late ‘70s until the late ‘90s, I have doubts whether this trend is still 
ongoing today. It seems more likely that the biological is being inserted as an element in 
the new space opera (especially in Britain) and new mixtures of sf and fantasy (for example 
China Miéville’s work).
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28  Sf novels and other literary texts are increasingly becoming the object of literary analyses 
that emphasize nonhuman forces and actors. See for example Stacy Alaimo’s Bodily Natures: 
Science, Environment and the Material Self (2010); Wai Chee Dimock’s Through Other Continents: 
American Literature Across Deep Time (2006); and Mark McGurl’s article “The Posthuman 
Comedy” (2012) in the journal Critical Inquiry.
29  The qualification of the “world wide lab” as performative can be extrapolated to any lab sit-
uation if we follow Barad’s “posthumanist performativity” in Meeting the Universe Halfway 
(2007), but also on the critique of representationalism in Bruno Latour’s Science in Action 
(1987), and Andrew Pickering’s The Mangle of Practice (1995). From the perspective of these 
theorists, the lab is never merely a place for representing or simulating reality, but rather a 
transformation of the world, actually or virtually (in terms of what can be done, perceived, 
understood, or what can happen).
30  Examples of analyses of sf by scholars in science studies and allied fields include Donna 
Haraway’s Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), Colin Milburn’s Na-
novision: Engineering the Future (2008), Susan Squier’s Liminal Lives: Imagining the Human at the 
Frontiers of Biomedicine (2004), Priscilla Wald’s Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak 
Narrative (2008), and Hub Zwart’s De waarheid op de wand: Psychoanalyse van het weten (2010).
31 For a sophisticated discussion of the sf genre and its limits see Freedman.
32 In Hindu religion Sheva is the Godess presiding over life and death. 
notes chaPter 2
1  I use the term “biophysical” to refer to the continuum of biological and physical phenomena 
(including chemical processes), and should not be confused with the scientific field of bio-
physics, which uses methodologies and ideas from physics to study biological systems.
2  In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari refer to the work of Asimov in relation to the 
becomings explored in sf, but refrain from reference to a specific work or from further ex-
planation.
3  The connection between science studies and sf studies is a relatively recent and underde-
veloped one. See Bould, Science Fiction (2012); Luckhurst, The Invention of Telepathy, 1870-1901 
(2002) and “Pseudoscience” (2009); Bould and Vint, “Learning from the Little Engines That 
Couldn’t: Transported by Gernsback, Wells, and Latour” (2006); and Vint, “Science Studies” 
(2009), and “Archaeologies of the Amodern” (2012).
4  The novel Blood Music was based on a short story by the same title published in the sf journal 
Analog in (1983), for which Bear won Hugo and Nebula awards in the category “best novelette.” 
5  Ernst Bloch develops the concept of the novum, an unanticipated event or idea that enables 
the imagination of a new future, in The Principle of Hope. In his landmark study Metamorpho-
ses of Science Fiction (1979), Darko Suvin argues that good sf novels essential work by intro-
ducing such a novum–a technology, a disease, an extraterrestrial life form–which functions 
as a device that sets the narrative in motion. This novum is not something static, but some-
thing productive: it performs something new. The mere presence of extraterrestrials, for 
example, is not sufficient; these beings have to make a difference in the succession of events, 
for example through (bio)technologies that reconfigure human bodies and social relations.
6  Moore’s Utopia imagines an island on which new and more perfect society has come to 
fruition, while in Island of Dr. Moreau, a medical professor who has been expelled from his 
scientific community seeks refuge on a deserted island to continue his controversial work, 
creating a hybrid of human-animals, an experiment that ends up in a massacre.
7  Here Jameson is especially indebted to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, where Adorno insists on 
the preeminence of literary form and artistic autonomy.
8  The problem of realism or cognitivism in sf has been discussed widely. Recently, Carl Freed-
man has argued that sf does not produce stories that are inherently “cognitive” (logical, 
plausible), for this would imply that there is a way to assess such a qualification objectively, 
which is impossible, for what counts as “true” in science is up for debate and subject to 
changes in time. Instead, Freedman argues, we can observe in sf a “cognition effect” which 
is not explained through external judgment but through “the attitude of the text itself to 
the kind of estrangements being performed (18). However, I agree with China Miéville that 
even in this conception, the pretention of “scientific accuracy … sneaks in through the back 
door” (236). The whole idea of cognitivism, which seems to boil down to some appeal to mi-
mesis, should be left behind in order to do justice to the power of experimentation, whose 
merits should not be sought not in logic, correspondence, or plausibility, but in text-imma-
nent consistency.
9  For Jameson, all libidinal energy that goes into artistic and intellectual work must flow in 
the direction of class struggle; there is no viable alternative. When other interests take hold 
of this shallow reserve of the utopian imagination, for example in the name of feminism or 
racial politics, Jameson suggests that this only amounts to one other ideological trap. He 
argues that, unfortunately, under postmodernity (or “late capitalism”) the possibility of class 
consciousness has been lost. Referring to feminist literary and philosophical utopian writ-
ings in the US in the 1970s, Jameson comments that “the gender turn of the Utopian imagi-
nation is the sign of a waning of the Utopian imagination in the post-Cold-War period, in 
which the socialist model seems to have been discredited by Stalinism and the excesses and 
dysfunctionality of the newer global capitalist system have not yet begun fully to appear” 
(140). In spite of Jameson’s ongoing interest in feminist sf authors like Ursula Le Guin, such 
a position amounts to an imposition of his Marxist framework on politics as such (Stengers, 
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Cosmopolitics II 408). Furthermore, Jameson’s bleak image of postmodernism, which he ar-
gues has brought about a loss of coherent subjectivity, denies the fact that the de/reter-
ritorialization of cultures and economics systems also yields possibilities for new forms of 
identity and belonging (Sandoval 34-5).
10  The modulation of language is not exclusive to literature. As Deleuze and Guattari note, 
he same type of linguistic experimentation can be found in the elaboration of accents and 
slang by African-Americans (Kafka 17). An even better example, perhaps, is the profusion of 
“Spanglish” (a hybrid of English and Spanish) in the US.
11  A common form of experimentation with language in sf is neologisms describing new place, 
beings, and artifacts. There are also sf novels that explore the very concept of language, but 
they are scarce. Carl Malmgren mentions Samuel Delany’s Babel-17 (1966), Jack Vance’s The 
Languages of Pao (1958), and Ian Watson’s The Embedding (1973) as examples of sf that “deal 
with the invention of languages with the power to transform social reality” (78). Fredric 
Jameson singles out Philip K. Dick’s work as a site of experimentation with language itself 
(Archaeologies 363-383). A more radical statement comes from Samuel Delany, who has ar-
gued that the genre of sf as such invites different “reading protocols”: the meaning of an ordi-
nary sentence can change significantly when it is transposed from a mainstream literary text 
to an sf text (“Dichtung”). For Delany, what is unique about sf is “the occurrence of unusual, if 
not downright opaque, signifiers” on the level of single terms, sentences and plots (“To Read” 
256). I am hesitant to assert that any of these examples correspond to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
idea of the deterritorialization of language. In reference to Kafka’s work, Deleuze argues that 
“the creation of words or neologisms is worth nothing apart from the effects of syntax in 
which they are developed” (Critique 5). Delany’s more bold statement about the genre of sf as 
an “inmixing” (“To Read” 259) of unexpected signifiers seems to me a problematic identifica-
tion of Derrida’s différance with the genre of sf as such. As I argue in this chapter, what sets 
sf apart is an introduction of scientific ideas, practices, desires, and attitudes in literature. 
12  Émile Zola’s notion of the “literary experiment” supposes a kind of rapprochement between 
literature and science. Writing in the 1880s, Zola compared literature with bioscience 
(notably the work of the French physiologist Claude Bernard), stating that “naturalistic” 
novels aim to test and build upon scientific views under various conditions.
13  Deleuze and Guattari want to circumvent the trap they see in dominant critical paradigms 
such as psychoanalysis and Marxism, where too often reading becomes the mere reification 
of one’s own theory at the expense of the unique properties of a literary text (a point that 
has been usefully elaborated by Colebrook and Lambert). They denounce all forms of inter-
pretation, the method that aims to extract meaning from literary texts. For Deleuze and 
Guatari, the interpreter is a statist thinker, a “priest” or a “bureaucrat,” who blocks the flow 
of thought (A Thousand, 126). In place of interpretation they present a pragmatic approach 
based on analyzing the way a text functions: not what it signifies, but what it does and how 
it can be put to use. While many scholars read Kafka with a preset arrangement of “con-
tents” in mind whose occurrence they will recognize instantaneously in the text (the chal-
lenge is always to get to the “hidden” contents: this or that pathology, fetish, or archetype), 
Deleuze and Guattari attempt to follow Kafka’s experiments “freed from his interpreters” 
(Bensmaïa, xxi) and to distill philosophical concepts from this reading exercise. The notion 
of minor literature is in fact one of these concepts: first coined as an off-hand idea in Kafka’s 
diaries, Deleuze and Guattari have made it into a full concept intuiting what literature can 
do, substantiating their theory on the basis of Kafka’s oeuvre. 
14  My Deleuzian approach to sf relies on science, but not, as in Jameson’s work, as a source of “cog-
nitive” authority. In a similar vein, speculative fiction writer China Miéville has argued against 
the Jamesonian “cognitivism” and the concomitant skepticism about the genre of fantasy. Ac-
cording to Miéville, sf writers should be devoted to “the development of a radical, aesthetically 
estranging and narratologically rigorous literature of literalized metaphor and alterity” (244). 
15  The concept of historical a priori was coined by Husserl in his essay “Origins of Geometry” 
as a phenomenological alternative to Kant’s transcendental a priori. Foucault, in chapter 5 
of The Archaeology of Knowledge, changed the meaning of the concept in order to emanci-
pate his archaeological method from phenomenology, which for him relied to much on the 
notion of the subject. For a comparison between Foucault’s understanding of “historical a 
priori” and Husserl’s initial usage of the term, see Oksala 67-9.
16  Baudrillard argues: “The point when prostheses are introduced at a deeper level, when they 
are so completely internalized that the infiltrate the anonymous and the micro molecular 
core of the body, when they impose themselves on the body itself as the body’s ‘original’ 
model, burning out all subsequent symbolic circuits in such a way that every body is now 
nothing but an invariant reproduction of the prosthesis: this point means the end of the 
body, the end of its history, the end of its vicissitudes. It means that the individual is now 
nothing but a cancerous metastasis of his basic formula” (119).
17  Delanda has argued that it is not the genome, but “the more or less free flow of genes 
through microorganisms” that constitutes a Body without Organs (“The Geology” 11).
18  Hansen argues that although Deleuze and Guattari’s biophilosophy has a lot in common 
with contemporary approaches to organic complexity in fields like systems biology and De-
velopmental Systems Theory, there is a fundamental mismatch between their philosophical 
ideas and the workings of biological systems. Hansen’s critique hinges on two points. Firstly, 
Deleuze and Guattari portray higher levels of organization such as biological organism as 
“an exclusively negative limitation of life, one that does not express so much as restrict its 
expression” (35), focusing instead on populations and the relations between populations as 
the site of development. Secondly, according to Hansen, Deleuze and Guattari see transver-
sal (horizontal) molecular processes–which they call involution– as the exclusive domain 
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where novel traits are produced, rejecting the theory of evolution by natural selection. Han-
sen argues that Deleuze and Guattari ignore the irreversibility of developmental processes 
(path dependency). He accuses them of “confusing the flexibility attributable to organisms 
on an evolutionary timescale with the far more narrow flexibility characteristic of devel-
opmental processes” (58). I feel that Hansen exaggerates his point, which is in contradic-
tion with his own convincing comparative analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s biophilosophy 
and contemporary biosciences. Although Deleuze and Guattari admittedly go too far in 
denouncing the organism in favor of experiment and becoming, throughout Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus they are at pains to stress that there are limits to experimentation 
and to what a body can do. As I see it, Deleuze and Guattari’s aim is to “reverse” evolution-
ary theory, arguing that variation on the level of transversal communication (gene transfer 
through viruses and other vectors) is primary, rather than a secondary phenomenon, an 
insight that has been given scientific form in the work of biologist Lynn Margulis. The co-
nundrum of how flexible organisms really are has partly to do with epigenetic factors which 
the biosciences are only beginning to come to grips with.
19  Hayles, building on Hansens critique, argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s body without or-
gans has a “lack of internal structure” (153), and thus cannot do justice to highly patterned 
developmental processes which are always constrained by environments. She goes on to 
argue that the mistake Deleuze and Guattari make is to take on biological terms as meta-
phors and then claim to use them literally. Like Hansen, Hayles seems to take Deleuze and 
Guattari’s statements about going beyond the organism at face value, disregarding the fact 
that they also stress the limits to and dangers of such experimentation. However, the great-
est problem I have with Hayles’s critique is that it fails to take into account Deleuze and 
Guattari’s distinction between science and philosophy. When Deleuze and Guattari state 
that they are using terms literally, this does not mean that they use them in a mimetic way 
or as a proposition, as in science (see What is Philosophy). 
20  See in particular chapter 6 of A Thousand Plateaus, “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make 
Yourself a Body without Organs?”
21  For an interesting elaboration of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the molecular and its 
connection to contemporary modeling of swarm behavior, see Eugene Thacker’s “Swarm-
ing: Number versus Animal?”
22  Deleuze and Guattari analyze Kafka’s The Trial as an effort to dismantle the Law: to reveal, 
in a Foucaultian way, the machinery of power. What from a distance looks like a solid ma-
chine for making judgments, on closer look is a complex and amorphous assemblage of 
individuals, groups, institutions, rules, customs, and so on. Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
in The Trial, the goal of authorities is not to pass judgment once and for all, but precisely to 
suspend judgment and to wallow endlessly in desire for truth and justice. Power is revealed 
as an immanent field of desire: not the desires of human subjects but the “polyvocal” desire 
of bodies and of the assemblages humans are part of (49). For this idea of polyvolcality in 
literature Deleuze and Guattari seem indebted to Michael Bakhtin who coined the term in 
The Dialogic Imagination. 
notes chaPter 3
1  Pickering’s assessment that State science includes “classically modern sciences like physics 
and sociology” (“Cybernetics” 155) seems to me problematic; I would rather argue that all 
science is dominated by the State science model, and that nomad science is everywhere 
present as potential (perhaps some fields have historically developed to be more hospitable 
to nomad thought than others).
2  According to Deleuze and Guattari, the state is a form of “interiority” or capture, while the 
war machine is a form of “exteriority” or freedom: “The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty 
only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally. Not only is there 
no universal State, but the outside of states cannot be reduced to “foreign policy,” that is, to 
a set of relations among States. The outside appears simultaneously in two directions: huge 
worldwide machines branched out over the entire ecumenon at a given moment, which 
enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the states (for example, commercial or-
ganization of the “multinational” type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations 
like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic margins or messianic movements, etc.); but also 
the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to rights of segmentary 
societies in opposition to the organs of State power” (397).
3  Besides these examples, Deleuze and Guattari do not go much further in explicating the 
concepts of State and nomad science than simple enumeration: “Democritus, Menaech-
mus, Archimedes, Vauban, Desargues, Bernoulli, Monge, Carnot, Poncelet, Perronet, etc.: 
in each case a monograph would be necessary to take into account the special situation 
of these savants whom State science used only after restraining or disciplining them, after 
repressing their social or political conceptions” (A Thousand 401).
4  Jackie Leach Scully has even argued that “the deterministic program model of gene action is 
currently the only one available for popular discourse on human nature” (354).
5  In each institution, Deleuze discerns processes of deterritorialization: “In the prison system: 
the attempt to find penalties of ‘substitution,’ at least for petty crimes, and the use of elec-
tronic collars that force the convicted person to stay at home during certain hours. For 
the school system: continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual 
training, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduction of the 
“corporation” at all levels of schooling. For the hospital system: the new medicine ‘without 
doctor or patient’ that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk, which in no 
way attests to individuation–as they say–but substitutes for the individual or numerical 
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body the code of a ‘dividual’ material to be controlled” (“Postscript” 4). Deleuze here adopts 
a polemical style and a mode of future telling almost unique in his oeuvre. In spite of its 
speculative features, scholars have found this text useful in trying to fathom the directions 
in which biopower is heading.
6  As the work of environmental philosopher Sanne van der Hout shows, it remains to be seen 
what the research fields of metagenomics and ecogenomics do to address environmental 
complexity and whether they lead to more sustainable ways of coping with nature.
7  In one of his experiments, Venter water marked a “synthetic cell” with several sentences 
transcoded into the four-digit code of DNA, one of which was a famous sentence from cy-
bernetician Richard Feynman “What I cannot create, I do not understand” (Venter, What is 
Life). Indeed, this seems to be the dictum of Venter’s work. 
8  As Kay has pointed out, in The Human Use of Human Beings (1950), Wiener already argued that 
the possibility of transmitting a living human being in coded form and then reconstruct-
ing the body was theoretically possible. A similar statement was made by Nobel laure-
ate Walter Gilbert (89, 327). However, Kay argues that there is also historical discontinuity: 
Schrödinger in What is Life “did not think of DNA or information; in fact, epochal distance 
separated his voice from its distorted echoes” (66).
9  On the potential of tissue engineering to generate endless wealth, see Cooper’s Life as Sur-
plus, in particular p. 120.
10 For a very similar argument see Kay, in particular p. 54.
11  Mayeri qualifies Venter as narcissistic (76, 80), referring to Venter’s decision to use his 
own DNA for the sequencing of the human genome. After sequencing his genome, Ven-
ter learned about his health risks, and immediately took action, increasing body excersise, 
changing his diet, and taking certain drugs (Venter, A Life 85).
12  James Williams’s guide to Difference and Repetition is highly recommendable, clarifying as-
pects of Deleuze’s philosophy through a myriad of examples. As Williams explains, “things 
acquire fixity, that is, they acquire parts and hence boundaries through repetition. These 
parts and boundaries then allow us to see the individual as a member of a class or species. 
For example, the boundaries of an animal’s territory come from the repeated prowling and 
marking of its perimeter. Or we acquire an accent by the repetition of particular intona-
tions. Neither the actual territory nor the accent exist prior to the repetitions” (11-12).
13  Deleuze’s fascination with embryology is salient in the context of contemporary alterna-
tives to the molecular paradigm. As Griesemer argues, whereas in (post-)genomics “process 
is pushed into the methodological background,” a field like embryology “foregrounds devel-
opment and backgrounds hereditary transmission” (222). Evelyn Fox Keller even goes as far 
as to argue that the dominant focus on genes has led to the “eclipse of embryology” and, 
thus, a situation where the “problems of development, still unresolved, lay dormant” (“Be-
yond” 298). Deleuze’s argument in Difference and Repetition about the neglect of “difference-
in-itself” in Western thought, I argue, serves as a general framework for understanding the 
neglect of embryology and other fields that foreground process.
14  In his study of Deleuze’s biophilosophy entitled Germinal Life, Ansell-Pearson traces Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome, as well as Deleuze’s idea of an embryological life that 
stays part of the organism, back to Bergson: “Although Bergson is close to Weismann he 
does not wish to locate the vital principle in something as specific and self-contained as a 
germ-plasm, since this would reduce the scope within ‘creative evolution’ for invention and 
innovation. For Bergson what is transmitted is not imply the physic-chemical elements of 
the germ-plasm but also the vital energies and capacities of an embryogenesis and mor-
phogenesis that allows for perpetual invention in evolution”( 40).
15  Reflection about science often occurs outside science departments, and many scientists 
regard exercises of philosophical reflection as impediments to their work-flow. Biologists 
Richard Levins and Abha Sur explain this lack of philosophical interest within the contem-
porary biosciences by pointing to the pressure to increase academic production levels “in an 
era of neo-liberal economics”: “Commodification of science and its institutional organiza-
tion works against self-reflectivity and produces contempt for philosophy. This contributes 
to the narrowness of contemporary science even when there are pleas for complexity, in-
terdisciplinary methodologies, and wholeness. So far the appeals to complexity tend to live 
in the introductory chapters of books, while the main text is still fragmented and narrowly 
focused. Scientists are evaluated mostly by their contributions within the bounds of their 
department’s definitions” (37).
notes chaPter 4
1  SHEVA stands for “Scattered Human Endogenous Retro Virus Activation.” It is not the virus 
itself, but the process of activation. In Hinduism, Shiva is the eight-armed god of creation 
who destroys and transforms life at will. 
2  Darwin’s Children explores the consequences of a transmutation of humanity, when new 
humans have to live in a society where they are looked upon as anomalous and threatening. 
Since in the sequel, the actual transmutation has already transpired, it is less relevant in the 
context of this thesis.
3  In a book review of DR in Nature, biologist Michael A. Goldman even concludes that “hard 
scientific evidence tells us that the scenario is possible” (15). As Goldman concurs, “there is 
some basis for speculating that something other than a grossly random mess would result 
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from a massive mobilization of transposable elements … it is possible that simple insertion 
of a retroviral element in the vicinity of a gene could result in an alteration in the timing 
or positioning of its expression in early development. The result could be a different, yet 
perfectly viable, organism” (15-6). Although Goldman does confess that the idea of species 
change within a single generation “might be a little too radical at the moment,” he points 
to the fact that Bear has based his speculation on scientific studies on fruit flies, which have 
revealed that exposure to certain environmental pressures can cause radical mutations in 
only a few generations.
4  In the epilogue to Darwin’s Children, Bear indicates that Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay 
Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium had been “one of the key stimuli” for his thoughts 
on evolution (490). An extension of Ernst Mayer’s notion of “genetic revolutions,” punctu-
ated equilibrium uses discontinuities in fossil records to show that evolution is character-
ized by long periods of very slow change and short episodes of rapid transformation (the 
latter covering hundreds or even thousands of years).
5  In an article on his web site entitled “The New Biology,” Bear reveals his familiarity with 
Koestler’s work, stating that Koestler “fought reductionism in psychology and biology from 
the 1950s to his death.”
6  The evolutionary role of transposons was first described, against the scientific grain, by 
Barbara McClintock in her research on corn genomes. See Evelyn Fox Keller’s biography A 
Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (1983).
7  Zwart’s term “genomics novels” emerges out of his readings of Michael Crichton’s Jurassic 
Park (1991) and Next (2006). Priscilla Wald and Jay Clayton have also discussed genomics in 
literature, visual arts and culture, although their understanding of genomics here seems 
extremely broad, encompassing genetics as well as eugenics. For analyses of genomics in 
film, see Kirby; Kirby and Gaither.
8  Margulis’ idea that creativity and change, before they can be selected from the outside, 
must first emanate from the inside, ring with the work of Koestler, but more importantly, 
with the work of C.H. Waddington who coined the term epigenetics to point to the complex 
regulation of gene expression by factors other than the DNA itself, factors that are impor-
tant for the actual development of organisms.
9  Consider, for example, the resemblances between Bear’s description of biofilms and the 
following description from Acquiring Genomes: “In the protocist world, the first engineers 
and designers created structures like delicate silica boxes or calcium bonate hunting plat-
forms. Others invented agriculture. Single-celled foraminifera, representing some 60,000 
distinctive species, and comprising relatively huge cells, farmed and trapped algae they ex-
pelled along body tracks and stored in stalls in their cells. The well-trained algae take in the 
sunlight and manufacture the food for everyone nearby during daylight hours. Then, snug 
inside the foram shells at night, the algae breathe in oxygen that they produced during the 
day. Some fussy relatives of these foram farmers make their new shells from a multicolor 
mix. These “agglutinators” plaster tiny stones to their bodies. Other forams even pack min-
erals together to construct look out towers. They climb atop the towers and hunt, preying 
on animals such as rotifers and crustaceans far larger than themselves” (86).
10  In DR, men whose SHEVA retrovirus has become activated can laterally transmit the virus 
to women through sexual intercourse. Once infected, pregnant women first miscarry an 
extremely malformed fetus. Then, without having sexual intercourse, the women become 
pregnant again and miscarry a fetus that reveals regular embryonic development. It is only 
by the end of the novel, when obstetricians have learned that it is the anesthesia that kills 
the fetuses, that “second-stage births” become successful.
11  Bear’s idea of a global “neural network” on the level of the species closely resembles How-
ard Bloom’s ideas presented in Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to 
the 21st Century (2000). A useful book for understanding Bear’s discourse on networks and 
its relation to neo-Darwinism and the Modern Synthesis is Steven Shaviro’s Connected: Or 
What It Means to Live in a Network Society (2003). A recent novel that combines the themes 
of evolution and the brain is Joan Slonczewski’s Brain Plague (2000).
12  Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) was one of the first biologists in the modern sense of 
the word. Today he is most often remembered for his theory of the inheritance of acquired 
traits. According to this theory, organisms pass on to the next generation traits that they 
have acquired throughout their life time. This theory, sometimes referred to as Lamarck-
ism, has been rejected widely in modern molecular biology. According to a dominant idea 
known as the Modern Synthesis, the DNA is protected from outside influences by a mem-
brane, so that the DNA is inherited without being altered.
13  For a fascinating exploration of these issues in American literature and culture see Priscilla 
Wald’s Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (2008).
14  The biopolitical themes in DR are manifold. The novel plays on the concerns for global epi-
demics and, in the long run, the need to find alternatives to antibiotics, which are increas-
ingly losing the battle against new viruses. It examines the power games played by the 
pharmaceutical industry, scientific institutes such as the Centers for Disease Control, and 
the federal government in times of crisis. Furthermore, Bear’s story resonates with the bio-
politics of sexual reproduction and sexuality in the US: the politicization of birth, the fetus, 
AIDS, and homosexuality. It raises questions about the ways in which people with a sexually 
transmitted disease are tagged as threats to the family, the State and to the cultural logic 
of what Judith Butler has called “the heterosexual matrix”: the organization of society in 
exclusively heterosexual terms (Butler).
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15  The term “molar” is used by Deleuze and Guattari to denote actualized, organized entities, 
while the “molecular” concerns the field of particles that interconnect, forming assemblages 
that are not actualized in a complete, functional body.
16  This was a critique of several students in the MA course Science and literature I taught in 
2009 at the Faculty of Science of Radboud University, The Netherlands. 
17  The pioneering molecular biologist Bruce Lipton argues that human evolution can be con-
trolled through meditation and other techniques. The way we think and how we perceive 
the world, Lipton suggests, impacts immediately on our brains, which in turn influences our 
immune systems and our genomes. The corollary is that we can cure ourselves, release new 
superhuman powers, and transform ourselves as a species. See Spontaneous Evolution: Our 
Positive Future and a Way to Get There from Here (2009).
18  According to Margulis and Sagan, all symbioses begin with what Ivan Emmanuel Wallin 
(1890-1967) called “prototaxis,” a set of inherited motivations: “Examples include the ten-
dency of the mouse to flee from the cat, the shark to swallow the fish, the rabbit to dine 
on lettuce, or the fly to lay its eggs on the bloody muscle tissue of a recently dead boar” 
(Acquiring 98).
notes chaPter 5
1  One famous exception is Arthur C. Clarke’s sf classic Childhood’s End, in which humanity is 
destined to merge with extraterrestrial “Overlords,” who turn out to be mere messengers 
of a central “Overmind,” a pure disembodied abstraction controlling the Universe, incorpo-
rating everything into itself. While this narrative reaches a kind of immanence, critiquing 
modern science’s division between body and mind, it can also be read as a cybernetic fan-
tasy of transcendence, reaching a state of energy and information independent of matter. 
In this sense, it differs from LB, in which the merger of subject and world is nonlinear and 
non-totalizing.
2  In the majority of alien encounter films, such as the Star Wars series (dir. George Lucas) Star-
ship Troopers (dir. Paul Verhoeven1997,) and Independence Day (dir. Roland Emmerich), the 
prime strategy for preserving autonomy is warfare. Stories about “alien love” such as E.T. 
are exceptional in the sense that they relinquish violence, but here too, there is a humanist 
core that sets humans apart from its “others” (Badmington 6, 63).
3 The trilogy was formerly known as Xenogenesis, which means “strange beginning.”
4  Biologist and sf writer Joan Slonczewski has praised Butler’s account of genetic trade for its 
biological viability, arguing even that it is “remarkably consistent with modern molecular 
biology, even predicting developments that have occurred since the novels were written” 
(“Octavia” 1).
5  Bruce Clarke and Cathy Peppers have asked Butler respectively through e-mail and in per-
son about her scientific sources. Butler indicated that she was introduced to the work of 
Margulis and Lovelock through the PBS television show NOVA, titled Gaia, the Goddess of the 
Earth and featuring expert commentary from Stephen H. Schneider and Richard Dawkins 
(broadcasted on January 28,1986). See Clarke 168-69.
6  The possible consequences of liberal eugenics are sketched in other contemporary fictions 
such as Nancy Kress’s sf novel Beggars in Spain (1993), on the struggles for recognition and au-
tonomy of a minority of enhanced “sleepless” people, and the sf film Gattaca (1997), in which 
an “ordinary” citizen manages to take on the identity of a member of the genetically enhanced 
upper class, and thereby manages to fulfill is childhood wish of becoming an astronaut. 
7  As Robert Mitchell has pointed out to me, the name Akin refers to the fact that the son is 
like his mother in many ways, but not quite the same.
8  Perhaps the name “Ooloi” is a reference to the androgynous “Eloi” of H.G. Wells’s The Time 
Machine (1895).
9  Jorgensen, in a critique of Jameson’s approach to sf, repetitively states the need of reading 
“literally” rather than metaphorically. In a brief reference to Ursala Le Guin’s novel The Left 
Hand of Darkness, which experiments with a world purged of “compulsive heterosexuality” 
(Rich), Jorgensen asserts that Le Guin’s novel “can be taken as a concrete, scientific sugges-
tion to engineer a human society that is not warped by libidinal investments. In looking to 
the limits of a world of ideological production, Le Guin engineers the shock and disgust of 
actual difference, and its possibility in the science of genetics” (209). Le Guin’s novel, in other 
words, makes it possible to think the future of human gender relations and sexuality in the 
light of new possibilities in molecular biology. A crucial point is that reading literally does 
not mean taking the text at face value, or treating it as one-dimensional and programmatic.
10  For example, in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation Deleuze argues that the painter does 
not start with a blank slate: first he has to “empty” the canvas from the cliché’s and images 
projected from his own mind (71). In other words, the painter should not re-present some-
thing that is already there, but rather clear his mind from workaday experiences, in order to 
invent something new.
11  Although these philosophers go beyond Heidegger’s technophobia, they continue Hei-
degger’s idea of “lichtung,” a unique human space created through language and other ex-
ternalizing technologies. It seems that Stiegler’s philosophy of technology and the post-
phenomenological field of Object Oriented Ontology (Harman, Bryant and others) carry a 
residual anthropocentrism not found in the work of Deleuze and Whitehead. For a discus-
sion of the convergence of Deleuze and Whitehead see Steven Shaviro’s Without Criteria: 
Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (2009).
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12  In Mexican-Amerindian mythology, Malinche is the woman who became the translator and 
concubine of conquistador Hernán Cortez. The figure of Malinche symbolizes the downfall 
of the native American cultures. Her name literally means “the fucked one” (Anzaldúa).
13  For Deleuze and Guattari,, “machinic” does not mean technological or mechanistic but 
rather abstract (A Thousand 562). The communication of the Oankali is abstract because it 
precedes a division into concrete organs of perception and frames of understanding: it is an 
expression of affects, which are relational and transformational, not formal or substantial. 
14  In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels attribute a unique “species-being” to humans: un-
like animals, humans are free and conscious beings producing their “means of subsistence” 
and thereby, indirectly “their actual material life” (42). According to Marx and Engels, reli-
gion, the state, and capital try to conceal the reality of material production by representing 
life as an unchangeable, natural form, thus estranging man from his material needs and 
capabilities. Their theory of historical materialism, although accepting that there is such 
a thing as human nature, is a plea for man to purposefully change the course of history. 
Natural forces play no role in this project: “Of course, we cannot here go either into the 
actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself–
geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set 
out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the 
action of men” (42).
15  For a lucid analysis of the relations between the logic of sacrifice, genomics, and contem-
porary biocommerce, see Mitchell’s article “Sacrifice, Individuation, and the Economies of 
Genomics” (2007) in the journal Literature and Medicine.
16  I do not mean to argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas about the nonhuman, and ani-
mals in particular, are wholly compatible with Haraway’s work. In A Thousand Plateaus De-
leuze and Guattari ridicule the relations between humans and pet animals, proclaiming 
that “anyone who likes cats and dogs is a fool” (265). Haraway condemns Deleuze and 
Guattari’s comments, which illustrate that while they have interesting things to say about 
co-evolution, they never really show any regard of mundane human-animal relations and 
the responsibilities that come with them. Similar criticisms on this remark by Deleuze and 
Guattari have been outed by Susan McHugh in Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines 
(2011) and George Gessert in Green Light: Toward and Art of Evolution (2010).
17  The concept of becoming is one of the most difficult and controversial ones in Deleuze’s 
oeuvre. For useful reflections on becoming, see the works of Braidotti and Grosz.
18  Butler’s narrative ontologies touch on Baudrillard’s notion of “hyperreality,” a postmodern 
state in which there is no longer a steady reality behind the simulated environments of 
technological media. A crucial difference is that Baudrillard’s term denotes a social and se-
miotic implosion of reality, effacing meaningful mythologies, while Butler rewrites mytholo-
gies based on the endless embeddedness of biological life. 
19  The inapplicability of genetic determinism becomes apparent very early on in the story, when 
Jdaya explains to Lilith the complexity of cancer: “It isn’t simple, and it isn’t a gene or two. It’s 
many–the result of a tangled combination of factors that only begins with the genes” (39). 
20  For a lucid argument about the inadequacy of existing economic models for understanding 
transformation, and the potential for non-Darwinist evolutionary theory to explain eco-
nomic dynamics, see Kauffman’s Investigations (2000), specifically the chapter “The Persis-
tently Innovative Econosphere.”
21  The situation in resister villages can be explained by what Latour has defined as a dis-
tinctively modern “purification” (We Have) of the categories of nature and culture, and a 
tendency to privilege the latter, whereas the Oankali way of life is a worlding that exceeds 
such categories.
22  For an explanation of Spinoza’s opposition between potentia (an inner potential) and po-
testas (an external imposition or framework), see Braidotti’s Transpositions, 49.
notes chaPter 6
1  Robinson has won a number of prestigious sf awards, including the Nebula award and the 
British Science Fiction Award for Red Mars, Hugo and Locus awards for Green Mars and Blue 
Mars, and a Locus award for his alternative history novel Years of Rice and Salt (2003).
2  Robinson himself uses the concept of polyphony in dissertation, published as The Novels of 
Philip K. Dick (1984).
3  Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint have argued that while Robinson’s Mars trilogy at times offers 
a complex image of technoscience in the sense of a Latourian actor-network, even “allow-
ing the landscape to become a powerful actant with which all others must negotiate,” the 
work does tend to gravitate towards human “heroes, villains, bureaucrats and politicians” 
(140). My aim her is two-fold: to analyze this tension in the trilogy and to bring out the 
“minor” element of human-nonhuman entanglements.
4  In an analysis of Paul Di Filippo’s transmutation novel A Mouth Full of Tongues (2003), Rossini 
argues that “The politically and ethically relevant potential of DST consists primarily in the 
proposition that system and environment, inside and outside, are mutually determining; 
in other words, power, control and agency are neither here or there, neither attributed to 
the self-subject nor to the other/object but are seen as multiple and distributed. A second 
important implication of DST is that we cannot legitimately define information as a binary 
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code of ones and zeros, as a blueprint, fixed programme or stable representation of what a 
living organism will inevitable become and then eternally be” (249).
5  In the tradition of alchemy the practitioner exposes himself to obscure knowledges, sub-
stances and conditions in order to produce transmutations of matter and of the self (Zwart, 
De Waarheid op de Wand 183-86).
6  Recently, the concept of terraformation has been elaborated by engineers Martyn Fogg in 
Terraforming: Engineering Planetary Environments (1995) and Robert Zubrin’s The Case for Mars: 
The Plan to Settle the Red Planet and Why We Must (1996). For a convincing analysis of the con-
nections between these accounts of terraformation, capitalism, and the American frontier 
hypothesis, see Markley (779-81).
7  In Wells’s The Time Machine a time-traveler discovers that in the year 802701 the human 
race is divided in two biological types, the feeble Eloi who live on the surface and the brutish 
Morlocks who, like rodents, live underground and only come out after dark.
8  Robinson’s choice of Arkady’s surname Bogdanov seems to refer to a Bolshevik intellectual 
who in the 1920s experimented with blood transfusion as a means of achieving rejuvenation. 
9  In an interview with the journal Science Fiction Studies, Robinson laments the production of 
a “consensus future” in sf: a usually bleak and generally indifferent future based on present 
conditions as portrayed in “cyberpunk, or American-Imperial Heinleinism, or the ‘future-
war’ subgenres” (Szeman and Whiteman 186). The sf author Robert Heinlein is one of the 
classic authors writing in a tradition celebrating American imperialism during the Cold War. 
In some ways, cyberpunk novels such as William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1983) and Bruce 
Sterling’s Schismatrix (1985) can be seen as postmodern, bleak versions of this imperialism, 
celebrating (male) aggression, fetishizing cybertechnology and neglecting non-anthro-
pomorphic (ecological) processes. For critical discussions of cyberpunk see Bruce Clarke’s 
Posthuman Metamorphoses: Narrative and Systems (2008), Catherine Hayles’s How We Became 
Posthuman (1999), Eleaine Graham’s Representations of the Post/human: Monsters, Aliens and 
Others in Popular Culture (2002) and the volume Beyond Cyberpunk: New Critical Perspectives 
edited by Graham J. Murphy and Sherryl Vint (2010).
10  The idea of extended heredity is associated with C.H. Waddington’s theory of epigenetics 
and Gottlieb’s idea of the bidirectional influence of genes and environment. 
11  Desmond’s nickname is a reference to Amerindian myths where the coyote represents a 
dweller and messenger. See Anzaldúa.
12  In some ways, Hiroko can be seen as a cult leader exploiting her biotechnological skills 
to create a following. At one point Ann wonders: “To conceive so many children, without 
the fathers’ permission, without control over the genetic manipulations; it was a form of 
insanity, really, divine or not” (Green 169). As most of the ectogenes are left-handed, rumors 
circulate that Hiroko “tweaked their genes” with left-handedness as side-effect, but this 
rumor is never confirmed (Green 33, 64). In spite of its artificiality and clandestine nature, 
there is an air of rightness and inevitability about Hiroko’s experiment, not just for Hiroko 
but for most scientists. Although Hiroko is highly influential, I would argue that she is not 
an authoritarian guru, and that the success of her ideas depends on a network of under-
ground settlements. 
13  Robinson borrows the term viriditas from the Christian thinker, composer, and mystic 
Hildegard von Bingen (1098-1179). Von Bingen saw viriditas as a nourishing life force that 
“greens” the world (viride meaning green in Latin), a force that can be found not only in 
plants and trees, but also, for example, in celestial bodies. Humans gain viriditas mainly 
through eating and drinking (Von Bingen was also interested in medicine). It would be 
interesting to further explore the connections between Von Bingen’s viriditas and the no-
madic, ecological approaches analyzed in this thesis. For an overview of Von Bingen’s life 
and work, see Flanagan.
14  In an interview with Rjurik Davidson, Robinson argues that Buddhist modes of contempla-
tion are in congruence with the scientific method: “Science has an attitude towards the 
universe that can be described as devotional: there’s an intensity of interest, and an attempt 
to understand how it works, that is not dissimilar to the way that Buddhism intends to pay 
attention to the reality that we’re in right now” (Davidson 40). Fritjof Capra has argued for 
the parallels between Buddhism and modern physics (The Tao); more recently, John Tresch 
has studied the multiple links between Buddhism and neuroscience (“Experimental Ethics”). 
notes chaPter 7
1  It seems feasible that the idea of “another science” points in the direction of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of nomad science although it is uncertain whether this concept was 
already conceived at the time they wrote Kafka.
2  As Deleuze and Guattari note, nomad science is a mode attuned to “the sensible conditions 
of intuition and construction” which continually lead it to encounter new problems, while 
royal science tries to “isolate” its operations from these conditions, acquiring a position of 
autonomy (A Thousand 412).
3  As Coyote notes, “the feminine was instinct, the body, and nature; the masculine was rea-
son, mind, and law. And the law ruled … On Mars it may be that the ego ideal is shifting 
back to the maternal. To the Dionysian again, or to some kind of post-Oedipal reintegration 
with nature, which we are still in the process of inventing. Some new complex that would 
not be so subject to neurotic over-investment” (Green Mars 53).
4  Kay’s ideas do not only resemble those of Lynn Margulis, but also show affinities with 
the work of Barbara McClintock on gene transposons or “jumping genes” (genes that can 
change their position on the genome) for which she received the Nobel prize in 1983. Both 
of these female scientists had to fight for recognition by their (male) colleagues. For a fas-
cinating analysis of McClintock’s trials, see Evelyn Fox Keller’s A Feeling for the Organism: The 
Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (1983).
5  Toscano shows how there are a number of resonances between Simondon’s theories and 
systems theory, based primarily on their use of the term “information.” However, as Tosca-
no notes, for Simondon’s conception of information is different from its usage in cybernet-
ics and information theory, where it functions as a discrete entity carried along a channel. 
For Simondon, information rather constitutes the entire system of sender, receiver, mes-
sage, and channel (this is what Simondon calls “first information”). In short, information is 
the ontogenic production of the system itself, rather than that which is produced within 
that system. For another discussion of Deleuze, Simondon and the concept of information, 
see Eugene Thacker’s Biomedia.
6  For recent elaborations of the idea of extended in heritance, see Gilbert; Jablonka and 
Lamb; and Stotz.
7  See for example the work of Catherine Hayles, Luce Irigaray, Elizabeth Grosz, Sarah Frank-
lin, and Rosi Braidotti.
8  Kauffman’s idea that the emergence of order occurs as life moves in the direction of ever 
new “adjacent possibles” (Investigations 151) resonates with Deleuze’s concept of the vir-
tual, although Deleuze does separate virtuality sharply from possibility, the latter being 
discrete and the former continuous. Manual Delanda, however, has explicitly linked the 
idea of evolutionary strategies or “searching devices” (“Virtual Environments”) that ex-
plore possibilities to Deleuze’s understanding of the virtual, which he calls “the machinic 
phylum.” As Delanda argues, science itself is one of those “searching devices,” we must 
realize that by its very nature, systems governed by nonlinear dynamics resist absolute 
control and that sometimes the machinic phylum can only be tracked, or followed (17). 
This statement shows a great affinity between Delanda’s work and the concept of nomad 
science. For a concise discussion of nomad science by Delanda, see his chapter “Mate-
rial Complexity” in the volume Digital Tectonics edited by Neill Leach, David Turnbull and 
Chris Williams.
9  Schneider and Sagan provide a fascinating explanation of Schrödinger’s paradox–how it is 
possible for complex living systems to evolve in a universe whose guiding principle of en-
tropy dictates the progressive annulment of differences. In Into the Cool: Energy Flow, Ther-
modynamics and Life, Schneider and Sagan argue that living matter on Earth has created a 
biosphere that is relatively cool, extracting matter and work from solar energy and sending 
heat into space, thus producing entropy. In other words, if life diminishes entropy locally, it 
nevertheless produces entropy regionally.
10  Hiroko and the Oankali in Mars embody the “panspermia” idea, which was also held by one 
of the key figures in genetics, Francis Crick: life on earth may have originated through “in-
fection” from the outside, either deliberately or by coincidence (Zwart, De Waarheid 173-4). 
11  Haraway deplores Margulis’s support of the theory of autopoiesis as formulated by Mat-
urana and Varela, arguing that “symbiogenesis and autopoiesis are incompatible” because 
organisms develop and evolve in interaction (When 33). In a conversation with Haraway in 
2011, I learned that she is generally skeptical about systems thinking in biology.
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S U MM A R Y
This dissertation provides an analysis of contemporary biosciences through the lens of bio-sf 
novels (biologically oriented science fiction). The point of departure is that novels can be useful 
tools for understanding not just the psychological and social dimensions of science, but also 
the tensions between different scientific ideas, practices, and attitudes. Bio-sf novels usually 
revolve around radical events such as encounters with extraterrestrial species. This disserta-
tion analyzes how such fictional events can shed light on tensions in contemporary biosci-
ences. In the novels under study humans “transmutate,” sometimes even resulting in a new, 
posthuman species. What makes these novels exceptional is that they narrate transformations 
that are not of human design. Rather, these are spontaneous events emerging from the in-
terplay between humans and their new and/or changing environments. In the novels, certain 
scientists vainly attempt to stop or control the process of transformation. The protagonists, 
instead, realize that the event is too complex to be controlled. They seek to understand the 
transformation, adapting their own ways of thinking and living along the way. In short, these 
novels picture human beings, and scientists in particular, as participants rather than masters of 
their environments.
In this dissertation the scientific aspects of bio-sf novels are analyzed through the purview 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts “State science” and “nomad science.” State science is epito-
mized by a focus on orderliness, clarity, hierarchy, and solutions, while nomad science has a 
preference for fluidity, processes of becoming, open spaces, and problematization. Whereas 
State science wants to map and control nature, nomad science is concerned with following 
the unpredictable movements and transformations of matter. These concepts should not be 
regarded as mere labels that define particular scientists. Rather, they refer to basic tendencies 
that may occur in one and the same person. This dissertation argues that in a time of large-scale 
transformations such as globalization and climate change, nomadic modes of thinking are vi-
tal. Nomad science is better equipped to understand such complex transformations. Moreover, 
it can contribute to the development of new, more sustainable ways of living adapted to our 
changing environments. In this dissertation the potentials for nomad science are not just ex-
plored in bio-sf novels, but also in (popular) scientific texts. Through this cross-reading it aims 
to contribute to the scholarly fields of science studies, literature and science, and sf studies. 
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 This dissertation looks at how bio-sf novels write themselves into debates about the nature 
of life, with a special emphasis on the question of the roles of genes and genomes. Roughly 
since the 1950s, the biosciences have been dominated by a “molecular paradigm”: a focus on 
the structure and function of molecules such as DNA and proteins. Contemporary research 
fields such as genomics (the study of the complete DNA-set of a particular organism) bring 
forth a range of insights and technologies that are extraordinarily significant in the sense that 
they elucidate and intervene in organic life at the molecular level, making it increasingly rec-
ognizable, predictable and pliable. Such research fields have laid the foundations for new ways 
of treating and possibly curing disease, and promise revolutionary possibilities such as in-vitro 
meat or clearing pollution with microorganisms. Yet the implications of such developments are 
ill-understood as long as we see them as rational and unambiguous solutions. Instead, they 
should be understood as biopolitical—as part of a historical reconfiguration of how humans in-
fluence themselves and their environments. Moreover, many biologists argue that the central-
ity of genes and genomes in contemporary biology too often hampers a comprehensive, nu-
anced understanding of how life works. The concepts of State science and nomad science can 
shed light on the biopolitical dimensions of contemporary biosciences, as well as on the tension 
between the genocentric, molecular paradigm and alternative perspectives. In this thesis it is 
argued that aspects of nomad science are manifested most strongly in the work of biologists 
such as Lynn Margulis, Susan Oyama, Brian Goodwin, Stuart Kauffman, and Donna Haraway, 
who are critical of the molecular paradigm and variously emphasize ecological relations. Their 
perspectives resonate strongly with the bio-sf novels under scrutiny in this study.
Chapter 1presents the research goal sketched above and provides an outline of the chapters. 
Chapter 2 places this thesis in a recent scholarly trend that combines theories and method-
ologies from science studies and sf studies, regarding sf texts as useful thought-experiments 
about the future of humanity and its environments. This chapter reads Fredric Jameson’s highly 
influential theory of sf together with Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to literary texts, and their 
concept of “minor literature” in particular. A major advantage of Deleuze and Guatari’s approach 
is that it corrects Jameson’s assertion that sf is strictly about sociality. Firstly, this chapter argues 
that apart from renegotiating social practices and norms, “minor” bio-sf conjures up the pos-
sibility of another life by constructing the narrative around radical biophysical events. Secondly, 
it is argued that the central role of such biophysical events in minor bio-sf necessitates an en-
gagement with scientific elements in sf that is almost absent in Jameson’s work. To provide an ex-
ample, the chapter discusses Greg Bear’s novel Blood Music (1985), in which a nano-engineered 
virus escapes from the lab, infecting the whole population of North America and transforming 
human beings in a featureless, reddish flesh covering the landscape. This state of affairs, how-
ever, does not necessarily mark an end-point or death; the mass of flesh does seem to be alive 
and, moreover, to exhibit some form of collective consciousness. The import of Bear’s narrative 
cannot be sufficiently understood without pondering the (imagined) possibilities of nanosci-
ence emerging at this particular historical moment, possibilities that blur the boundaries be-
tween the living and the dead, the organic and the inorganic, the human and the nonhuman. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the concepts of “State science” and “nomad science,” placing them in 
the context of contemporary bioscience through the case of (post-)genomics and the research 
projects of Craig Venter in particular. Modulating the term “State science” into “control sci-
ence,” the chapter analyzes how science functions within contemporary regimes of biopower 
in which corporations become important strongholds alongside states. The chapter observes 
that (post-)genomics, while providing new technologies of control, also contains the promise of 
nomadic approaches to life. In particular, Venter’s 2004-2008 endeavor to map “the genome of 
the ocean itself” on the basis of water samples has apparent nomadic features, modeling a fluid, 
topological space whose complexity seemingly resists rigid models and quick solutions. It is 
argued, however, that if Venter unearths nomadic potentials in (post-)genomics, he ultimately 
fails to pursue them, reverting to a reductionist image of life as “DNA-software.” Glossing over 
Deleuze’s biophilosophy, this chapter contrasts Venter’s image with Deleuze’s concept of “a life” 
that is irreducible to any substrate or transcendental cause. I propose that Deleuze’s abstract 
yet material conception of life can serve as a catalyst for nomadic ideas in the biosciences. 
Chapter 4, the first of three case studies, reads Bear’s sf novel Darwin’s Radio (1999) to-
gether with evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis which holds that 
a species’ DNA is an assemblage of many genomes “acquired” in symbiotic relations. Accord-
ing to this theory, evolution is a creative, collective process rather than a blind process of ac-
cumulative random mutation and natural selection. In Bear’s novel, which was partly inspired 
on Margulis’s theory, the course of human evolution is altered through the activation of an 
“endogenous retrovirus,” ironically located in a “non-coding region” of the human genome. This 
activation, termed SHEVA (Scattered Human Endogenous Retro Virus Activation), causes hu-
mans to metamorphose into another species. At first perceived as a global plague, SHEVA pro-
vokes mass panic. In the US a task force is assembled to control the crisis and to find out how 
SHEVA operates at the genomic level. However, as research progresses, it becomes manifest 
that SHEVA is too complex to locate, decode, or “treat”—moreover, that it may not represent 
a disease at all, but rather an emergent, posthuman stage in evolution. Bear’s novel can be 
understood as a literary experiment with scientific ideas, notably the theory of symbiogenesis. 
Bear’s novel calls the neo-Darwinian conception of slow evolution into question, turning evolu-
tion into an immediate biopolitical issue. The import of Darwin’s Radio is not crass “prediction,” 
but a nomadic vision of life as always already different (impure, infected) and in becoming—a 
counterpoint to the image of the double helix as the bedrock of human identity and the promise 
of a man-made future.
Chapter 5 reads Octavia Butler’s trilogy Lilith’s Brood (1987; 1988; 1989) alongside the recent 
work of biologist-turned-cultural theorist Donna Haraway in which the relations between spe-
cies are center stage. Taking the cue from Haraway’s concept of “worlding,” this chapter analyz-
es Butler’s trilogy as a literary experiment in which species co-evolve, building a new world out 
of an uncomfortable contact zone. In Lilith’s Brood an extraterrestrial species called Oankali has 
rescued humanity from Earth, which had become inhospitable to humans due to pollution and 
atomic warfare. They start an experiment of “genetic trade” in which humans and Oankali will 
eventually transmute into another kind of being. The trade, however, is hampered by a signifi-
cant number of humans who are in fear of losing their human identities and autonomy. Literary 
critic Molly Wallace has argued that the Oankali’s “natural” capacity for genetic engineering 
represents strategies of contemporary technoscientific biopower, where genetic engineering 
is falsely presented as something inevitable and inherently beneficial. I agree partially with this 
reading, although I emphasize that the Oankali embody the ambiguity of technoscience. The 
Oankali’s experiment challenges humans (including the reader) to think life in nomadic terms 
as a continual struggle to connect, forget, and become. 
Chapter 6 reads Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy (1992; 1993; 1996) together with evolu-
tionary psychologist Susan Oyama’s concept of “constructive interactionism.” Oyama’s theory 
puts the interplay between (living) systems center stage, thus offering an alternative to geno-
centrism. In the trilogy, American physicist-turned-biologist Sax Russell appears a typical “state 
scientist” eager to control life on Mars, to turn Mars into a second earth. Sax’s “terraformation” 
team is able to manipulate the atmosphere, making it breathable, by releasing genetically engi-
neered, oxygen-excreting microorganisms. In a few decades, the face of the planet turns from 
red to green (due to the introduction of plants and trees) and eventually from green to blue 
(after the its icecap has melted, creating oceans and seas). While state and corporate forces try 
to harness the process of terraformation, it soon becomes clear that the experiment cannot 
be controlled. Instead, as an unidentified narrator proclaims, it is Mars itself (read: network of 
planetary systems) that is the most advanced “genetic engineer.” Life on Mars arises not from a 
human bauplan, but from the constructive interaction between systems. As this chapter dem-
onstrates, those nomad scientists in the trilogy who understand the Martian experiment along 
the lines of Oyama’s “constructive interactionism” are most successful at coping with the tough 
conditions on Mars and giving birth to sustainable ways of living.
Chapter 7 synthesizes and expands on the observations about nomad science in the previ-
ous chapters. It presents a number of clusters of nomadic traits that may serve as a rough map 
for understanding and reinforcing nomadism in contemporary bioscience. The first part of the 
chapter, which deals with the bio-sf novels, identifies the following clusters of nomadic desires, 
attitudes, and practices: following—opening up—interacting; risk—secrecy—resistance; fasci-
nation—imagination—intuition; problematization—cooperation—introduction; and immer-
sion—self-experimentation—becoming. The second part of the chapter identifies a number of 
clusters of fundamental nomadic ideas on the basis of the biological theories discussed: mul-
tiplicity—immanence—nested scales; relation—interaction—coevolution; embodiment—fluid-
ity—folding; and instability—nonlinearity—transformation. The common thrust of nomad biol-
ogy, it is argued, is to incorporate and connect to everything, so that bioscience ends up dealing 
with life, and the future of humanity, as cosmic.
Chapter 8, finally, presents some key findings and consequences of this thesis and points 
to possibilities for further research. It argues that “minor” bio-sf narratives that innovatively 
couple biological and social, human and nonhuman existence, may be of value for science stud-
ies in three ways. Firstly, minor bio-sf offers inspiring examples of thinking together with biosci-
ence about common challenges, rather than taking a distanced or critical position. Secondly, 
such narratives confront science with the fluid, chaotic side of life, and with the bigger ques-
tions—issues from which many scientists tend to shy away, sometimes simply for lack of time. 
Such a confrontation may help spark the development of complex, long-term scientific views 
on the future of humans and their environments. Thirdly, minor bio-sf allows science studies 
to demonstrate how science is a dramatic endeavor, involving actors, passions, encounters, and 
so on, but also that life as such is dramatic. Here, Shakespeare’s famous line “All the world’s a 
stage” attains a new meaning, pointing towards an eco-aesthetics of existence, where humans 
perform or play together with others—notably with other species—as inhabitants of a plethora 
of merging habitats. In short, these are narratives with the power of transmutation, bringing 
science to life.
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S A M E N V AT T I N G
(dutch suMMary)
In dit proefschrift worden de hedendaagse biowetenschappen beschouwd door de lens van 
bio-sf romans (biologisch georiënteerde science fiction). Het vertrekpunt is de gedachte dat 
romans niet alleen inzicht kunnen bieden in de psychologische en sociale dimensies van de 
wetenschap, maar ook in de spanningen die bestaan tussen verschillende wetenschappelijke 
ideeën, praktijken, en attitudes. Bio-sf romans gaan meestal over een ingrijpende gebeurte-
nis, zoals een ontmoeting met buitenaards leven. In dit proefschrift wordt geanalyseerd hoe 
zo’n fictieve gebeurtenis spanningen in de biowetenschappen zichtbaar maakt. In de bio-sf 
romans die worden bestudeerd, ondergaat de mensheid een radicale ‘transmutatie’ die soms 
zelfs resulteert in een nieuwe, post-humane soort. Wat deze verhalen bijzonder maakt, is dat 
de verandering niet door mensen is bewerkstelligd. Het gaat om een spontane gebeurtenis die 
voortkomt uit het samenspel tussen mensen en hun nieuwe en/of veranderende omgeving. In 
de romans proberen bepaalde wetenschappers tevergeefs het transformatieproces te stoppen 
of onder controle te krijgen. De hoofdpersonen daarentegen zijn zich bewust van de onbe-
heersbare complexiteit van de transformatie. Zij proberen het proces te begrijpen en passen 
gaandeweg hun eigen manieren van denken en leven aan. De mens —en de wetenschapper in 
het bijzonder— wordt kortom ten tonele gevoerd als een medespeler in plaats van een regisseur 
van zijn omgeving. 
De wetenschappelijke aspecten van bio-sf romans worden in dit proefschrift geanalyseerd 
aan de hand van twee concepten van de filosofen Deleuze en Guattari, namelijk ‘staatsweten-
schap’ en ‘nomadenwetenschap’. Staatswetenschap is gericht op ordelijkheid, duidelijkheid, 
hiërarchie en oplossingen, terwijl nomadenwetenschap een voorkeur heeft voor fluïditeit, 
wordingsprocessen, open ruimten en problematisering. Waar staatswetenschap zich in be-
ginsel richt op het in kaart brengen en in toom houden van de natuur, laat nomadenweten-
schap zich leiden door onvoorspelbare bewegingen en transformaties. Deze begrippen moeten 
beslist niet worden gezien als etiketten die gemakshalve op individuele wetenschappers kun-
nen worden geplakt. Het gaat om basale tendensen, die zich ook in een en dezelfde persoon 
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kunnen voordoen. In dit proefschrift wordt beargumenteerd dat ‘nomadische’ manieren van 
denken van belang zijn in een tijdperk van grootschalige veranderingen —denk aan globa-
lisering en klimaatverandering. Nomadenwetenschap is beter in staat om zulke complexe 
processen te begrijpen. Daarnaast kan zij bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van nieuwe, meer 
duurzame manieren van leven die aansluiten bij onze veranderende omgeving. Het poten-
tieel van nomadenwetenschap wordt in dit proefschrift niet alleen onderzocht in een aantal 
Amerikaanse bio-sf romans, maar ook in (populair-)wetenschappelijke teksten. Met deze 
cross-reading wordt beoogd een bijdrage te leveren aan de onderzoeksgebieden wetenschaps-
studies, literatuur en wetenschap, en sf studies.
In dit proefschrift wordt bekeken hoe bio-sf romans aanhaken bij fundamentele debatten 
over de aard van het leven, met speciale aandacht voor de rol van genen en genomen. Grofweg 
sinds de jaren vijftig wordt de biowetenschap gedomineerd door een ‘moleculair paradigma’: 
een gerichtheid op de structuur en functie van moleculen zoals DNA en eiwitten. Uit onder-
zoeksvelden zoals genomics (de studie van de complete DNA-set van een bepaald organis-
me) komt een reeks inzichten en technologieën voort die het organische leven op moleculair 
niveau verhelderen. Hierdoor wordt het steeds beter mogelijk om het leven te begrijpen, te 
voorspellen en te plooien. Genomics heeft de fundamenten gelegd voor nieuwe vormen van 
medische behandeling en mogelijk zelfs genezing van talloze ziekten. Biowetenschappers be-
loven revolutionaire toepassingen zoals in-vitro consumptievlees (gekweekt uit stamcellen) of 
het verminderen van milieuverontreiniging met behulp van genetisch gemodificeerde micro-
organismen. De implicaties van dergelijke ontwikkelingen blijven echter onderbelicht zolang ze 
worden voorgesteld als rationele, eenduidige ‘oplossingen’ voor maatschappelijke problemen. 
Ten eerste dienen ze te worden begrepen als biopolitiek: onderdeel van een historische transitie 
in de manier waarop mensen zichzelf en hun omgeving vormgeven. Bovendien, zo beweren 
diverse biologen, belemmert de dominante positie die genen en genomen binnen de contem-
poraine biowetenschap innemen de ontwikkeling van een breder, meer genuanceerd begrip 
van het leven. De concepten staatswetenschap en nomadenwetenschap kunnen licht werpen 
op de biopolitieke dimensies van de biowetenschap alsmede op de spanning tussen het mo-
leculaire, ‘genocentrische’ paradigma en alternatieve perspectieven. In dit proefschrift wordt 
beargumenteerd dat aspecten van nomadenwetenschap zich het meest nadrukkelijk manifes-
teren in het werk van biologen die zich kritisch verhouden ten opzichte van het moleculaire 
paradigma. Biologen zoals Lynn Margulis, Susan Oyama, Brian Goodwin, Stuart Kauffman en 
Donna Haraway leggen in hun werk de nadruk op complexe ecologische relaties. Dit perspec-
tief komt sterk naar voren in de bio-sf romans die in dit proefschrift worden belicht.
Hoofdstuk 1 schetst de problematiek van deze studie en geeft vervolgens een overzicht 
van de verschillende hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt dit proefschrift binnen een recente 
trend geplaatst waarin twee onderzoeksvelden elkaar ontmoeten: wetenschapsstudies en sf 
studies. Binnen deze trend worden sf romans beschouwd als ‘literaire experimenten’ waarin 
wordt meegedacht met de wetenschap over de toekomst van de mens en zijn omgeving. Dit 
hoofdstuk combineert Fredric Jamesons invloedrijke theorie van sf met Deleuze en Guattaris 
benadering van literaire teksten, in het bijzonder hun concept van ‘mineure literatuur’. Een be-
langrijk voordeel van de benadering van Deleuze en Guattari is dat hiermee een basisassump-
tie in Jamesons werk kan worden weerlegd: namelijk dat sf strikt genomen over sociale proces-
sen zou gaan. Ten eerste wordt betoogd dat ‘mineure’ bio-sf de mogelijkheid verbeeldt van een 
andere vorm van leven in de breedste zin des woords. Dit wordt bereikt door het verhaal rond 
een ingrijpende biofysische gebeurtenis te construeren. Ten tweede wordt beargumenteerd 
dat de centrale rol van biofysische gebeurtenissen in dit type romans onherroepelijk vraagt om 
engagement met wetenschappelijke aspecten, een engagement dat in Jamesons analyse nage-
noeg afwezig is. Als voorbeeld wordt Greg Bears roman Blood music (1985) besproken, waarin 
een gefabriceerd nano-virus uit een laboratorium ontsnapt en de gehele menselijke populatie 
van Noord-Amerika besmet, waardoor die populatie wordt getransformeerd tot een vorme-
loze, roodachtige vleesmassa. Deze toestand markeert niet per se een eindpunt; de vleesmassa 
is allicht geen organisme, maar vertoont toch een zekere vorm van collectief bewustzijn. De 
consequenties van Bears roman kunnen niet worden begrepen zonder dat men zich verdiept in 
de (ingebeelde) mogelijkheden van de nanowetenschap die op dat moment sterk in opkomst 
was, een veld van onderzoek waarin de scheidslijnen tussen levend en dood, organisch en an-
organisch, natuur en cultuur, beginnen te vervagen.
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de concepten ‘staatswetenschap’ en ‘nomadenwetenschap’ besproken 
en binnen de context geplaatst van de contemporaine biowetenschappen. Dit gebeurt aan de 
hand van de casus van (post-)genomics en in het bijzonder de onderzoeksprojecten van de 
pionierende genoomwetenschapper Craig Venter. Het begrip ‘staatswetenschap’ wordt gemo-
duleerd tot ‘controle wetenschap’, mede omdat in de hedendaagse maatschappij naast staten 
ook bedrijven een belangrijke positie innemen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt vastgesteld dat (post-)ge-
nomics nieuwe controle-technologieën voortbrengt, maar tegelijk de belofte van nomadische 
benaderingen van het leven in zich draagt. Vooral Venters recente project (2004-2008) met als 
doel ‘het genoom van de oceaan zelf’ in kaart brengen aan de hand van watermonsters, ver-
toont evident nomadische kenmerken, want het modelleert een fluïde, topologische materie 
wier complexiteit weerstand lijkt te bieden aan rigide modellen en technocratische oplossin-
gen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt echter beargumenteerd dat hoewel Venters werk het nomadisch 
potentieel van (post-)genomics onthult, Venter uiteindelijk geen nomadische route volgt en 
juist teruggrijpt naar een reductionistisch beeld van het leven als ‘DNA-software’. Na een korte 
omweg langs Deleuzes biofilosofie wordt Venters beeld gecontrasteerd met Deleuzes concept 
van ‘een leven’ dat niet tot enig substraat kan worden teruggebracht of kan worden verklaard 
door een transcendentale oorzaak. Deleuzes even abstracte als materiële conceptie van ‘een 
leven’ kan dienen als katalysator voor nomadische ideeën in de biowetenschappen.
Hoofdstuk 4, de eerste van drie case study’s, bespreekt Greg Bears roman Darwin’s radio 
(1999) samen met de ‘symbiogenese’-theorie van de Amerikaanse evolutionair bioloog Lynn 
Margulis. Volgens deze theorie bevat het genoom van een willekeurige soort in feite vele ge-
nomen die zijn verworven in symbiotische relaties met andere soorten. Margulis beschrijft 
evolutie als een creatief, collectief proces in plaats van een ‘blind’ proces van accumulerende 
willekeurige mutaties en natuurlijke selectie. In Bears roman, die ten dele is geïnspireerd op 
de theorie van Margulis, wijzigt de koers van de menselijke evolutie radicaal wanneer een ‘en-
dogeen retrovirus’ wordt geactiveerd, dat zich ironisch genoeg bevindt in een ‘niet-coderen-
de regio’ van het menselijk genoom. Dit proces, dat wordt aangeduid met de naam SHEVA 
(Scattered Human Endogenous Retro Virus Activation), gaat gepaard met onthutsende symp-
tomen, waaronder miskramen en een leerachtige gezichtshuid. SHEVA wordt in eerste in-
stantie gezien als een wereldwijde pandemie en veroorzaakt massale paniek. In de Verenigde 
Staten wordt een speciaal team samengesteld om te achterhalen hoe SHEVA op moleculair 
niveau werkt. Een nomadische georiënteerde onderzoeker toont echter aan dat SHEVA te 
complex is om te lokaliseren, te decoderen, of te ‘behandelen’, en begint te vermoeden dat 
het weleens helemaal geen ziekte zou kunnen zijn, maar de aanzet tot een posthumane fase 
in de evolutie. Bears roman kan worden beschouwd als literair experiment met wetenschap-
pelijke ideeën, in de eerste plaats Margulis’ theorie van symbiogenese. Bears roman levert een 
bijdrage aan een nomadische visie op het leven als altijd al anders (onzuiver, geïnfecteerd) en 
in wording: een alternatief voor het beeld van de dubbele helix als fundament van een unieke 
menselijke identiteit en belofte van een door de mens bepaalde toekomst.
Hoofdstuk 5 anayseert Octavia Butler’s trilogie Lilith’s brood (1987; 1988; 1989) aan de hand 
van het recente werk van de bioloog annex cultuurwetenschapper Donna Haraway, waarin re-
laties tussen de mens en andere soorten centraal staan. Op basis van Haraways concept ‘worl-
ding’ analyseert dit hoofdstuk Butlers trilogie als literair experiment waarin biologische soorten 
co-evolueren en samen een nieuwe wereld creëren. In Lilith’s brood heeft een buitenaardse be-
schaving genaamd Oankali de mensheid gered van de aarde die voor mensen onbewoonbaar 
was geworden ten gevolge van milieuverontreiniging en atoomoorlogen. De Oankali starten 
een experiment, een ‘genetische handel’, waarbinnen zowel mensen als zijzelf uiteindelijk zul-
len transformeren. Deze handel wordt echter ondermijnd doordat een aanzienlijk deel van de 
mensheid bang is haar identiteit en autonomie te verliezen. De literatuurcritica Molly Wallace 
heeft betoogd dat de Oankali met hun ‘natuurlijke’ capaciteit tot genetische manipulatie sym-
bool staan voor de techno-wetenschappelijke beheersing van (menselijk) leven in onze maat-
schappij. Volgens Wallace wordt genetic engineering in de trilogie ten onrechte gepresenteerd 
als onvermijdelijk en inherent heilzaam. In dit hoofdstuk wordt deze lezing ten dele beves-
tigd, maar wordt tegelijk benadrukt dat de Oankali de ambiguïteit van technowetenschap 
belichamen. Het experiment van de Oankali daagt de mens (de lezer incluis) uit om het leven 
in nomadische termen opnieuw te doordenken: als een voortdurende strijd om te verbinden, 
te vergeten en te veranderen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt Kim Stanley Robinsons Mars trilogie (1992; 1993; 1996) gelezen vanuit 
het perspectief van het concept ‘constructieve interactie’ van de evolutionair psycholoog Susan 
Oyama. Constructieve interactie is een theorie die het samenspel tussen (levende) systemen cen-
traal stelt en als zodanig een alternatief is voor het genocentrisme. Een van de hoofdpersonen, de 
Amerikaanse natuurkundige en bioloog Sax Russell, lijkt op een typische ‘staatswetenschapper’ 
die alles doet om het leven op Mars te controleren, om Mars in een tweede Aarde te veran-
deren. Door het introduceren van genetisch gemodificeerde, zuurstof-uitscheidende micro-
organismen, is het ‘terraformatie’ team onder leiding van Sax in staat om de atmosfeer van 
Mars adembaar te maken. Binnen enkele decennia verandert het aangezicht van de planeet 
van rood naar groen (door de introductie van bomen en planten) en uiteindelijk van groen 
naar blauw (nadat de ijskap is gesmolten en er oceanen en zeeën zijn ontstaan). Terwijl sta-
ten en bedrijven het proces van terraformatie proberen te bestieren, wordt duidelijk dat het 
experiment niet in de hand kan worden gehouden. Zoals een anonieme verteller verkondigt: 
Mars zelf (lees: netwerk van planetaire processen) is de meest geavanceerde genetic engineer. 
Het leven op Mars ontvouwt zich niet vanuit een door mensen vervaardigd bouwplan, maar 
in de ‘constructieve interactie’ tussen systemen die wordt beschreven in het werk van Oyama. 
In Robinsons trilogie zijn het juist de nomadenwetenschappers die—vanuit de gedachte van 
‘constructieve interactie’— het best in staat zijn om de barre omstandigheden op Mars het 
hoofd te bieden en duurzame manieren van leven te ontwikkelen.
Hoofdstuk 7 is een synthese en uitwerking van de analyses van nomadenwetenschap in de 
casestudy’s. Dit hoofdstuk presenteert een aantal clusters van nomadische eigenschappen die 
samen een basale landkaart vormen, bedoeld om nomadisme in de biowetenschap te trace-
ren, te begrijpen en te bevorderen. Het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk, , identificeert een aan-
tal clusters van nomadische praktijken, attitudes en verlangens: volgen—openen—interacteren; 
risico—heimelijkheid—verzet; fascinatie—verbeelding—intuïtie; problematisering—samen-
werking—introductie; en immersie—zelfexperiment—wording. In het tweede gedeelte wordt 
een aantal clusters van fundamentele nomadische ideeën geanalyseerd op basis van de bespro-
ken biologische theorieën: multipliciteit—immanentie—genestelde schalen; relatie—interac-
tie—co-evolutie; belichaming—fluïditeit—vouwen; en instabiliteit—non-lineariteit—transfor-
matie. Een algemene conclusie is dat nomadische biologie letterlijk alles wil incorporeren en 
zich overal toe wil verhouden; de toekomst van de mens en het leven als zodanig wordt dan 
ook in een kosmisch kader gezet.
Ten slotte behandelt hoofdstuk 8 enkele sleutelbevindingen en consequenties van dit 
proefschrift en wijst het mogelijkheden aan voor verder onderzoek. Er wordt beargumenteerd 
dat ‘mineure’ bio-sf verhalen waarin op innovatieve wijze biologische en sociale, menselijke en 
niet-menselijke processen aan elkaar worden gekoppeld, op drie manieren relevant zijn voor 
de wetenschap en wetenschapsstudies in het bijzonder. Ten eerste biedt mineure bio-sf in-
spirerende voorbeelden van meedenken met de biowetenschap over gezamenlijke uitdagingen, in 
plaats van een afstandelijke of kritische positie in te nemen. Ten tweede wordt de wetenschap 
in zulke verhalen geconfronteerd met de fluïde, chaotische kanten van het leven, alsmede met 
de grotere vragen —zaken waar veel wetenschappers zich in praktijk te weinig mee (kunnen) 
bezighouden. Dergelijke verhalen kunnen dienen als bron van inspiratie voor het genereren 
van interdisciplinaire, lange-termijn visies op de toekomst van de mens en zijn omgeving. Ten 
derde kunnen beoefenaren van wetenschapsstudies aan de hand van mineure bio-sf aantonen 
dat de wetenschap een door-en-door dramatische aangelegenheid is —met acteurs, passies, 
ontmoetingen, enzovoorts— maar ook dat het leven als zodanig een drama is. In deze context 
krijgt Shakespeare’s beroemde zin ‘All the world’s a stage’ een nieuwe betekenis, wijzend in de 
richting van een eco-esthetiek van het Zijn, waarin mensen in een mondiaal of zelfs interpla-
netair spel verwikkeld zijn, samen met anderen —in het bijzonder met andere soorten. Kortom, 
mineure bio-sf verhalen bezitten de gave van transmutatie: ze brengen de wetenschap tot 
leven.
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